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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-41484: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector · OneCollector exporter reads unbounded HTTP response bodies

Affects OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollectorSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-41484· Medium 5.3

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 1.15.1 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.15.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 6 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector to 1.15.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
NuGetOpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollectorAffected
  • <1.15.1
Fixed in
  • 1.15.1

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Description

### Summary When exporting telemetry to a back-end/collector over HTTP using the OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector exporter, if the request results in a unsuccessful request (i.e. HTTP 4xx or 5xx), the response is read into memory with no upper-bound on the number of bytes consumed. This could cause memory exhaustion in the consuming application if the configured back-end/collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response. ### Details The [`HttpJsonPostTransport`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/blob/171c6b81f88831641b56b470e6f92862e605013d/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector/Internal/Transports/HttpJsonPostTransport.cs) class reads the response body when a non-200 HTTP status code is received when exporting telemetry to aid debugging by operators so that the error response is included in the logs emitted by the exporter. An attacker who controls the configured endpoint, or who can intercept traffic to them (MiTM), can return an arbitrarily large response body. This causes unbounded heap allocation in the consuming process, leading to high transient memory pressure, garbage-collection stalls, or an OutOfMemoryException that terminates the process. ### Impact If an application using the OneCollector exporter is configured to use a back-end/collector endpoint that is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response the application could have its memory exhausted and create a denial-of-service condition. ### Mitigation The application's configured back-end/collector endpoint needs to behave maliciously. If the collector/back-end is a well-behaved implementation response bodies should not be excessively large if a request error occurs. ### Workarounds Use network-level controls (firewall rules, mTLS, service mesh) to prevent Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on the configured back-end/collector endpoint. ### Remediation [#4117](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4117) updates the OneCollector exporter to limit the number of bytes read from the response body in an error condition to 4MiB. ### Resources - [#4117](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4117)

References

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