This threat describes a coordinated influence campaign linked to Russian actors targeting the Moldovan parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2025. The campaign involves multiple operations—Operation Overload, Operation Undercut, Foundation to Battle Injustice, and Portal Kombat—that seek to destabilize the electoral process and hinder Moldova's aspirations for European Union accession. The tactics employed include the dissemination of inauthentic news content, manipulation of social media platforms, and automated content generation to spread disinformation. The narrative pushed by these operations portrays the current Moldovan leadership, specifically President Maia Sandu and the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity, negatively. It frames EU integration as harmful to Moldova’s economy and sovereignty while promoting closer ties with Russia as a beneficial alternative. Although the direct influence on voter behavior appears limited at present, the campaign undermines media integrity and erodes public trust in democratic institutions. The operations utilize a range of tactics consistent with known adversary behaviors, including social media manipulation (T1583, T1592), use of automated content (T1608), and disinformation campaigns (T1565, T1585). These activities represent a sophisticated hybrid threat combining cyber-enabled information operations with psychological influence techniques aimed at shaping public opinion and political outcomes.

For European organizations, particularly those involved in election monitoring, media, and governmental institutions, this campaign poses significant risks. The erosion of public trust in democratic processes can destabilize regional security and political cohesion, especially in Eastern Europe. Disinformation campaigns can also affect EU institutions by undermining the legitimacy of EU enlargement policies and fostering divisions within the Union. Media outlets and social media platforms operating in or covering Moldova and neighboring countries may face challenges in verifying information and combating fake news, potentially leading to reputational damage and reduced public confidence. Additionally, the campaign’s success could embolden similar influence operations targeting other European countries, threatening the integrity of democratic processes across the continent.

Mitigation should focus on enhancing the resilience of information ecosystems and election infrastructure. Specific recommendations include: 1) Strengthening collaboration between government agencies, civil society, and social media platforms to detect and disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior early; 2) Implementing advanced monitoring tools that leverage AI and machine learning to identify automated content generation and disinformation patterns; 3) Conducting public awareness campaigns to educate voters on recognizing disinformation and verifying sources; 4) Enhancing transparency requirements for online political advertising and content origin; 5) Supporting independent media and fact-checking organizations to provide timely and accurate information; 6) Securing election-related IT systems against cyber intrusions that could be leveraged to amplify misinformation; 7) Encouraging cross-border intelligence sharing within the EU and with Moldova to track evolving tactics and threat actors; 8) Developing rapid response protocols to counter emerging disinformation narratives during the election period.