CVE-2026-114510VulnerabilityPublished 27 Oct 2026

Flexible GraphRAG: Cypher/Graph Injection via broken string-escaping in FalkorDB adapter (_escape()) - full graph wipe

Affects flexible-graphragSource GCVE Database

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-114510· High 7.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 0.8.2 soon.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 16:27 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.1High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 0.8.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: High
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: High: A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected. For example, a successful attack may require an attacker to: gather knowledge about the environment in which the vulnerable target/component exists; prepare the target environment to improve exploit reliability; or inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim in order to read and/or modify network communications (e.g., a man in the middle attack).
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 22 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade flexible-graphrag to 0.8.2.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
PyPIflexible-graphrag	Affected >=0.6.0 <0.8.2	Fixed in 0.8.2

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Description

**Description** def _escape(v: str) -> str: return str(v).replace("'", "\\'").replace("\\", "\\\\") The escaping order is backwards, exactly like the classic HTML double-escape bug: step 1 inserts a literal backslash in front of every ', then step 2 re-matches that just-inserted backslash and doubles it. For an input ending in a single quote, the two steps combined produce \\' (two backslashes followed by the quote) in the output — which, under the standard backslash-escape convention used by Cypher/openCypher single-quoted string literals, is parsed as one escaped backslash followed by an unescaped, string-terminating quote. The quote is not neutralized; the string breaks open. This escaped value is interpolated directly into Cypher query strings built by string formatting (not parameters) at 5 call sites in the same method: self.lc_graph.query( f"MERGE (n:`{node.type}` {{id: '{_escape(node.id)}'}}) " f"{props}" f"RETURN distinct 'done' AS result" ) ... self.lc_graph.query( f"MATCH (a:`{rel.source.type}` {{id: '{_escape(rel.source.id)}'}}), " f"(b:`{rel.target.type}` {{id: '{_escape(rel.target.id)}'}}) " f"MERGE (a)-[r:`{rel_type}`]->(b) " f"{props}" f"RETURN distinct 'done' AS result" ) node.type, rel.source.type, rel.target.type and rel_type are also interpolated into backtick-quoted identifiers with no escaping at all. Where the attacker-controlled data comes from: node/rel objects are LLM-extracted entities and relationships derived from ingested document content (the whole point of this GraphRAG pipeline). Document content is therefore untrusted input relative to this database layer — a classic indirect-prompt-injection-to-query-injection chain: craft a document whose text causes the extraction LLM to produce an entity id containing the payload below, ingest it, and the broken escape function turns it into live Cypher. **Impact** Full Cypher clause injection into lc_graph.query() calls that run with no query parameterization and no read-only restriction visible in this adapter. Demonstrated impact: appending a second clause (MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m) to the query wipes every node and relationship in the graph in a single call. The same primitive can be adapted to exfiltrate data (e.g. RETURN other nodes' properties back through a field the caller reads) or tamper with existing records, depending on what the calling code surfaces to the end user/LLM. Proof of Concept (executed, full query reconstruction) Only the two-line _escape() function and the f-string template were executed — no import of the flexible-graphrag package itself. raw attacker-controlled node.id: "pwn' }) MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn //" output of buggy _escape(): "pwn\\' }) MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn //" full query string actually sent to lc_graph.query(): MERGE (n:`Entity` {id: 'pwn\\' }) MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn //'}) RETURN distinct 'done' AS result Parse trace (standard backslash-escape convention for single-quoted Cypher strings): Opening ' starts the id string literal. pwn is consumed literally. \\ (two backslash chars) is consumed as one escaped-backslash sequence — the string now holds one literal backslash. The very next character is an unescaped ' — this closes the string literal early. id value ends up as "pwn\" (with a trailing backslash). The remaining text }) MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn //... is now parsed as live Cypher syntax, not string content. }) closes the property map and the node pattern — completing a valid MERGE clause. MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn is a second, fully valid Cypher clause chained immediately after the MERGE (Cypher allows sequential clauses with no separator). // starts a line comment, consuming the rest of the original template ('}) RETURN distinct 'done' AS result) so it never executes. Effective query the database actually receives: MERGE (n:`Entity` {id: 'pwn\'}) MATCH (m) DETACH DELETE m RETURN count(m) AS pwn - a syntactically complete, two-clause Cypher statement that creates one throwaway node and then deletes the entire graph. Suggested Fix Escape \ before ' (fixes the ordering bug, same class of fix as the litellm report): def _escape(v: str) -> str: return str(v).replace("\\", "\\\\").replace("'", "\\'") Stronger fix, recommended in addition: use FalkorDB's parameterized query support (lc_graph.query(query, params={...})) instead of string interpolation entirely, and reject/escape backtick characters in node.type/rel_type/rel.source.type/rel.target.type before using them as label/relationship-type identifiers (these have no escaping at all today). One caveat (same as original internal triage) This was verified as a pure string-construction bug (steps 1-8 above are executed, not hypothesized) and confirmed against FalkorDB's Cypher-compatible documentation's stated backslash-escape convention for string literals, but was not run ag

CWE-116Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output (opens in a new tab)
Class weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighOWASP Top 10 A05:2025: Injection (opens in a new tab)
The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.
Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Architecture and Design · Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Architecture and Design · Implementation
Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Content Security Policy (opens in a new tab)
Injection Prevention (opens in a new tab)
SQL Injection Prevention (opens in a new tab)
Injection Prevention in Java (opens in a new tab)
Query Parameterization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V14.4.6 (opens in a new tab)
V14.4.4 (opens in a new tab)
V14.4.2 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
Cross Zone Scripting (opens in a new tab)
User-Controlled Filename (opens in a new tab)
Web Server Logs Tampering (opens in a new tab)
AJAX Footprinting (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).
CWE-943Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic (opens in a new tab)
Class weakness
The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Abuse Case (opens in a new tab)
Deserialization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V1.5.1 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
NoSQL Injection (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

References

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-116, CWE-943

Technical details

References

Community reviews

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