A sophisticated campaign deployed 148 malicious npm packages disguised as student web proxy applications under brands like Riverbend Tutoring and Northstar Tutoring. Published by accounts terminal3airport and eerikakirk, these packages weaponized visitor browsers into distributed denial-of-service botnets while generating advertising revenue. The applications functioned as working proxies but secretly executed mutable remote code and high-performance WebSocket traffic generators compatible with the Wisp protocol. During a critical two-week period in May 2026, active deployments launched HTTP floods generating 2GB/s aggregate traffic and control-plane attacks establishing 10,240 socket connections per second against target servers. The campaign abused npm as a content delivery network, affecting users who visited proxy instances rather than through traditional dependency infection.
A misconfigured Python HTTP server on a Budapest VPS exposed the complete operational infrastructure of three distinct phishing operators. The investigation uncovered codemado, an Egyptian threat actor operating since 2018, running a full AiTM platform with custom tools including MaDoO Blaster; saroula01, deploying OAuth Device Code Flow attacks that accumulated 218 victims across 12 countries over a year; and mail-argenta, a Nigerian operator identified through infostealer logs containing his own credentials. All three actors leveraged customized Evilginx forks and AI-assisted development to build MFA-bypass infrastructure from public GitHub repositories. The campaigns targeted Microsoft 365 accounts primarily, with codemado maintaining ties to RockyBelling's "The Quarry" cybercrime ecosystem. The exposed server contained phishing configurations, credential logs, RMM installers, combolists, and Telegram session files, revealing sustained operations from at least January 2025 through May 2026.
A China-linked threat cluster has been exploiting vulnerable Roundcube servers at U.S. and Canadian universities to steal credentials and deploy backdoor malware. [...]
A financially motivated campaign identified in April 2026 delivers Vidar stealer and XMRig cryptocurrency miner to victims worldwide through malvertising. Attackers distribute password-protected archives impersonating cracked software, using Go-compiled loaders built with the Factory-v3 framework. The malware employs sophisticated evasion techniques including rogue Authenticode certificates mimicking JustWatch and BleacherReport, file-size inflation to hundreds of MB with null bytes, and AMSI bypass. Once executed, Vidar stealer exfiltrates browser credentials, cookies and cryptocurrency wallets to C2 infrastructure, while XMRig mines Monero cryptocurrency. The operation establishes persistence through registry modifications, scheduled tasks and startup folder scripts. The threat actor, operating under the moniker X3D MINER, primarily targets victims in the U.S. and European Union through a dual-monetization scheme combining credential theft and cryptojacking.
Beginning in August 2025, a sophisticated intrusion was discovered where attackers used log poisoning techniques to deploy a web shell on vulnerable phpMyAdmin panels. The threat actors exploited misconfigured web applications to plant China Chopper web shells, controlled via AntSword, before deploying Nezha, an open-source monitoring tool, to facilitate remote command execution. This led to the deployment of Ghost RAT on compromised systems. Analysis revealed over 100 compromised machines, predominantly located in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. The attackers demonstrated technical proficiency through multi-stage operations, utilizing AWS and VPS infrastructure, with indicators pointing to China-nexus threat actors. The campaign highlights increasing abuse of legitimate publicly available tools to achieve malicious objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.
Only a handful of the 100 organizations targeted in the PeopleSoft campaign have been confirmed. The post Nissan Employee Data Breached in Oracle PeopleSoft Hack appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Nissan is warning that it suffered a data breach affecting current and former employees after threat actors exploited an Oracle PeopleSoft vulnerability in data theft attacks previously linked to the ShinyHunters extortion group. [...]
A Chinese web-development framework called DCloud Uni-App has become the technical foundation for over 236,000 scam domains since 2022, powering fake cryptocurrency exchanges, pig-butchering operations, wallet drainers, gambling platforms, and brand-impersonation sites. The framework gained prominence after the 2024 RainbowEx cryptocurrency scam in Argentina, which defrauded residents of San Pedro. Similar operations include the Lightning Shared Scooter Co. (LSSC) scam in the United States, which caused millions in losses across multiple states, and the currently-active Yuechi Sharing Technology Ltd. bicycle-sharing investment scam. These operations use legitimate hosting providers, with approximately 6% utilizing bulletproof hosting, particularly CTG Server. The scams target victims globally through WhatsApp, Telegram, and social media, converting victims into recruiters for pyramid-style operations. Enterprise exposure reaches over 985 distinct organizations across 25 industry verticals, with over five m...
Between June 16 and 19, 2026, a sophisticated adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaign targeted AWS console users through three domains registered within 48 hours and hosted on Cloudflare. The campaign impersonated AWS login pages and captured credentials along with real-time multi-factor authentication codes through email, SMS, and authenticator apps. Phishing emails were delivered through legitimate platforms like SendGrid and Nimbu to bypass spam filters. The kit employed JavaScript-based credential harvesting with victim validation through encrypted URL parameters, preventing sandbox analysis. Targets were primarily US-based software engineers and engineering leadership, suggesting a curated target list rather than mass phishing. The same kit was linked to concurrent SendGrid impersonation campaigns and previous cryptocurrency wallet targeting since July 2025. The small sample of fewer than 50 targeted email addresses indicates highly selective targeting of technical personnel with AWS access.
Prinz Eugen is a newly discovered Go-based ransomware family first observed in April 2026, attributed to an actor known as ROOTBOY. The encryptor employs sophisticated techniques including ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, prioritizes recently modified files to maximize pressure on victims, and implements anti-forensic measures such as memory scrubbing and self-deletion. Unlike typical ransomware, it leaves no ransom note on disk, conducting all extortion communications out-of-band through leak sites and direct contact. The threat actor gains initial access through compromised RDP credentials, uses legitimate RMM tools like RemotePC for persistence, and creates backdoor admin accounts. Victims span multiple countries and sectors, with notable incidents including Standard Bank Group in South Africa and Transitions Pro Centre Val de Loire in France.
EvilTokens is a sophisticated phishing kit that conceals critical components of its attack through browser-side AES-GCM encryption, creating visibility gaps for traditional static URL analysis. The kit exploits Microsoft's legitimate device login flow through OAuth device-code phishing to gain account access without directly stealing passwords. Targeting organizations primarily in the United States and Europe, EvilTokens focuses on managed security services, technology, manufacturing, education, banking, and consulting sectors. The encrypted landing page only reveals its malicious content after browser decryption, requiring dynamic analysis to uncover the complete attack chain. The kit uses multiple stages including gate checks, user code requests, and session monitoring to complete Microsoft 365 account takeovers while appearing legitimate through final redirects to OneDrive.
An exposed attacker server has unveiled FortiBleed, a large-scale credential-compromise campaign targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways globally. This operation involved credential harvesting through reuse, brute force, and hash cracking using a distributed GPU infrastructure with approximately 36 rented GPUs via Hashtopolis. The exposed directory contained 319 files revealing scanning tools, cracking infrastructure, credential databases, post-exploitation toolkits, and active VPN configurations. While initially reported as affecting 21,632 domains, analysis of the attacker's own tooling reveals only 918 organizations showed evidence of internal network compromise, with merely 148 confirmed cases where credentials were fully cracked. The operation ultimately aimed to sell initial access to compromised networks, with victims spanning 194 countries, predominantly India, United States, and Taiwan.
A previously undocumented Windows loader designated as OXLOADER delivers the CASTLESTEALER infostealer through malicious Google Ads campaigns, achieving remarkably low detection rates. The loader employs multiple obfuscation layers including control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and mixed Boolean-Arithmetic techniques, along with self-modifying decryption stubs and abuse of the Windows .reloc section for shellcode staging. Distribution occurs via malvertising impersonating Node.js installations, redirecting victims through intermediary domains to Storj-hosted batch scripts. The loader implements five anti-VM and language checks, including CIS-region and Russian-language exclusions, suggesting a financially motivated Russian-speaking threat actor. OXLOADER uses DonutLoader to deliver the .NET-based CASTLESTEALER payload in memory, evading traditional detection mechanisms through deliberate engineering choices.
Global law enforcement, including agencies from the Netherlands, Canada, United States, and Germany, coordinated Operation Endgame to disrupt TA569, a prominent cybercriminal group tracked since 2018. The operation targeted SocGholish infrastructure, taking down over 100 servers and domains while remediating 14,971 compromised websites. TA569 pioneered web inject techniques using fake browser updates to distribute malware, often leading to ransomware attacks. The group compromised high-traffic websites across multiple industries, affecting millions of visitors globally. Their attack chains involved traffic distribution systems like Keitaro TDS and ParrotTDS, delivering GhoLoader payloads that could lead to ransomware deployment in enterprise environments. Law enforcement actions included server disruption and website disinfection, significantly impacting the threat actor's operations, infrastructure, and reputation within the cybercriminal ecosystem.
A sophisticated espionage campaign attributed to UNC6508, a China-nexus threat actor, targeted North American academic, medical, and military research institutions for over a year. The adversary exploited REDCap servers, deployed custom INFINITERED malware to harvest credentials, and maintained persistent access through trojanized legitimate files that survived software upgrades. After remaining undetected for more than a year, the threat actor pivoted to administrative accounts and created malicious content compliance rules to silently exfiltrate emails containing defense intelligence, Indo-Pacific command operations, artificial intelligence research, uncrewed vehicle systems, cyber programs, and medical research data. The operation employed sophisticated techniques including obfuscation networks routing through US-based infrastructure, compromised routers, and dedicated exfiltration accounts, demonstrating advanced operational security aligned with strategic intelligence collection requirements.
An FBI investigation identified Denis Nikolayevich Obrezko, a Russian national, as facilitating cyber intrusions conducted by the Russia-aligned threat group Void Blizzard. Between June and July 2024, multiple U.S. companies across various sectors were targeted in a large-scale cyber espionage campaign involving mass email harvesting and unauthorized access. The threat actors utilized stolen session tokens, proxy services, and VPNs to authenticate to victim Office 365 environments and exfiltrate data. Obrezko allegedly obtained critical infrastructure including a virtual private server and domain registration used in these attacks. FBI investigation linked Obrezko through cryptocurrency transactions, email accounts, phone numbers, and IP addresses to domains and infrastructure used in the intrusion campaign. Eleven U.S. companies have confirmed unauthorized access, representing only a fraction of suspected victims nationwide.
US Federal authorities have seized 13 domains allegedly used in a Chinese intelligence-linked operation to recruit Americans with access to classified government information. The websites posed as legitimate consulting firms, offering vague consultancy and advisory roles to current and former US government employees, military personnel, and security clearance holders. The operation, which began in November 2023, used fake company websites, online job postings, and social media recruiting to approach potential targets. Recruiters offered paid consulting work, then pressured candidates to share confidential insider information. The campaign employed false personas, stolen identities, AI-generated profile photos, encrypted messaging, cryptocurrency, and fake contracts to appear legitimate. Job postings appeared on platforms including Upwork, Expertia AI, and Hubstaff Talent, covering topics aligned with Chinese government interests.
Between April and May 2026, a likely North Korean threat actor conducted phishing campaigns targeting developers across nearly 100 organizations in finance, cryptocurrency, education, and technology sectors. The attacks used recruitment and code review themes, delivering emails with links to actor-controlled GitHub repositories hosting malicious scripts. The infection chain exploited Visual Studio Code workflows and deployed malicious Visual Studio Extensions (VSIX) requiring minimal user interaction. Cross-platform malware was executed on macOS, Linux, and Windows systems, including the open-source Overlord framework. The campaigns specifically targeted developer assets including API tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, and credentials. Attackers employed fake company personas and professional-looking repositories masquerading as legitimate cryptocurrency and blockchain projects to establish credibility and lure victims.
From January through May 2026, a financially motivated data theft extortion campaign executed by threat cluster UNC3753 targeted dozens of organizations across professional, legal, and financial services in the United States. The threat actors leverage voice phishing and social engineering techniques, posing as IT support to convince targets to host screen-sharing sessions and download remote monitoring and management utilities. Once inside environments, they conduct searches to locate and exfiltrate highly sensitive data including proprietary legal agreements, personally identifiable information, and financial records for subsequent extortion demands. The entire attack sequence often occurs within a single business day, with recent incidents showing data theft initiated in under an hour. Notably, threat actors have also accessed victims' systems in person, with individuals posing as IT technicians entering corporate offices to attempt direct exfiltration using USB storage media.
Over 900 automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems across the United States, used to monitor fuel and chemical storage tanks across various critical infrastructure sectors, have been found exposed online and are vulnerable to ongoing attacks. [...]
