CVE-2026-24912: epower.ie · CWE-613
Affects epower.ieSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.3 High.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ePowerepower.ie | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement the following specific measures: 1) Update the WebSocket backend to use cryptographically secure, unpredictable session identifiers that are unique per connection and expire appropriately to prevent reuse or session shadowing. 2) Enforce strict session management policies that disallow multiple simultaneous connections using the same session identifier. 3) Implement backend rate limiting and connection throttling to mitigate denial-of-service attempts by limiting the number of concurrent sessions from a single source or overall. 4) Employ mutual authentication mechanisms between charging stations and backend to ensure only authorized devices can establish sessions. 5) Monitor WebSocket connections for anomalous behavior such as rapid reconnections or multiple connections from the same session ID. 6) If available, apply vendor patches or updates addressing this vulnerability as soon as they are released. 7) Segment the network to restrict access to the WebSocket backend only to trusted devices and networks. 8) Conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on session management and WebSocket implementations.
Description
The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.