CVE-2026-48205: Apache Camel DNS · Improper Input Validation
Affects Apache Camel DNSSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical · fixed in 4.21.0 : patch Apache Camel DNS as a priority.
Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 49% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.21.0, 4.18.3, 4.14.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Apache to 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel DNS | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel DNS | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel DNS | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-dnspkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-dnsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Users should upgrade to Apache Camel DNS version 4.21.0 or later. For users on the 4.14.x LTS stream, upgrade to 4.14.8; for the 4.18.x stream, upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes must use the Camel-prefixed header names (CamelDnsServer, CamelDnsName, CamelDnsDomain, CamelDnsType, CamelDnsClass, CamelDnsTerm) instead of the vulnerable dns.* and term headers. For deployments unable to upgrade immediately, it is recommended to strip the dns.* and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer and set DNS parameters from trusted sources within the route.
Description
Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component. The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNS_SERVER, DNS_NAME, DNS_DOMAIN, DNS_TYPE, DNS_CLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns.* / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns.* and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.