CVE-2026-44522: enchant97 note-mark · Improper Input Validation
Affects enchant97 note-markSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.6 High : upgrade to 0.19.4 soon.
Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 47% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.19.4
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 19 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade note-mark and enchant97/note-mark to 0.19.4.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| enchant97note-mark | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubenchant97/note-markpkg:github/enchant97/note-markOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
This vulnerability is fixed in Note Mark version 0.19.4. Users should upgrade to version 0.19.4 or later to remediate this issue. There is no official vendor advisory provided here, but the fix is confirmed in the version history. Until upgraded, restrict authenticated user privileges and avoid running export commands on untrusted data.
Description
Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. From 0.13.0 to before 0.19.4, the Note Mark application allows authenticated users to upload assets to notes via POST /api/notes/{noteID}/assets, where the asset filename is provided through the X-Name HTTP request header. This value is stored directly in the database without any sanitization or validation - no path separator filtering, no directory traversal sequence rejection, and no use of filepath.Base() to strip directory components. The unsanitized name is persisted as-is in the note_assets table (Name column, varchar(80)). When an administrator subsequently runs the data export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export-v1 or note-mark migrate export), the stored asset name is passed directly into filepath.Join() and path.Join() calls as part of the output file path argument to os.Create(). Since Go's filepath.Join() resolves ../ sequences during path normalization, an attacker-controlled asset name containing directory traversal sequences causes the export process to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, completely outside the intended export directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.4.