CVE-2026-27181: sergejey MajorDoMo · Missing Authorization
Affects sergejey MajorDoMoSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 07:57 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 56% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Feb 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| sergejeyMajorDoMo | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, restrict access to the /objects/?module=market endpoint and monitor for suspicious unauthenticated requests targeting module uninstallation. Consider implementing network-level access controls or web application firewall rules to block unauthorized access to this functionality.
Description
MajorDoMo (aka Major Domestic Module) allows unauthenticated arbitrary module uninstallation through the market module. The market module's admin() method reads gr('mode') from $_REQUEST and assigns it to $this->mode at the start of execution, making all mode-gated code paths reachable without authentication via the /objects/?module=market endpoint. The uninstall mode handler calls uninstallPlugin(), which deletes module records from the database, executes the module's uninstall() method via eval(), recursively deletes the module's directory and template files using removeTree(), and removes associated cycle scripts. An attacker can iterate through module names and wipe the entire MajorDoMo installation with a series of unauthenticated GET requests.