Between April and July 2026, AOMEI Backupper, a Windows backup and disk cloning software, was compromised multiple times in short-lived supply chain attack windows. During these brief periods, users received a downloader for the ShinyRoad modular backdoor framework. The attacker, tracked as UNC7017, tampered with update server configurations to redirect users to malicious payloads, including the CrossRoad dropper, a modified Radmin Server with a malicious DLL, and the Adaptix C2 framework. The campaign used ephemeral tampering windows lasting only five to ten minutes, reverting quickly to authentic versions, which complicated detection. The attack affected a broad range of users opportunistically, with some higher education, IT services, and telecommunications organizations in multiple countries identified as compromised. AOMEI initially dismissed reports of tampering but later took corrective actions after repeated notifications.
Between late September 2025 and early April 2026, the threat group BlueDelta conducted espionage campaigns targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye. They deployed HOOKEDGE, a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor, via macro-enabled Word documents with diplomatic-themed lures. HOOKEDGE shares code and tradecraft overlap with the HEADLACE backdoor and abuses legitimate webhook services for command-and-control, payload staging, and data exfiltration. The implant was continuously refined to evade sandbox detection and adapt to webhook service constraints. BlueDelta used a tiered operational model, deploying second-stage payloads with shorter beaconing intervals for high-value targets while preserving initial access infrastructure.
This report highlights a cyber espionage campaign attributed to the Iranian APT group Charming Kitten, targeting eight countries and eight critical sectors simultaneously. The campaign, dubbed Operation Olalampo, affects Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, Hungary, Turkmenistan, Israel, and South America, focusing on government, healthcare, financial services, energy, education, telecommunications, defense, and industrial sectors. The information is sourced from a Reddit post linking to a GitHub repository simulating adversary tactics. No specific vulnerabilities or exploits are detailed, and no affected software versions are identified.
OkoBot is a malicious framework delivering over 20 payloads aimed at stealing cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases, credentials, and sensitive data. It spreads via ClickFix attacks and trojanized GitHub repositories. The infection chain involves multiple stages, starting with a PowerShell script that installs an SSH bot to collect system info and disable Windows Defender notifications. Key modules include browser injectors, fake seed phrase prompts targeting hardware wallets, keyloggers, and spyware that records video and keystrokes. The campaign has been active since early 2025 with a global reach, primarily impacting Brazil, Vietnam, Canada, Mexico, and Turkey. Indicators of compromise and detailed telemetry are available from Kaspersky. No official patch or remediation is noted.
In January 2026, researchers identified a sophisticated malware framework dubbed OkoBot that targets cryptocurrency users through a multi-stage infection chain. The campaign begins with TookPS PowerShell scripts delivered via ClickFix attacks or fake software on GitHub. An automated SSH bot deploys over 20 malicious modules including HDUtil launcher, browser extension injectors installing Rilide stealer, and specialized tools like SeedHunter for wallet seed phrase theft and OkoSpyware for window capture. The framework uses VMProtect obfuscation, UAC bypass techniques, and maintains persistence through RDP access and scheduled tasks. Victims span more than 25 countries with concentrations in Brazil, Vietnam, Canada, Mexico, and Turkey. Attribution suggests Russian-speaking threat actors based on geoblocking patterns and Russian language artifacts.
DarkSword and Coruna are new iOS malware strains that infect devices through zero-click attacks. Learn how these threats operate, which iOS versions are at risk, and how to protect your devices.
A threat cluster has been identified leveraging a customized Adwind (Java RAT) variant with polymorphic characteristics to deliver JanaWare ransomware. The campaign specifically targets Turkish users through geofencing mechanisms that check system locale and external IP geolocation. Active since at least 2020, the operation primarily affects home users and small to medium-sized businesses. Initial access occurs via phishing emails with malicious Java archives distributed through Google Drive links. The ransomware employs AES encryption and communicates over Tor networks, demanding modest ransoms between $200-$400. The malware uses multiple obfuscation techniques including Stringer and Allatori obfuscators, implements file pumping for polymorphism, and disables Windows security features before encryption. Victims are instructed to contact attackers through qTox or dedicated Tor onion sites.
The new CrystalX remote access Trojan combines pranks with full control over the victim’s computer. It also spies on its victims, steals their cryptocurrency and accounts, and uses advanced methods to bypass protection. We explain how it works, and how to avoid infection.
Spammers are disguising fraudulent links within legitimate survey platforms — emails containing these links easily bypass standard spam filters. We analyze the scheme, highlight the red flags, and provide defensive strategies.
The role of Israel’s hijacking of Iran’s street cameras in the killing of the country’s supreme leader underscores how surveillance systems are increasingly being targeted by adversaries in wartime. The post Iran Built a Vast Camera Network to Control Dissent. Israel Turned It Into a Targeting Tool appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A series of attacks targeting Libyan organizations, including an oil refinery, a telecoms organization, and a state institution, occurred between November 2025 and February 2026. The campaign utilized the AsyncRAT backdoor, delivered through spear-phishing emails with Libya-themed lure documents. The attackers exploited current events, such as the assassination of Saif al-Gaddafi, to gain access to networks. The modular nature of AsyncRAT and the targeted organizations suggest possible state sponsorship. The campaign's focus on Libya and its oil industry is notable, given the country's increased oil production and global energy supply concerns amidst Middle East conflicts.
Perseus is a new Android threat that builds upon earlier malware families like Cerberus and Phoenix. It enables real-time monitoring and interaction with infected devices through Accessibility-based remote sessions, allowing full Device Takeover. The malware focuses on extracting high-value personal information, including monitoring user notes. It employs strong anti-analysis measures to evade detection. Perseus is primarily distributed through IPTV applications, targeting users in Turkey and Italy. Its capabilities include overlay attacks, keylogging, and systematic exploration of note-taking apps. The malware performs extensive environment checks to detect analysis conditions and assess device risk. Perseus represents the ongoing evolution of mobile malware, adapting to remain effective in an increasingly secure mobile environment.
The IndonesianFoods campaign saw attackers flood the npm registry with junk packages. We explore how it works, and how to safeguard enterprise development.
Hydra Saiga, a suspected Kazakhstani state-sponsored threat actor, has been actively targeting government, energy, and critical infrastructure in Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East since 2021. The group is known for using Telegram Bot API for C2 communication and employing a mix of custom implants and 'Living off the Land' techniques. Their activities align closely with Kazakhstan's geopolitical interests, particularly in water and energy sectors. The group has compromised at least 34 organizations across 8 countries, with reconnaissance extending to over 200 additional targets globally. Hydra Saiga's operations demonstrate a clear focus on water infrastructure linked to major regional rivers and gas distribution systems, reflecting strategic intelligence collection efforts.
Iranian intelligence services are increasingly engaging with the cyber crime ecosystem, leveraging criminal tools, services, and operational models to support state objectives. This trend is particularly evident among actors linked to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), such as Void Manticore and MuddyWater. These actors are not merely imitating criminal behavior but actively associating with the cyber criminal ecosystem, using its infrastructure, malware, and affiliate-style relationships. This approach enhances their operational capabilities, complicates attribution, and contributes to confusion around Iranian threat activity. Examples include the use of ransomware branding, commercial infostealers, and overlaps with criminal malware clusters. This shift from imitation to active engagement with cyber crime offers both improved deniability and expanded technical capabilities for Iranian actors.
An intrusion attributed to MuddyWater, an Iranian-linked APT, was identified in a customer environment. The attack involved initial access through RDP, establishing an SSH tunnel, and deploying malware via DLL side-loading. The threat actor used FMAPP.exe, a legitimate Fortemedia Inc.application, to load a malicious FMAPP.dll for C2 communications. The timeline of activities revealed typos in commands, suggesting manual typing by the attacker. The intrusion included reconnaissance efforts, attempts to verify tunnel functionality, and issues with initial C2 communication. The attack targeted an Israeli company, aligning with known MuddyWater tactics.
