Digital Doppelgangers: Anatomy of Evolving Impersonation Campaigns Distributing Gh0st RAT
The Digital Doppelgangers campaigns are evolving malware operations targeting Chinese-speaking users globally in 2025, distributing variants of the Gh0st RAT remote access trojan. These campaigns employ large-scale brand impersonation across thousands of domains and over 40 application facades, leveraging cloud infrastructure for payload delivery and DLL side-loading for stealth. The adversary has progressed from simple dropper malware to complex, multi-stage infection chains, demonstrating persistence and operational sophistication. While primarily focused on Chinese-speaking targets, the use of cloud infrastructure and generic infection techniques could pose risks to organizations worldwide. The campaigns have remained active for months, indicating a well-resourced threat actor. No known public exploits exist, and the threat is assessed as medium severity due to its complexity and targeted nature. European organizations with business or communication ties to Chinese-speaking regions or using affected brands should be vigilant. Mitigation requires enhanced detection of impersonation domains, monitoring DLL side-loading behaviors, and restricting execution of unauthorized binaries. Countries with significant Chinese diaspora, strong trade links with China, or large Chinese-speaking populations are most likely affected, including the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Digital Doppelgangers campaigns represent a sophisticated evolution in malware distribution tactics, focusing on delivering Gh0st RAT variants to Chinese-speaking users worldwide throughout 2025. The first campaign, active from February to March, impersonated three well-known brands across more than 2,000 domains, while the second campaign, starting in May, expanded to mimic over 40 different applications with more complex infection chains. Both campaigns utilize cloud infrastructure for hosting and delivering payloads, enhancing their resilience and evasion capabilities. A key technique employed is DLL side-loading, where malicious DLLs are loaded by legitimate applications to bypass security controls and evade detection. The adversary’s operational playbook has evolved from simple dropper malware to multi-stage infections involving several tactics such as domain generation algorithms, social engineering via brand impersonation, and use of legitimate cloud services. These campaigns have persisted for months, indicating a well-resourced and patient threat actor. Although the campaigns target Chinese-speaking users primarily, the infection vectors and infrastructure could potentially impact other regions if the malware spreads beyond intended targets. There are no known public exploits associated with this threat, and no specific affected software versions are identified. The medium severity rating reflects the complexity of the infection chain, the use of evasive techniques, and the targeted nature of the attacks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the primary impact lies in potential espionage, data theft, and persistent unauthorized access if targeted by these campaigns. Organizations with Chinese-speaking employees, business partners, or customers are at increased risk due to the targeted nature of the malware. The use of brand impersonation and cloud infrastructure could lead to successful phishing or supply chain attacks, potentially compromising sensitive corporate data or intellectual property. DLL side-loading techniques may allow attackers to bypass endpoint security solutions, increasing the likelihood of stealthy infections. Persistent access via Gh0st RAT could enable attackers to conduct long-term surveillance, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware payloads. While the campaigns currently focus on Chinese-speaking targets, collateral infections or misdirected attacks could affect European entities, especially those with multinational operations or cloud dependencies. The operational persistence and sophistication suggest that detection and remediation may be challenging, increasing potential downtime and incident response costs.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted detection capabilities for brand impersonation domains and monitor DNS traffic for suspicious domain generation algorithm (DGA) activity. Deploy advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of identifying DLL side-loading and anomalous process behaviors. Restrict execution privileges to prevent unauthorized DLL loading by legitimate applications and enforce application whitelisting where feasible. Conduct user awareness training focused on recognizing phishing attempts that leverage brand impersonation, especially in Chinese language contexts. Monitor cloud infrastructure usage and network traffic for unusual patterns indicative of payload delivery or command and control communications. Employ threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators of compromise related to Gh0st RAT and associated campaigns. Regularly audit and update security controls to detect multi-stage infection chains and lateral movement. Collaborate with cybersecurity communities to share intelligence on these campaigns and coordinate defensive measures. Finally, ensure incident response plans include scenarios involving advanced persistent threats using sophisticated evasion techniques.
Affected Countries
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Italy
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 6e1c52be3b1b38d57430bbcaee7d367a
- hash: 7cb5cea873665a41b21e216d01c23087
- hash: db591d11abfa31047843e84a004fdb8b
- hash: ddc764d0b18c5af9f7e94e9d5eebb48f
- hash: 6726588885e853e40a768aad2f366e3c95e3fcad
- hash: 7329711c865faf018bd1d0446613cfc1020a05b9
- hash: a06d80258da2a37c316b56cd73423a1127ff0079
- hash: d562a64b760462dbd5201d1954dd2b4e1c1268db
- hash: 0076f6ea4346af5ae43db08205664092029e06bb353e3406ee649e98723182eb
- hash: 1395627eca4ca8229c3e7da0a48a36d130ce6b016bb6da750b3d992888b20ab8
- hash: 1a13dc5488612aff33c3ad378d6b06b76551a2c6defb30b132547a633df03076
- hash: 2232612b09b636698afcdb995b822adf21c34fb8979dd63f8d01f0d038acb454
- hash: 23a96252ba2a3cff76158fa598f4de904780f24fbbd426f36258077628e8cfc2
- hash: 299e6791e4eb85617c4fab7f27ac53fb70cd038671f011007831b558c318b369
- hash: 33414abc9d5d4767a2612f85fe3b0555f3cbef646163ef3d1d9ddb753df5efbf
- hash: 45c62ebe5cd2441ca25a86ddc7023bc938c8d47f12ea626d5245875bf0a13c02
- hash: 61bb32673e33c7aa1a0825e18629880b4d870fdeb4666d8b0ca954866d110a07
- hash: 77c12dcdacd58f1f0cbf032fcf52b18aa06cd30c8a763a4dd3b2216f9c78e9a4
- hash: 7a4d5219956854db9581c98d9cee7d6ebe61c5498988ec2655cd80f3548f7bed
- hash: af1a08578a5ebb02835cf10a9a45393349bcaa2caa6eb9e823e7fc08db37da66
- hash: c333e4ed8e0d5c3b1f26fa12f51a1dc66db4cca344a646061e2c95f305560aa9
- hash: c37d0c9c9da830e6173b71a3bcc5203fbb66241ccd7d704b3a1d809cadd551b2
- hash: d44603abdcd6a4eb3283d5d4be88b93cc359d6f0efaccfd546c10e3349ccb4ed
- hash: d9efd833d31365c25bc10bb2a34845add5ff89bd660da1d9405dea82d035a308
- hash: e5d6f7138fcccd1a579d681ef354c4660deab3c216f3db1a330a8212d99fbea1
- ip: 103.181.134.138
- ip: 154.82.84.227
- ip: 156.251.25.112
- ip: 156.251.25.43
- domain: deep-seek.bar
- domain: deep-seek.bond
- domain: deep-seek.cfd
- domain: deep-seek.qpon
- domain: deep-seek.rest
- domain: i4toolsearch.vip
- domain: i4toolssddsl.top
- domain: i4toolssddzp.top
- domain: i4toolssddzq.top
- domain: i4toolssddzr.top
- domain: i4toolssddzt.top
- domain: i4toolssddzu.top
- domain: i4toolssddzw.top
- domain: i4toolssddzy.top
- domain: i4toolssffna.top
- domain: i4toolssffnd.top
- domain: i4toolssffnf.top
- domain: i4toolssffng.top
- domain: i4toolssffnh.top
- domain: i4toolssffnj.top
- domain: i4toolssffnl.top
- domain: xiaobaituziha.com
- domain: xiazailianjieoss.com
- domain: youdaohhnf.top
- domain: youdaohhsh.top
- domain: youdaohhvw.top
- domain: youdaohhvy.top
- domain: youdaohhxf.top
- domain: youdaohhzi.top
- domain: youdaohhzy.top
- domain: fs-im-kefu.7moor-fs1.com
- hash: 00f206b3dfc921f0c696b0c346e39fc9
- hash: 06807d8d7282959ce062f92a708d382f
- hash: fbfdc8bbff6225cebcc4f005c985159096b0d709
- hash: ff2d55a844c1fd37b3841cefa7e2d21de5fa8bac
- hash: 18a21dbc327484b8accbd4a6d7b18608390a69033647099f807fdbfdcfff7e6d
- hash: 1c3f2530b2764754045039066d2c277dff4efabd4f15f2944e30b10e82f443c0
- hash: 491872a50b8db56d6a5ef1ccabe8702fb7763da4fd3b474d20ae0c98969acfe5
- hash: 495ea08268fd9cf52643a986b7b035415660eb411d8484e2c3b54e2c4e466a58
- hash: 7267a303abb5fcae2e6f5c3ecf3b50d204f760dabdfc5600bd248fcfad3fc133
- hash: bc6fb2eab9ed8d9eb405f6186d08e85be8b1308d207970cc41cf90477aa79064
- hash: bd4635d582413f84ac83adbb4b449b18bac4fc87ca000d0c7be84ad0f9caf68e
- hash: dbe70991750c6dd665b281c27f7be40afea8b5718b097e43cd041d698706ade4
- hash: e8c058acfa2518ddc7828304cf314b6dd49717e9a291ca32ba185c44937c422b
- domain: 1235saddfs.icu
- domain: anydesk-www.cyou
- domain: djbzdhygj.com
- domain: guwaanzh1.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh2.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh20.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh21.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh24.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh25.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh34.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh35.cyou
- domain: guwaanzh8.cyou
- domain: i4toolsllsk.top
- domain: i4toolsuuoxk.top
- domain: i4toolsuuozp.top
- domain: qishuiyinyque-vip.top
- domain: xiaofeige.icu
- domain: xiazaizhadia1.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia10.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia11.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia12.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia16.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia18.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia19.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia2.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia20.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia21.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia22.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia24.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia27.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia29.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia30.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia31.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia33.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia34.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia35.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia36.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia37.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia39.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia40.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia41.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia42.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia44.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia46.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia50.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia51.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia8.cyou
- domain: xiazaizhadia9.cyou
- domain: ydbao11.cyou
- domain: ydbaoo52.cyou
- domain: youdaooosssj.top
- domain: youdaqqaavw.top
- domain: youdaxxddxk.top
- domain: youdaxxyzr.top
- domain: youdaxxyzy.top
- domain: yqmqhjgn.com
- domain: 7m-sdk.7moor-fs1.com
- domain: i4.llllxiazai-web.vip
Digital Doppelgangers: Anatomy of Evolving Impersonation Campaigns Distributing Gh0st RAT
Description
The Digital Doppelgangers campaigns are evolving malware operations targeting Chinese-speaking users globally in 2025, distributing variants of the Gh0st RAT remote access trojan. These campaigns employ large-scale brand impersonation across thousands of domains and over 40 application facades, leveraging cloud infrastructure for payload delivery and DLL side-loading for stealth. The adversary has progressed from simple dropper malware to complex, multi-stage infection chains, demonstrating persistence and operational sophistication. While primarily focused on Chinese-speaking targets, the use of cloud infrastructure and generic infection techniques could pose risks to organizations worldwide. The campaigns have remained active for months, indicating a well-resourced threat actor. No known public exploits exist, and the threat is assessed as medium severity due to its complexity and targeted nature. European organizations with business or communication ties to Chinese-speaking regions or using affected brands should be vigilant. Mitigation requires enhanced detection of impersonation domains, monitoring DLL side-loading behaviors, and restricting execution of unauthorized binaries. Countries with significant Chinese diaspora, strong trade links with China, or large Chinese-speaking populations are most likely affected, including the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The Digital Doppelgangers campaigns represent a sophisticated evolution in malware distribution tactics, focusing on delivering Gh0st RAT variants to Chinese-speaking users worldwide throughout 2025. The first campaign, active from February to March, impersonated three well-known brands across more than 2,000 domains, while the second campaign, starting in May, expanded to mimic over 40 different applications with more complex infection chains. Both campaigns utilize cloud infrastructure for hosting and delivering payloads, enhancing their resilience and evasion capabilities. A key technique employed is DLL side-loading, where malicious DLLs are loaded by legitimate applications to bypass security controls and evade detection. The adversary’s operational playbook has evolved from simple dropper malware to multi-stage infections involving several tactics such as domain generation algorithms, social engineering via brand impersonation, and use of legitimate cloud services. These campaigns have persisted for months, indicating a well-resourced and patient threat actor. Although the campaigns target Chinese-speaking users primarily, the infection vectors and infrastructure could potentially impact other regions if the malware spreads beyond intended targets. There are no known public exploits associated with this threat, and no specific affected software versions are identified. The medium severity rating reflects the complexity of the infection chain, the use of evasive techniques, and the targeted nature of the attacks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the primary impact lies in potential espionage, data theft, and persistent unauthorized access if targeted by these campaigns. Organizations with Chinese-speaking employees, business partners, or customers are at increased risk due to the targeted nature of the malware. The use of brand impersonation and cloud infrastructure could lead to successful phishing or supply chain attacks, potentially compromising sensitive corporate data or intellectual property. DLL side-loading techniques may allow attackers to bypass endpoint security solutions, increasing the likelihood of stealthy infections. Persistent access via Gh0st RAT could enable attackers to conduct long-term surveillance, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware payloads. While the campaigns currently focus on Chinese-speaking targets, collateral infections or misdirected attacks could affect European entities, especially those with multinational operations or cloud dependencies. The operational persistence and sophistication suggest that detection and remediation may be challenging, increasing potential downtime and incident response costs.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted detection capabilities for brand impersonation domains and monitor DNS traffic for suspicious domain generation algorithm (DGA) activity. Deploy advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of identifying DLL side-loading and anomalous process behaviors. Restrict execution privileges to prevent unauthorized DLL loading by legitimate applications and enforce application whitelisting where feasible. Conduct user awareness training focused on recognizing phishing attempts that leverage brand impersonation, especially in Chinese language contexts. Monitor cloud infrastructure usage and network traffic for unusual patterns indicative of payload delivery or command and control communications. Employ threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators of compromise related to Gh0st RAT and associated campaigns. Regularly audit and update security controls to detect multi-stage infection chains and lateral movement. Collaborate with cybersecurity communities to share intelligence on these campaigns and coordinate defensive measures. Finally, ensure incident response plans include scenarios involving advanced persistent threats using sophisticated evasion techniques.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/impersonation-campaigns-deliver-gh0st-rat/"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 6918168f887ca57be0147adb
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
hash6e1c52be3b1b38d57430bbcaee7d367a | — | |
hash7cb5cea873665a41b21e216d01c23087 | — | |
hashdb591d11abfa31047843e84a004fdb8b | — | |
hashddc764d0b18c5af9f7e94e9d5eebb48f | — | |
hash6726588885e853e40a768aad2f366e3c95e3fcad | — | |
hash7329711c865faf018bd1d0446613cfc1020a05b9 | — | |
hasha06d80258da2a37c316b56cd73423a1127ff0079 | — | |
hashd562a64b760462dbd5201d1954dd2b4e1c1268db | — | |
hash0076f6ea4346af5ae43db08205664092029e06bb353e3406ee649e98723182eb | — | |
hash1395627eca4ca8229c3e7da0a48a36d130ce6b016bb6da750b3d992888b20ab8 | — | |
hash1a13dc5488612aff33c3ad378d6b06b76551a2c6defb30b132547a633df03076 | — | |
hash2232612b09b636698afcdb995b822adf21c34fb8979dd63f8d01f0d038acb454 | — | |
hash23a96252ba2a3cff76158fa598f4de904780f24fbbd426f36258077628e8cfc2 | — | |
hash299e6791e4eb85617c4fab7f27ac53fb70cd038671f011007831b558c318b369 | — | |
hash33414abc9d5d4767a2612f85fe3b0555f3cbef646163ef3d1d9ddb753df5efbf | — | |
hash45c62ebe5cd2441ca25a86ddc7023bc938c8d47f12ea626d5245875bf0a13c02 | — | |
hash61bb32673e33c7aa1a0825e18629880b4d870fdeb4666d8b0ca954866d110a07 | — | |
hash77c12dcdacd58f1f0cbf032fcf52b18aa06cd30c8a763a4dd3b2216f9c78e9a4 | — | |
hash7a4d5219956854db9581c98d9cee7d6ebe61c5498988ec2655cd80f3548f7bed | — | |
hashaf1a08578a5ebb02835cf10a9a45393349bcaa2caa6eb9e823e7fc08db37da66 | — | |
hashc333e4ed8e0d5c3b1f26fa12f51a1dc66db4cca344a646061e2c95f305560aa9 | — | |
hashc37d0c9c9da830e6173b71a3bcc5203fbb66241ccd7d704b3a1d809cadd551b2 | — | |
hashd44603abdcd6a4eb3283d5d4be88b93cc359d6f0efaccfd546c10e3349ccb4ed | — | |
hashd9efd833d31365c25bc10bb2a34845add5ff89bd660da1d9405dea82d035a308 | — | |
hashe5d6f7138fcccd1a579d681ef354c4660deab3c216f3db1a330a8212d99fbea1 | — | |
hash00f206b3dfc921f0c696b0c346e39fc9 | — | |
hash06807d8d7282959ce062f92a708d382f | — | |
hashfbfdc8bbff6225cebcc4f005c985159096b0d709 | — | |
hashff2d55a844c1fd37b3841cefa7e2d21de5fa8bac | — | |
hash18a21dbc327484b8accbd4a6d7b18608390a69033647099f807fdbfdcfff7e6d | — | |
hash1c3f2530b2764754045039066d2c277dff4efabd4f15f2944e30b10e82f443c0 | — | |
hash491872a50b8db56d6a5ef1ccabe8702fb7763da4fd3b474d20ae0c98969acfe5 | — | |
hash495ea08268fd9cf52643a986b7b035415660eb411d8484e2c3b54e2c4e466a58 | — | |
hash7267a303abb5fcae2e6f5c3ecf3b50d204f760dabdfc5600bd248fcfad3fc133 | — | |
hashbc6fb2eab9ed8d9eb405f6186d08e85be8b1308d207970cc41cf90477aa79064 | — | |
hashbd4635d582413f84ac83adbb4b449b18bac4fc87ca000d0c7be84ad0f9caf68e | — | |
hashdbe70991750c6dd665b281c27f7be40afea8b5718b097e43cd041d698706ade4 | — | |
hashe8c058acfa2518ddc7828304cf314b6dd49717e9a291ca32ba185c44937c422b | — |
Ip
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
ip103.181.134.138 | — | |
ip154.82.84.227 | — | |
ip156.251.25.112 | — | |
ip156.251.25.43 | — |
Domain
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
domaindeep-seek.bar | — | |
domaindeep-seek.bond | — | |
domaindeep-seek.cfd | — | |
domaindeep-seek.qpon | — | |
domaindeep-seek.rest | — | |
domaini4toolsearch.vip | — | |
domaini4toolssddsl.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzp.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzq.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzr.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzt.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzu.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzw.top | — | |
domaini4toolssddzy.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffna.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffnd.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffnf.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffng.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffnh.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffnj.top | — | |
domaini4toolssffnl.top | — | |
domainxiaobaituziha.com | — | |
domainxiazailianjieoss.com | — | |
domainyoudaohhnf.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhsh.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhvw.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhvy.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhxf.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhzi.top | — | |
domainyoudaohhzy.top | — | |
domainfs-im-kefu.7moor-fs1.com | — | |
domain1235saddfs.icu | — | |
domainanydesk-www.cyou | — | |
domaindjbzdhygj.com | — | |
domainguwaanzh1.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh2.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh20.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh21.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh24.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh25.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh34.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh35.cyou | — | |
domainguwaanzh8.cyou | — | |
domaini4toolsllsk.top | — | |
domaini4toolsuuoxk.top | — | |
domaini4toolsuuozp.top | — | |
domainqishuiyinyque-vip.top | — | |
domainxiaofeige.icu | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia1.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia10.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia11.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia12.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia16.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia18.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia19.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia2.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia20.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia21.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia22.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia24.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia27.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia29.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia30.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia31.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia33.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia34.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia35.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia36.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia37.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia39.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia40.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia41.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia42.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia44.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia46.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia50.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia51.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia8.cyou | — | |
domainxiazaizhadia9.cyou | — | |
domainydbao11.cyou | — | |
domainydbaoo52.cyou | — | |
domainyoudaooosssj.top | — | |
domainyoudaqqaavw.top | — | |
domainyoudaxxddxk.top | — | |
domainyoudaxxyzr.top | — | |
domainyoudaxxyzy.top | — | |
domainyqmqhjgn.com | — | |
domain7m-sdk.7moor-fs1.com | — | |
domaini4.llllxiazai-web.vip | — |
Threat ID: 691aebada2e17873632ea95b
Added to database: 11/17/2025, 9:32:29 AM
Last enriched: 11/17/2025, 9:47:39 AM
Last updated: 11/19/2025, 2:26:50 AM
Views: 44
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