BambooToken is a multiplatform malware family active since at least February 2023 that uses the MQTT protocol for covert command and control. It targets Windows and Linux systems primarily across Asia and South America, infecting backend servers in various sectors including mobile apps, legal, financial, software, hotels, and GitLab instances. The malware employs sideloading via Tendyron's OnKey authentication software, common in Chinese banking and government networks. It has capabilities for host enumeration, antivirus detection, and potential keylogging and clipboard theft. The attacker uses MQTT's publish-subscribe model and Cloudflare proxies to conceal infrastructure and operations. The campaign demonstrates sophisticated operational security and widespread infections.
In July 2026, IIJ discovered and analyzed an unknown .NET-based malicious tool hosted on a public directory. This tool, named PIVOTPIPE, exhibits functionality similar to Cobalt Strike Beacon, communicating with C2 servers using configurations close to default profiles and supporting numerous C2 commands. However, PIVOTPIPE differs from official Cobalt Strike Beacon through unique implementations including detection evasion code, custom loaders, and obfuscated strings. The tool consists of two components: a loader and RAT module. The loader implements AMSI bypass, indirect syscalls, and sleep masking for EDR evasion. PIVOTPIPE supports TCP Beacon and SMB Beacon functionality for peer-to-peer communication through compromised hosts. Debug artifacts suggest the tool was still under development at the time of discovery, indicating potential future enhancements.
Mythic is an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework used by red teams and threat actors. Analysis found 131 unique Mythic C2 hosts exposed on the public Internet, with most using default TLS certificates. These deployments span major cloud providers and are concentrated in the US, Hong Kong, and China. Default artifacts such as TLS certificates with O=Mythic and port 7443 responses enable detection. Some clusters appear to be training environments, while isolated deployments with custom domains and advanced transport methods like Discord and steganography indicate operational use.
Cybercriminals are using fake websites that mimic the legitimate Bitrefill site to defraud users. These lookalike sites appear in search engine results and use domains similar to Bitrefill's, including Punycode variants. Victims are tricked into completing checkout processes that resemble Bitrefill's, paying cryptocurrency to attacker-controlled addresses with no recovery option. The campaign uses sophisticated analytics to optimize victim conversion, indicating organized criminal activity.
The GrelosGTM cybercriminal group abuses the legitimate functionality of Google Tag Manager to compromise e-commerce websites, primarily those running Magento CMS. Since early 2020, they have injected malicious Google Tag Manager scripts that load multi-stage JavaScript payloads via WebSocket connections. The final payload is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript sniffer designed to steal payment card information during checkout through fake payment forms. Stolen data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled servers. The campaign has affected at least seven websites across Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
A malicious browser extension named 'Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot' distributed via Chrome Web Store and Firefox Add-ons steals Twitch OAuth tokens from approximately 30,000 Chrome users and 552 Firefox users. The extension masquerades as a tool to improve user experience by blocking ads and unlocking streams but secretly captures and exfiltrates OAuth session tokens to Russian-controlled proxy servers. The stolen tokens are sent during video playlist redirects or via POST requests to collection endpoints. The operator is linked to a commercial Russian bot service called JeetBot, with infrastructure hosted in Germany and cloud providers.
LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.
Threat actors exploited trusted brands and cloud services in a sophisticated web campaign combining fraudulent DocuSign workflows, Florida healthcare screening lures, and deceptive cloud infrastructure to deploy ConnectWise ScreenConnect Access clients. The attack utilized Cloudflare Pages hosting with fake Cloudflare verification workflows to establish legitimacy. Victims were socially engineered to download a ZIP archive containing a malicious HTA file that employed Base64-encoded VBScript, fake Adobe interfaces, UAC privilege escalation, and Microsoft Defender SmartScreen registry modifications. The attack leveraged living-off-the-land techniques using native Windows tools like mshta.exe, curl.exe, and msiexec.exe for silent ScreenConnect installation, ultimately providing unauthorized remote access. The campaign was classified as Zero Hour Fraudulent and blocked at the web entry point before payload delivery could occur.
Threat actors are leveraging generative AI to enhance financial fraud campaigns targeting enterprise organizations. Between August 3-5, over one million phishing emails were distributed through third-party infrastructure, primarily targeting US-based organizations (87.7%). The attacks employed sophisticated executive impersonation, specifically CEOs and CFOs, combined with fabricated ServiceNow invoices requesting ACH transfers of approximately $50,000. The campaign demonstrated multiple AI-assisted indicators including extensive HTML comments, structured section labeling, and uniform template construction. Attackers registered lookalike domains and created elaborate forwarded email threads between spoofed executives to establish legitimacy. The fraudulent invoices contained detailed branding, personalized recipient information, and specific payment instructions to attacker-controlled bank accounts. Multiple layered social engineering techniques were deployed to reduce recipient skepticism and convince acc...
Melofee is a Linux implant malware that has evolved over three years to include a modular architecture with hot-loadable components for shell access, file management, and command execution. It incorporates a kernel rootkit based on the Reptile project to enhance stealth and supports multiple communication protocols with RC4 encryption. The malware infrastructure uses fake certificates impersonating legitimate entities and shows code similarities with Windows implants linked to Chinese state-sponsored groups. Its modular design allows dynamic loading of up to eleven specialized modules via a common plugin interface.
In June 2026, a new malware family named SloppyRAT was identified, likely used by ransomware-related threat actors to establish footholds for lateral movement. Delivered through multi-stage ClickFix infection chains, the malware features encrypted code blocks, EtherHiding for command-and-control resolution via Polygon JSON-RPC protocol, and multiple anti-analysis techniques including junk code and indirect system calls. SloppyRAT implements certificate pinning to prevent TLS traffic inspection and includes 47 built-in PowerShell-like commands for remote access. The infection chain uses finger.exe, IronPython, and deploys CastleLoader and CastleRAT components before installing SloppyRAT. Despite sophisticated capabilities, the codebase contains numerous software bugs affecting persistence mechanisms and other features, suggesting active development.
A widespread IT impersonation and voice-phishing campaign designated PREY-0058 is actively targeting Microsoft 365 and SaaS platforms. Threat actors impersonate IT helpdesk staff via phone or text to trick executives and senior personnel into divulging credentials through adversary-in-the-middle phishing portals. After bypassing multi-factor authentication, attackers conduct rapid automated data exfiltration across email, file storage, and cloud repositories without deploying ransomware. The operation relies heavily on NodeMaven residential proxy infrastructure to blend with legitimate traffic. Extortion demands are delivered via TOX messaging within hours of compromise, typically with 72-hour deadlines and threats of public data exposure. The campaign exhibits tradecraft overlapping with UNC6671 and involves multiple extortionware brands including BlackFile, Redact, Pink, and Helix.
Six Chrome and Firefox extensions linked through shared code, C2 infrastructure, and publishing history have been identified targeting cryptocurrency traders. Four malicious extensions steal authenticated session tokens and wallet data from Axiom Trade and Padre users, while two earlier extensions reveal a pattern of repackaging crypto trading tools. The extensions J7Tracker, VREO, and Orbit Tracker automatically retrieve user information, wallet bundles, Firebase tokens, and application state, then exfiltrate data to threat actor-controlled Vercel deployments. The campaign targets an active trading community with Axiom processing over $15 billion in volume across 650,000 wallets. The malicious code runs inside authenticated sessions, collecting localStorage, IndexedDB data, and API responses containing authentication tokens and wallet keys. Data is Base64-encoded and transmitted via browser navigation to avoid CORS restrictions, enabling account compromise and cryptocurrency theft.
Mantax Otax is an Android malware targeting devices running Android 9 and earlier. It combines ransomware and spyware capabilities, encrypting files with AES and appending .enc extensions. The malware requests extensive permissions, including device administrator and accessibility access, to steal sensitive data such as screen recordings, browser history, PINs, contacts, call logs, SMS, and chats from WhatsApp and Telegram. It communicates with command and control servers via HTTPS and WebSockets, using dynamic domain resolution through GitHub. Version 2 introduces advanced features like UI hijacking, screen blocking, touch input interception, harassment capabilities, and remote text-to-speech. Data exfiltration is facilitated through Firebase and Catbox services, enabling a double-extortion scheme with an interactive ransom chat portal.
Multiple cloud accounts have been compromised through passkey-themed social engineering campaigns since May 2026. Attackers impersonate IT helpdesk staff via phone calls or SMS, directing victims to phishing sites that mimic Microsoft sign-in pages. After obtaining credentials through adversary-in-the-middle or device code authentication flows, attackers establish persistence by adding unauthorized MFA methods. They then conduct extensive reconnaissance using Microsoft Graph API to map users, groups, permissions, and resources. The intrusion culminates in high-volume data collection from SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange using automated tools, with exfiltration occurring over hours or days at controlled rates to avoid detection.
Gigabud is an Android remote access banking trojan active since 2022, attributed to GoldFactory group, targeting victims across Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The malware now utilizes Vwork, a weaponized fork of the open-source app cloning application Shelter, to evade detection by creating isolated work profiles. After initial Gigabud infection, Vwork is installed to clone banking applications into the work profile, hiding malicious activity from signature-based detection in application security SDKs. Between February and July 2026, approximately 1,469 compromised devices and 1,281 potentially compromised logins were observed in Indonesia alone, with estimated losses of roughly $960,939. The infection chain involves social engineering through phishing sites delivering fake apps disguised as legitimate services, followed by credential theft through overlays and remote-controlled fraudulent transactions executed within cloned banking apps.
Threat actors are exploiting anticipation for Grand Theft Auto VI by distributing malicious ISO files disguised as leaked game versions. These fake installers are spread through SEO poisoning, gaming forums, social media, and torrenting sites. The analyzed ISO contains multiple malicious components including several RAT variants (NJRAT and DCRAT), Mercurial Grabber infostealer, Chaos ransomware functioning as a wiper, and Yandex Browser. When executed, the fake installer displays Russian-language messages and deploys malware to %TEMP% folders. The package includes data exfiltration capabilities, credential theft, system control features, and destructive file encryption. Based on Russian language usage throughout the infection chain, the campaign appears to target Russian-speaking gamers. The malware components date back to 2023, suggesting repurposed tools for this opportunistic attack.
Two sophisticated phishing campaigns employed browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) techniques to deceive victims into installing rogue ScreenConnect remote management tools. Attackers sent phishing messages with malicious links redirecting targets to fake Adobe Reader update pages. The BiTB technique created convincing fake browser windows within webpages, displaying legitimate-looking Adobe URLs to bypass user awareness training. Victims were tricked into downloading ScreenConnect installers disguised as Adobe software updates. Each incident resulted in deployment of multiple rogue ScreenConnect instances for redundant persistence, followed by execution of defense-evasion binaries (HideCursor.exe and HideUL.exe) designed to hide attacker activities. The attacks established service-based persistence through Windows services, enabling continued remote access. Both campaigns were intercepted before further damage occurred, demonstrating how threat actors combine social engineering throughout the entire attack chain...
A massive cybercrime campaign tracked as CL-CRI-1171 has operated undetected for at least two years, utilizing a pay-per-install marketplace to distribute multiple malware families. The operation targeted primarily young gamers through YouTube channels with hundreds of thousands of followers, while simultaneously using SEO poisoning to compromise corporate endpoints including critical infrastructure and government entities. The campaign employed OfferLoader, a custom loader capable of delivering unique payload combinations through sophisticated gating mechanisms. Three distinct malware families were identified: Insomnia RAT, a cross-platform backdoor targeting Windows and macOS; ARKTunnel, a WebSocket tunneling tool hidden via steganography; and Docro Hijacker, a Chrome browser hijacker. Over 10,000 distinct loader samples were discovered, indicating a much larger deployment campaign affecting numerous organizations globally.
A cryptomining botnet compromised 3,562 Redis servers by exploiting unauthenticated Redis instances using rogue replication to inject cron jobs that deployed XMRig miners. The affected Redis versions range from 2.8.17 to 7.2.0 across various Linux distributions, indicating misconfiguration rather than a software vulnerability. The attacker toolkit, exposed via an open directory, contained exploit source code, campaign logs, and Windows registry hives. Additional attack vectors targeting WordPress, MongoDB, and SSH were included but did not result in confirmed compromises. The operation mined Monero using a wallet linked to the operator's own systems. Meterpreter deployment capabilities were also observed, extending the operator's activity timeline. No known exploits in the wild or vendor patches are documented.
