More Steganography!
A malicious Excel file using steganography was analyzed, revealing embedded XLS sheets and a complex infection chain. The file downloads an HTA file that creates a BAT file, which in turn generates and executes a VBS file. The VBS file fetches a VBA script that creates and runs a PowerShell script. The PowerShell script downloads an image containing a hidden payload delimited by specific tags. The payload is a Base64-encoded PE file, which is decoded and executed as a DLL. The final payload appears to be a Katz stealer. This analysis highlights the use of multiple file types and steganography techniques to evade detection.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The analyzed threat involves a sophisticated multi-stage malware infection chain initiated by a malicious Microsoft Excel file employing steganography to embed hidden XLS sheets. Upon opening, the Excel file triggers a download of an HTA (HTML Application) file from a remote server. This HTA file executes a BAT (batch) script, which subsequently generates and runs a VBS (Visual Basic Script) file. The VBS script fetches a VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) script that creates and executes a PowerShell script. The PowerShell script downloads an image file containing a hidden payload embedded using steganography, delimited by specific tags to isolate the malicious content. This payload is a Base64-encoded Portable Executable (PE) file, decoded and executed as a DLL (Dynamic Link Library) in memory. The final payload is identified as a Katz stealer, a known credential theft malware that targets stored passwords and authentication tokens. The infection chain leverages multiple scripting languages and file formats (Excel, HTA, BAT, VBS, VBA, PowerShell) and uses steganography to evade traditional signature-based detection mechanisms. The use of living-off-the-land binaries and scripts (LOLBins) such as PowerShell and VBS, combined with steganographic payload delivery, complicates detection and analysis. The attack techniques correspond to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques including command and scripting interpreter (T1059 variants), user execution (T1204.002), steganography (T1140), process injection (T1055), and persistence (T1547.001). Indicators of compromise include multiple file hashes and a known malicious URL hosting the HTA file. No known exploits in the wild or specific threat actors are currently attributed to this campaign, but the complexity and stealthy nature suggest a targeted or financially motivated operation aiming to steal credentials for further exploitation.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this threat poses a significant risk primarily through credential theft, which can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data breaches, and lateral movement within networks. The use of Excel files as the initial infection vector exploits the widespread use of Microsoft Office in European enterprises, increasing the likelihood of successful delivery via phishing or spear-phishing campaigns. The multi-stage infection chain and steganography techniques reduce detection efficacy of traditional antivirus and endpoint detection systems, potentially allowing prolonged undetected presence. Compromised credentials can facilitate espionage, financial fraud, or ransomware deployment, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical systems. Sectors such as finance, government, healthcare, and critical infrastructure in Europe are particularly vulnerable due to the high value of credentials and sensitive data. Additionally, the use of living-off-the-land techniques complicates incident response and forensic investigations, increasing remediation costs and operational disruption. Although no active widespread exploitation is reported, the medium severity and stealthy nature warrant proactive defense measures to prevent potential escalation and impact.
Mitigation Recommendations
Implement advanced email filtering and attachment sandboxing to detect and block malicious Excel files, especially those with embedded objects or macros. Enforce strict macro policies in Microsoft Office, disabling macros by default and allowing only digitally signed macros from trusted sources. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with behavioral analytics capable of detecting anomalous script execution chains and steganographic payload extraction. Monitor and restrict the execution of HTA, BAT, VBS, and PowerShell scripts, applying application control policies and logging their usage for suspicious activity. Use network security controls to block or monitor outbound connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses, including the identified HTA hosting domain. Conduct regular credential audits and implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the impact of stolen credentials. Educate users on phishing awareness, emphasizing the risks of opening unsolicited Excel attachments and enabling macros. Implement threat hunting exercises focusing on detection of steganography usage and unusual script execution patterns within the environment. Regularly update and patch all software, including Microsoft Office and Windows OS, to mitigate exploitation of known vulnerabilities that could facilitate infection. Leverage threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators and tactics related to this malware family and adjust defenses accordingly.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 15cc16763e16a1239eac4f78d5e4f316
- hash: 2a1b8592ef9e40cf304968f1f1bb206b
- hash: 5730aa469972b91b05af9424dc17b63130304dbf
- hash: 601c9f4ab0fe48eea3f852ea9418eb3f0b3d8f99
- hash: 352ef6f5c4568d6ed6a018a5128cf538d33ea72bd040f0fd3b9bca6bd6a5dae9
- hash: 5a73927d56c0fd4a805489d5817e1aa4fbd491e5a91ed36f4a2babef74158912
- hash: c92c761a4c5c3f44e914d6654a678953d56d4d3a2329433afe1710b59c9acd3a
- url: http://107.172.235.203/245/wecreatedbestsolutionswithniceworkingskill.hta
More Steganography!
Description
A malicious Excel file using steganography was analyzed, revealing embedded XLS sheets and a complex infection chain. The file downloads an HTA file that creates a BAT file, which in turn generates and executes a VBS file. The VBS file fetches a VBA script that creates and runs a PowerShell script. The PowerShell script downloads an image containing a hidden payload delimited by specific tags. The payload is a Base64-encoded PE file, which is decoded and executed as a DLL. The final payload appears to be a Katz stealer. This analysis highlights the use of multiple file types and steganography techniques to evade detection.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The analyzed threat involves a sophisticated multi-stage malware infection chain initiated by a malicious Microsoft Excel file employing steganography to embed hidden XLS sheets. Upon opening, the Excel file triggers a download of an HTA (HTML Application) file from a remote server. This HTA file executes a BAT (batch) script, which subsequently generates and runs a VBS (Visual Basic Script) file. The VBS script fetches a VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) script that creates and executes a PowerShell script. The PowerShell script downloads an image file containing a hidden payload embedded using steganography, delimited by specific tags to isolate the malicious content. This payload is a Base64-encoded Portable Executable (PE) file, decoded and executed as a DLL (Dynamic Link Library) in memory. The final payload is identified as a Katz stealer, a known credential theft malware that targets stored passwords and authentication tokens. The infection chain leverages multiple scripting languages and file formats (Excel, HTA, BAT, VBS, VBA, PowerShell) and uses steganography to evade traditional signature-based detection mechanisms. The use of living-off-the-land binaries and scripts (LOLBins) such as PowerShell and VBS, combined with steganographic payload delivery, complicates detection and analysis. The attack techniques correspond to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques including command and scripting interpreter (T1059 variants), user execution (T1204.002), steganography (T1140), process injection (T1055), and persistence (T1547.001). Indicators of compromise include multiple file hashes and a known malicious URL hosting the HTA file. No known exploits in the wild or specific threat actors are currently attributed to this campaign, but the complexity and stealthy nature suggest a targeted or financially motivated operation aiming to steal credentials for further exploitation.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this threat poses a significant risk primarily through credential theft, which can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data breaches, and lateral movement within networks. The use of Excel files as the initial infection vector exploits the widespread use of Microsoft Office in European enterprises, increasing the likelihood of successful delivery via phishing or spear-phishing campaigns. The multi-stage infection chain and steganography techniques reduce detection efficacy of traditional antivirus and endpoint detection systems, potentially allowing prolonged undetected presence. Compromised credentials can facilitate espionage, financial fraud, or ransomware deployment, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical systems. Sectors such as finance, government, healthcare, and critical infrastructure in Europe are particularly vulnerable due to the high value of credentials and sensitive data. Additionally, the use of living-off-the-land techniques complicates incident response and forensic investigations, increasing remediation costs and operational disruption. Although no active widespread exploitation is reported, the medium severity and stealthy nature warrant proactive defense measures to prevent potential escalation and impact.
Mitigation Recommendations
Implement advanced email filtering and attachment sandboxing to detect and block malicious Excel files, especially those with embedded objects or macros. Enforce strict macro policies in Microsoft Office, disabling macros by default and allowing only digitally signed macros from trusted sources. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with behavioral analytics capable of detecting anomalous script execution chains and steganographic payload extraction. Monitor and restrict the execution of HTA, BAT, VBS, and PowerShell scripts, applying application control policies and logging their usage for suspicious activity. Use network security controls to block or monitor outbound connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses, including the identified HTA hosting domain. Conduct regular credential audits and implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the impact of stolen credentials. Educate users on phishing awareness, emphasizing the risks of opening unsolicited Excel attachments and enabling macros. Implement threat hunting exercises focusing on detection of steganography usage and unusual script execution patterns within the environment. Regularly update and patch all software, including Microsoft Office and Windows OS, to mitigate exploitation of known vulnerabilities that could facilitate infection. Leverage threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators and tactics related to this malware family and adjust defenses accordingly.
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32044"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 684da8c81baecf48b68eb91e
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash15cc16763e16a1239eac4f78d5e4f316 | — | |
hash2a1b8592ef9e40cf304968f1f1bb206b | — | |
hash5730aa469972b91b05af9424dc17b63130304dbf | — | |
hash601c9f4ab0fe48eea3f852ea9418eb3f0b3d8f99 | — | |
hash352ef6f5c4568d6ed6a018a5128cf538d33ea72bd040f0fd3b9bca6bd6a5dae9 | — | |
hash5a73927d56c0fd4a805489d5817e1aa4fbd491e5a91ed36f4a2babef74158912 | — | |
hashc92c761a4c5c3f44e914d6654a678953d56d4d3a2329433afe1710b59c9acd3a | — |
Url
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
urlhttp://107.172.235.203/245/wecreatedbestsolutionswithniceworkingskill.hta | — |
Threat ID: 6850327ca8c9212743843f16
Added to database: 6/16/2025, 3:04:28 PM
Last enriched: 6/16/2025, 3:20:22 PM
Last updated: 8/12/2025, 2:05:44 PM
Views: 26
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