Between late December 2025 and mid-January 2026, hackers stole personal and health plan information from Navia’s environment. The post Navia Data Breach Impacts 2.7 Million appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The attacks started on February 27 and have targeted e-commerce platforms, global brands, and government services. The post Thousands of Magento Sites Hit in Ongoing Defacement Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A new supply chain attack targeting Trivy has compromised 75 out of 76 version tags in the aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub repository. The attacker force-pushed these tags to serve malicious payloads, effectively turning trusted version references into a distribution mechanism for an infostealer. The malicious code executes within GitHub Actions runners, targeting sensitive data in CI/CD environments. It harvests secrets from runner process memory and the filesystem, encrypts the collected data, and exfiltrates it to an attacker-controlled endpoint or a fallback GitHub-based channel. The attack's scope is significant, potentially affecting over 10,000 workflow files on GitHub referencing this action.
VoidStealer is an emerging infostealer that employs a novel debugger-based Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) bypass technique. This method leverages hardware breakpoints to extract the v20_master_key directly from browser memory, requiring neither privilege escalation nor code injection. The technique involves attaching to the browser process as a debugger, setting breakpoints at strategic locations, and extracting the key when it's briefly present in plaintext. This approach offers a lower detection footprint compared to alternative bypass methods. The blog post dissects the technique step-by-step, from locating the target address for breakpoint placement to extracting the key. It also provides detection strategies for defenders, focusing on monitoring debugger attachments and suspicious browser memory reads.
Yesterday, I discovered a malicious Bash script that installs a GSocket backdoor on the victim's computer. I don't know the source of the script not how it is delivered to the victim.
A sophisticated malware campaign delivering PureLog Stealer has been identified, targeting healthcare, government, hospitality, and education sectors in multiple countries. The attack uses localized copyright violation lures to trick victims into executing a multi-stage infection chain. The malware employs encrypted payloads, remote key retrieval, and fileless execution techniques to evade detection. It utilizes a Python-based loader and dual .NET loaders to run PureLog Stealer entirely in memory. The campaign incorporates AMSI bypass, registry persistence, screenshot capture, and victim fingerprinting for stealth and intelligence gathering. Evidence confirms communication with PureLog-associated infrastructure.
This analysis delves into the Beast ransomware, a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that emerged in June 2024 as a successor to Monster ransomware. The investigation focuses on a Beast ransomware server detected in March 2026, revealing the operators' toolkit and attack methodology. The toolkit includes various tools for reconnaissance, network mapping, credential theft, persistence, lateral movement, exfiltration, and impact. Notable findings include the presence of both Windows and Linux versions of Beast ransomware, indicating targeting of workstations and Linux servers on VMware ESXi hypervisors. The report highlights the importance of proactive collection of internet telemetry in identifying ransomware operators' toolkits before they can be used against targets.
The lesser-known JackSkid and Mossad botnets have also been targeted in the operation. The post Aisuru and Kimwolf DDoS Botnets Disrupted in International Operation appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A large-scale malvertising campaign targeting U.S.tax form searchers has been uncovered. The attack chain begins with Google Ads, using dual commercial cloaking services to evade detection. Victims are directed to rogue ScreenConnect installers, leading to a multi-stage crypter that ultimately deploys a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) tool. This tool, named HwAudKiller, exploits a previously undocumented Huawei audio driver to terminate antivirus and EDR processes from kernel mode. The campaign's sophistication lies in its use of commodity tools and services, combining free-tier ScreenConnect instances, off-the-shelf crypters, and a signed driver with an exploitable weakness. The attackers consistently deploy multiple remote access tools on compromised hosts for redundancy, indicating a likely pre-ransomware or initial access broker operation.
Analysis reveals a six-month buildup of Iran-linked cyber infrastructure, including US-based shell companies, designed to weather kinetic strikes and ensure the resilience of its global hacking operations. The post Iran Readied Cyberattack Capabilities for Response Prior to Epic Fury appeared first on SecurityWeek .
This analysis explores the ecosystem of EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) killers, tools used by ransomware attackers to disrupt security solutions before deploying encryptors. The research, based on almost 90 EDR killers tracked in the wild, reveals that these tools are fundamental in modern ransomware operations. Affiliates, not operators, typically choose EDR killers, leading to greater tooling diversity in larger affiliate pools. The same vulnerable driver can appear in unrelated tools, and tools can switch between drivers, making driver-based attribution unreliable. The landscape includes forked proofs of concept, professional implementations, and commercial offerings. While Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique dominates, custom scripts, anti-rootkits, and driverless approaches are also utilized. The analysis emphasizes the importance of looking beyond drivers to understand the full scope of EDR killer ecosystem and its implications for cybersecurity.
During tax season, threat actors exploit the urgency of time-sensitive tax-related emails to trick targets into opening malicious attachments, scanning QR codes, or following link chains. Recent campaigns identified by Microsoft Threat Intelligence use lures around W-2 forms, tax forms, and impersonation of government tax agencies and financial institutions. These campaigns aim to harvest credentials or deliver malware, often using phishing-as-a-service platforms for convincing credential theft and MFA bypass. Notable tactics include using legitimate remote monitoring tools, targeting specific industries and roles like accountants, and employing sophisticated social engineering techniques. The campaigns leverage various file formats, legitimate infrastructure, and multiple user interactions to complicate detection.
It was previously estimated that more than 1.6 million people may be affected by the Marquis data breach. The post Marquis Data Breach Affects 672,000 Individuals appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The threat group ShinyHunters has adopted a new tactic of subdomain impersonation for initial access, moving away from newly registered lookalike domains. They are utilizing mobile-first lures and outsourcing spam services to scale their operations. The group is likely reusing previously stolen CRM and ERP data to drive social engineering attacks. Their approach involves phone-guided adversary-in-the-middle phishing to capture credentials and authenticated sessions. ShinyHunters is also scaling vishing operations through paid contractors and specialized harassment services. This evolution in tactics allows for rapid identity-to-SaaS compromise without deploying malware, making traditional domain-based monitoring less effective.
The information was stolen from a marketing tool after an employee fell victim to a targeted phone phishing attack. The post Security Firm Aura Discloses Data Breach Impacting 900,000 Records appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A newly discovered loader called SILENTCONNECT is being used in active campaigns to silently install ScreenConnect, a remote monitoring and management tool, on victim machines. The infection chain begins with users being redirected to a Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA page disguised as a digital invitation. Upon clicking, a VBScript file is downloaded, which retrieves and executes C# source code in memory using PowerShell. SILENTCONNECT employs various evasion techniques, including PEB masquerading and UAC bypass. The campaigns leverage trusted hosting providers like Google Drive and Cloudflare, and abuse living-off-the-land binaries. The loader has been active since March 2025 and poses a significant threat due to its stealthy nature and effectiveness.
A novel and stealthy threat called Infostealer.Speagle has been discovered, hijacking the functionality of Cobra DocGuard, a legitimate security software. This malware collects sensitive information from infected computers and transmits it to a compromised Cobra DocGuard server, masking the data exfiltration as legitimate communications. Speagle specifically targets computers with Cobra DocGuard installed and has shown capabilities to search for documents related to Chinese ballistic missiles. The infection vector remains unknown, but there are indications of a possible supply chain attack. The malware collects system information, file listings, and browser data in multiple phases, using sophisticated techniques to evade detection and self-delete after completing its tasks.
The IndonesianFoods campaign saw attackers flood the npm registry with junk packages. We explore how it works, and how to safeguard enterprise development.
This activity was found and reported by BACS student Adam Thorman as part of one of his assignments which I posted his final paper [1] last week. This activity appeared to only have occurred on the 19 Feb 2026 where at least 2 sensors detected on the same day by DShield sensor in the cowrie logs an echo command that included: "MAGIC_PAYLOAD_KILLER_HERE_OR_LEAVE_EMPTY_iranbot_was_here". My DShield sensor captured activity from source IP 64.89.161.198 between 30 Jan - 22 Feb 2026 that included portscans, a successful login via Telnet (TCP/23) and web access that included all the activity listed below captured by the DShield sensor (cowrie, webhoneypot & iptables logs).
