This security threat involves a local privilege escalation vulnerability in macOS Sonoma (version 14.x) and iOS 17.2, specifically targeting the macOS LaunchDaemon system. The exploit abuses a vulnerable or misconfigured LaunchDaemon plist file named com.apple.securemonitor.plist located in /Library/LaunchDaemons/. By hijacking this plist, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. The provided exploit code, written in Python 3, creates a root payload script that performs several malicious actions: it copies the bash shell to /tmp/.rootbash and sets its permissions to be a setuid root binary, effectively creating a root shell accessible to the attacker; it adds a new administrative user named 'pentest' with a preset password, granting persistent administrative access; it logs the backdoor activation to a file for tracking; and it installs a persistent LaunchDaemon backdoor plist (com.apple.backdoor.plist) that runs the root shell on system startup, ensuring continued root access. The exploit works by either creating a fake vulnerable plist if none exists or hijacking the existing one by modifying its ProgramArguments to point to the payload script and setting RunAtLoad to true. The attacker then manually triggers the LaunchDaemon using launchctl to load and execute the payload immediately. This exploit requires local access and does not require prior root privileges, making it a powerful escalation vector once an attacker gains user-level access. No official patch or mitigation is referenced yet, and no known exploits in the wild have been reported as of the publication date. The vulnerability is identified as CVE-2025-24085. The exploit demonstrates a high level of sophistication by combining privilege escalation, persistence, and stealth techniques on macOS systems.

For European organizations using macOS systems, especially those running macOS Sonoma or iOS 17.2 on Apple hardware, this vulnerability poses a significant risk. An attacker with local access—such as an insider threat, a compromised user account, or through social engineering—can escalate privileges to root, bypassing standard security controls. This can lead to full system compromise, unauthorized creation of administrative accounts, installation of persistent backdoors, and potential lateral movement within corporate networks. Confidentiality is at high risk as attackers can access sensitive data and credentials stored on the device. Integrity is compromised due to unauthorized modifications to system files and configurations. Availability could also be affected if attackers disrupt system services or deploy destructive payloads. The stealthy nature of the persistent backdoor makes detection and remediation challenging. This threat is particularly critical for organizations with sensitive intellectual property, regulated data, or critical infrastructure relying on macOS endpoints. The lack of patches or official mitigations increases the urgency for proactive defense measures.

1. Immediate auditing of /Library/LaunchDaemons/ directory for unauthorized or suspicious plist files, especially com.apple.securemonitor.plist and com.apple.backdoor.plist. 2. Implement strict file integrity monitoring (FIM) on LaunchDaemon plist files and critical system binaries to detect unauthorized changes. 3. Restrict local user permissions to prevent unauthorized modification of LaunchDaemon configurations; enforce least privilege principles. 4. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting unusual creation of setuid binaries, new admin users, and persistence mechanisms. 5. Educate users on the risks of local privilege escalation and enforce strong physical and logical access controls to prevent unauthorized local access. 6. Monitor system logs for suspicious launchctl load/unload commands and unexpected user account creations. 7. Until an official patch is released, consider disabling or restricting the vulnerable LaunchDaemon if feasible, or applying custom hardening policies to prevent plist hijacking. 8. Regularly update macOS and iOS devices to the latest versions once patches become available. 9. Use multi-factor authentication and network segmentation to limit the impact of compromised endpoints. 10. Conduct penetration testing and red team exercises simulating this exploit to evaluate detection and response capabilities.