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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-66747: Zbtlink CPE2801 Firmware · Embedded Malicious Code

Affects Zbtlink CPE2801 FirmwareSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical.

Data as of 3 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.3Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 56% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 5 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 3 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
ZbtlinkCPE2801 FirmwareAffected
  • =22.10.09
Fixed in–
ZbtlinkWE1026-5G-WD FirmwareAffected
  • =21.04.07
Fixed in–
ZbtlinkWE1326 FirmwareAffected
  • =22.02.18_1
Fixed in–
ZbtlinkWE2007 FirmwareAffected
  • =23.08.12
Fixed in–
ZbtlinkWE2008-DSIM FirmwareAffected
  • =23.08.11
Fixed in–
ZbtlinkWE2416 FirmwareAffected
  • =21.03.22_1
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

Zbtlink router firmware ships an embedded remote-control implant, ENDLESSDOORS, present in every published build across the product line. It is the open-source ycsunjane/rctl tool built in as an OpenWrt package (librctl.so), started at boot and run as root under the process name kworker to blend in with the kernel's [kworker/*] threads. It opens no listening port; it phones home over cleartext TCP to a hardcoded command-and-control server (command channel 7000, interactive-shell callback 7001) with no authentication and no transport encryption, re-attempting contact roughly every 35 seconds. Its command handler passes any received string to popen() as uid=0, and a reserved rctlbash command returns an interactive root shell. Because the channel is unauthenticated and cleartext, control is not limited to whoever planted it: any party that answers at the C2 address, occupies the network path (DNS or route hijack), or acquires the hardcoded fallback domain obtains unauthenticated remote code execution as root.

References

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