The Lapsus$ hackers allegedly compromised internal code repositories, credentials, and employee data. The post Extortion Group Claims It Hacked AstraZeneca appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A new payload in the TeamPCP arsenal has been discovered, capable of wiping entire Kubernetes clusters. The script uses the same ICP canister as the CanisterWorm campaign, with consistent lateral movement via DaemonSets. However, this variant introduces a geopolitically targeted destructive payload aimed specifically at Iranian systems. The malware checks timezone and locale to identify Iranian systems, deploying privileged DaemonSets across every node in Kubernetes environments. Iranian nodes are wiped and force-rebooted, while non-Iranian nodes receive the CanisterWorm backdoor. The latest variant adds network-based lateral movement, exploiting exposed Docker APIs and using SSH for spread. This development shows TeamPCP's ability to operate at supply chain scale and their willingness to engage in destructive actions.
A threat actor known as TeamPCP expanded its supply chain attack from Aqua Security's Trivy to Checkmarx's AST GitHub Action. The attack, which began on March 19, 2026, involved injecting a credential-stealing payload into CI/CD pipelines across thousands of repositories. The malicious code harvested secrets from runner memory, queried cloud metadata, and exfiltrated encrypted data to typosquat domains. The Checkmarx compromise occurred approximately four days after the initial Trivy incident, using identical techniques but targeting a different action. This cascading effect demonstrates how compromised actions can be used to harvest credentials and compromise additional dependencies. Runtime detection proved effective in identifying the attack pattern across both waves, as the underlying behavior remained consistent despite changes in the delivery mechanism.
The KICS GitHub Action, an open-source infrastructure as code security scanner by Checkmarx, was compromised by TeamPCP, the group behind the recent Trivy attack. Between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC on March 23, 35 tags were hijacked, exposing users to credential-stealing malware. The attack involved staging imposter commits and updating tags using a compromised identity. The malware uses a new C2 domain, creates a fallback repository, and adds Kubernetes-focused persistence code. Additionally, two OpenVSX extensions were compromised. The payload targets cloud provider credentials and installs persistence on non-CI systems. Security teams are advised to audit workflows, search for exfiltration artifacts, and implement long-term hardening measures.
A multi-stage malware delivery campaign was uncovered, initially detected through a suspicious VBS file. The investigation revealed a complex attack infrastructure using Unicode obfuscation, PNG-based payload staging, and reflectively loaded .NET execution. The attacker utilized open directories to host multiple obfuscated VBS files, each mapping to different malware payloads including XWorm and Remcos RAT. A secondary infection vector involving a weaponized 'PDF' and batch script was also discovered. The campaign demonstrated a modular approach, allowing for payload rotation and multiple attack vectors from the same domain. This sophisticated infrastructure design enables rapid modification and expansion of available payloads without altering the initial delivery mechanism.
So, I&#;x26;#;39;ve been slow to get on the Claude Code/OpenCode/Codex/OpenClaw bandwagon, but I had some time last week so I asked Claude to review (/security-review) some of my python scripts. He found more than I&#;x26;#;39;d like to admit, so I checked in a bunch of updates. In reviewing his suggestions, he was right, I made some stupid mistakes, some of which have been sitting in there for a long time. It was nothing earth-shattering and it took almost no time for Claude, it took longer for me to read through the updates he wanted to make, figure out what he was seeing, and decide whether to accept them or tweak them. Here are a few of them.
Hackers published a malicious scanner release and replaced tags to point to information-stealer malware. The post Aqua’s Trivy Vulnerability Scanner Hit by Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek .
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 23rd March, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Navia Benefit Solutions, a United States-based employee benefits administrator, has disclosed a breach affecting more than 2.6 million individuals after unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration occurred between December 22, 2025 and […] The post 23rd March – Threat Intelligence Report appeared first on Check Point Research .
The GhostClaw malware campaign has expanded its distribution methods beyond npm packages to include GitHub repositories and AI-assisted development workflows. The attackers impersonate legitimate tools and utilize multi-stage payloads to steal credentials and retrieve additional malicious code. The infection chain involves executing shell commands, presenting fake authentication prompts, and establishing persistence. The campaign leverages both manual installation through README instructions and automated AI-assisted workflows. Multiple GitHub repositories have been identified, all communicating with a common command-and-control infrastructure. This shift in tactics allows the attackers to target a broader range of victims, including developers and users of AI-assisted coding tools.
CVE-2024-46878 is a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability found in the 'page' parameter of tiki-editpage.php in Tiki CMS version 26.3 and earlier. This flaw allows an attacker with at least low privileges and requiring user interaction to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of the victim's browser. The vulnerability can lead to unauthorized actions or access to sensitive information within the affected web application. Although no known exploits are currently reported in the wild, the vulnerability has a medium severity score of 5.4. The attack requires the victim to interact with a crafted payload, and the vulnerability impacts confidentiality and integrity but not availability. Organizations using Tiki CMS should prioritize patching or mitigating this issue to prevent potential exploitation. The countries most at risk are those with significant Tiki CMS usage, including the United States, Germany, France, Brazil, and India.
CVE-2026-4533 is a medium severity SQL injection vulnerability found in version 1.0 of the code-projects Simple Food Ordering System, specifically in the all-tickets.php file. The vulnerability arises from improper sanitization of the 'Status' parameter, allowing remote attackers to inject malicious SQL commands without authentication or user interaction. Although the exploit code is publicly available, there are no confirmed reports of active exploitation in the wild. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized data access or modification within the affected database, impacting confidentiality and integrity. The vulnerability affects a niche food ordering system product, limiting its widespread impact but posing risks to organizations using this software. Mitigation requires immediate input validation and parameterized queries in the affected code, along with monitoring and restricting access to the vulnerable endpoint. Countries with notable usage of this software or similar web applications, including the United States, India, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Germany, may face higher risks. Organizations should prioritize patching or applying workarounds to prevent potential data breaches or service disruptions.
Other noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: vulnerabilities found in KVM devices, Claudy Day Claude vulnerabilities, The Gentlemen ransomware group. The post In Other News: New Android Safeguards, Operation Alice, UK Toughens Cyber Reporting appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The attacks started on February 27 and have targeted e-commerce platforms, global brands, and government services. The post Thousands of Magento Sites Hit in Ongoing Defacement Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A new supply chain attack targeting Trivy has compromised 75 out of 76 version tags in the aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub repository. The attacker force-pushed these tags to serve malicious payloads, effectively turning trusted version references into a distribution mechanism for an infostealer. The malicious code executes within GitHub Actions runners, targeting sensitive data in CI/CD environments. It harvests secrets from runner process memory and the filesystem, encrypts the collected data, and exfiltrates it to an attacker-controlled endpoint or a fallback GitHub-based channel. The attack's scope is significant, potentially affecting over 10,000 workflow files on GitHub referencing this action.
Yesterday, I discovered a malicious Bash script that installs a GSocket backdoor on the victim's computer. I don't know the source of the script not how it is delivered to the victim.
A sophisticated malware campaign delivering PureLog Stealer has been identified, targeting healthcare, government, hospitality, and education sectors in multiple countries. The attack uses localized copyright violation lures to trick victims into executing a multi-stage infection chain. The malware employs encrypted payloads, remote key retrieval, and fileless execution techniques to evade detection. It utilizes a Python-based loader and dual .NET loaders to run PureLog Stealer entirely in memory. The campaign incorporates AMSI bypass, registry persistence, screenshot capture, and victim fingerprinting for stealth and intelligence gathering. Evidence confirms communication with PureLog-associated infrastructure.
The lesser-known JackSkid and Mossad botnets have also been targeted in the operation. The post Aisuru and Kimwolf DDoS Botnets Disrupted in International Operation appeared first on SecurityWeek .
This analysis explores the ecosystem of EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) killers, tools used by ransomware attackers to disrupt security solutions before deploying encryptors. The research, based on almost 90 EDR killers tracked in the wild, reveals that these tools are fundamental in modern ransomware operations. Affiliates, not operators, typically choose EDR killers, leading to greater tooling diversity in larger affiliate pools. The same vulnerable driver can appear in unrelated tools, and tools can switch between drivers, making driver-based attribution unreliable. The landscape includes forked proofs of concept, professional implementations, and commercial offerings. While Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique dominates, custom scripts, anti-rootkits, and driverless approaches are also utilized. The analysis emphasizes the importance of looking beyond drivers to understand the full scope of EDR killer ecosystem and its implications for cybersecurity.
