In November 2025, the npm ecosystem was targeted by the IndonesianFoods spam campaign, which flooded the npm registry with roughly 86,000 junk packages named after Indonesian culinary terms such as bakso, sate, and rendang. These packages were crafted to look legitimate, featuring standard structures, valid configuration files, and well-formatted documentation, allowing them to evade detection and persist for nearly two years. The primary purpose of these packages was to inject unnecessary dependencies into projects, cluttering the development environment and potentially causing performance degradation. A subset of these packages included self-replication mechanisms that, once installed, would autonomously create and publish new packages every seven seconds using the victim’s credentials, thereby expanding the spam network. Additionally, some packages integrated with the TEA blockchain platform, which rewards open-source contributions with tokens. By artificially inflating usage metrics through a web of dependencies and self-replication, attackers earned TEA tokens without providing genuine contributions. While no direct malware or exploits have been reported, the campaign poses risks including resource waste, reputational damage from packages published under compromised accounts, and the potential for future supply chain attacks if malicious functionality is introduced later. The campaign’s scale and stealth highlight vulnerabilities in the npm ecosystem’s package vetting and dependency management processes. The attackers’ motivations appear twofold: financial gain via the TEA protocol and possibly testing a new malware delivery method for future use. The incident underscores the importance of rigorous dependency auditing and developer education to prevent accidental inclusion of malicious or junk packages.

The IndonesianFoods campaign primarily impacts software development organizations relying on npm packages by cluttering their projects with redundant and unnecessary dependencies. This bloat can degrade build performance, increase maintenance overhead, and complicate dependency management. Organizations risk reputational harm if junk packages are published under their credentials due to compromised accounts. Although no immediate malware or data breaches have been linked to this campaign, the presence of self-replicating packages and integration with blockchain reward systems indicates potential for financial fraud and future escalation into supply chain attacks. If malicious functionality is introduced in updates, affected projects and their users could face severe security breaches, including data compromise or system disruption. The campaign also stresses the npm ecosystem’s trust model, potentially undermining confidence in open-source package integrity. Enterprises with large-scale or automated dependency inclusion processes are particularly vulnerable to accidental infection. Overall, the campaign highlights systemic risks in software supply chains and the need for enhanced security controls in package management.

To mitigate risks from the IndonesianFoods campaign, organizations should implement strict dependency management policies, including: 1) Enforce use of curated internal package registries or proxies that vet packages before inclusion. 2) Employ automated tools to scan and analyze package metadata, dependencies, and behavior for anomalies or suspicious patterns, focusing on unusual dependency chains and self-replication indicators. 3) Integrate container and build environment security solutions that monitor third-party dependencies and runtime behavior to detect and block unauthorized package publishing or execution. 4) Conduct regular security awareness training for developers emphasizing the risks of typosquatting, dependency confusion, and the importance of verifying package provenance. 5) Use package integrity verification methods such as checksums and signed packages to ensure authenticity. 6) Monitor npm accounts and credentials for unauthorized activity to prevent abuse in publishing. 7) Limit automated dependency updates and require manual review for new or unknown packages. 8) Collaborate with npm and security communities to report suspicious packages and improve ecosystem-wide detection. These targeted measures go beyond generic advice by focusing on proactive detection, credential protection, and developer education tailored to the unique tactics observed in this campaign.