Threats Tagged 'elections'

CopyCop, a Russian covert influence network, has significantly expanded its operations since March 2025, creating over 300 new fictional media websites targeting various countries. The network, likely operated by John Mark Dougan with support from Russian entities, aims to undermine support for Ukraine and exacerbate political fragmentation in Western countries. CopyCop's tactics include using deepfakes, AI-generated content, and impersonating media outlets to spread pro-Russian narratives. The network has widened its target languages and geographical scope, now including Turkey, Ukraine, Swahili-speaking regions, Moldova, Canada, and Armenia. While its core objectives remain unchanged, CopyCop has made marginal improvements to increase its reach, resilience, and credibility, including the use of self-hosted large language models for content generation.

MediumCampaignFranceGermanyUkraine+7#elections#deepfakes#ai-generated content

Multiple Russia-linked influence operations are targeting Moldova's September 2025 parliamentary elections, aiming to destabilize the process and impede Moldova's EU accession. These operations, including Operation Overload, Operation Undercut, Foundation to Battle Injustice, and Portal Kombat, are projecting negative views of President Maia Sandu and the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity. They portray EU integration as disastrous for Moldova's economy and sovereignty, while suggesting closer ties with Russia as a favorable alternative. The operations employ various tactics, including inauthentic news content, social media manipulation, and automated content generation. While their impact on voter behavior appears limited so far, they pose risks to media integrity and public trust.

MediumCampaignMoldovaRomaniaUkraine+3#elections#moldova#social media manipulation

This investigation delves into information operations conducted by Russian actors known as Doppelgänger, focusing on their activities from early June to late-July 2024. It examines their tactics, associated infrastructure, and motivations, particularly in relation to the unexpected snap general election in France during this period. The analysis reveals a persistent and complex effort to disseminate disinformation through social media, impersonating legitimate news websites and employing intricate redirection chains. The operations primarily target conservative and nationalist sentiments, aiming to destabilize Western democracies by exploiting existing societal and political divisions.

MediumCampaignFranceGermanyPoland+5#redirection#social media#russian actors