VulnerabilityPublished 5 May 2026

CVE-2026-42198: pgjdbc · Unbounded PBKDF2 iterations in SCRAM authentication allows CPU exhaustion DoS

Affects org.postgresql:postgresqlSource GCVE Database

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 42.7.11 soon.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 42.7.11

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: None
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade org.postgresql:postgresql to 42.7.11.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Mavenorg.postgresql:postgresql	Affected >=42.2.0 <42.7.11	Fixed in 42.7.11

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication. ### Impact A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count. With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail. A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools. In affected versions, `loginTimeout` did not fully mitigate this problem. When `loginTimeout` expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation. This issue affects availability. It does **not** provide authentication bypass, privilege escalation, or direct password disclosure. A user is vulnerable when **all** of the following are true: 1. The connection uses **SCRAM-SHA-256** authentication. 2. The client reaches a **malicious, compromised, or attacker-controlled PostgreSQL endpoint**. 3. That endpoint sends a very large SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count in the `server-first-message`. In practice, that can happen in these situations: - the application lets end users or tenants supply their own database connection details (as in many BI, reporting, analytics, ETL, and low-code platforms), so a user can point the shared client host at a server they control - the application accepts connection strings, hostnames, or JDBC URLs from user input, configuration uploaded by users, or other untrusted sources - the application is configured to connect to a PostgreSQL server that is itself malicious or later becomes compromised - the application connects through an untrusted proxy, relay, tunnel, bastion, or connection-pooling service that can act as the PostgreSQL server - an attacker can redirect the client to a fake PostgreSQL endpoint by manipulating DNS, service discovery, Kubernetes service resolution, `/etc/hosts`, environment variables, or similar indirection - an active network attacker on the path can impersonate the server because the connection does not strongly verify server identity (for example, `sslmode` lower than `verify-full`, or trusting a CA that signs hosts outside the operator's control) The issue is **more damaging** when the application uses connection retries, many parallel connection attempts, or `loginTimeout` and assumes the timeout fully stops the work. ### Patches The patch introduces a new connection property, `scramMaxIterations`, with a default of 100K. The client now rejects SCRAM server messages that advertise more PBKDF2 iterations than the configured cap before starting the PBKDF2 computation begins. ### Workarounds Until a patched version of pgjdbc is deployed, the following measures reduce exposure: 1. **Only connect to trusted PostgreSQL servers whose identity is verified.** Connect only to trusted PostgreSQL servers, and verify server identity with TLS using sslmode=verify-full and a trusted CA. TLS without certificate and hostname verification is not sufficient as an active network attacker can still impersonate the server. 2. **Do not rely on `loginTimeout` as a complete mitigation on unpatched versions.** On affected versions, `loginTimeout` can stop the waiting caller while the worker thread continues spending CPU. 3. **Avoid SCRAM on untrusted or interceptable connection paths.** For those paths, use an authentication method that does not let the server choose a SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count. 4. **Reduce blast radius operationally.** Limit parallel connection attempts, add retry backoff, isolate connection establishment in a separate worker or process when possible, and apply CPU or container limits where appropriate. 5. **On trusted servers you control, keep SCRAM iteration counts at ordinary values.** This does not defend against an attacker-controlled server, but it avoids unnecessary client cost when talking to legitimate servers.

CWE-770Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #25
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
Requirements
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Architecture and Design
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Architecture and Design
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Abuse Case (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V8.1.4 (opens in a new tab)
V13.4.1 (opens in a new tab)
V11.1.4 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
XML Ping of the Death (opens in a new tab)
Exponential Data Expansion (opens in a new tab)
Serialized Data Parameter Blowup (opens in a new tab)
Serialized Data with Nested Payloads (opens in a new tab)
Oversized Serialized Data Payloads (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

References

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-770

Technical details

References

Community reviews

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