Malicious code in envpack-conf (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a061ac72b9e392fee182ad4873aab0cc9a64694a11228438a7838343b96d338f) envpack-conf 1.0.1 is a trojanized copy of the pkg-conf utility. index.js appends a top-level async IIFE that runs whenever the module is imported. The IIFE queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth.blockscout.com/api, 1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io) for transactions sent from the attacker address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, decodes the `to` field of those transactions into two IPv4 addresses, fetches an XOR-encrypted second-stage payload from those hosts at path /0x/cls, and executes the decrypted payload with both eval() and spawn('node',['-e',<payload>],{detached:true,stdio:'ignore'}).unref(), giving a detached child process on the installer's host. Every sensitive identifier (module names http/https/zlib/child_process, hostnames, HTTP methods, header names, the attacker address, the RPC URLs, request paths, and global variable names) is written as \uXXXX-escaped literals to evade static analysis. The package name and README (`devpack-conf`) impersonate Sindre Sorhus's `pkg-conf`; package.json lists the author as 'Sinde Sorus' <[email protected]>, a typosquat of the real maintainer. The legitimate pkg-conf source is preserved above the injected block as cover.
Malicious code in envpack-conf (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a061ac72b9e392fee182ad4873aab0cc9a64694a11228438a7838343b96d338f) envpack-conf 1.0.1 is a trojanized copy of the pkg-conf utility. index.js appends a top-level async IIFE that runs whenever the module is imported. The IIFE queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth.blockscout.com/api, 1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io) for transactions sent from the attacker address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, decodes the `to` field of those transactions into two IPv4 addresses, fetches an XOR-encrypted second-stage payload from those hosts at path /0x/cls, and executes the decrypted payload with both eval() and spawn('node',['-e',<payload>],{detached:true,stdio:'ignore'}).unref(), giving a detached child process on the installer's host. Every sensitive identifier (module names http/https/zlib/child_process, hostnames, HTTP methods, header names, the attacker address, the RPC URLs, request paths, and global variable names) is written as \uXXXX-escaped literals to evade static analysis. The package name and README (`devpack-conf`) impersonate Sindre Sorhus's `pkg-conf`; package.json lists the author as 'Sinde Sorus' <[email protected]>, a typosquat of the real maintainer. The legitimate pkg-conf source is preserved above the injected block as cover.
Affected software
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Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-13921
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- []
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a7cd443bf8831d539187058
Added to database: 08/12/2026, 20:14:59 UTC
Last updated: 08/12/2026, 20:14:59 UTC
Views: 1
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