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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (bc7222a6cf31e1412fd943bcf3b140b02f6c615b1650f9c39cabf813801557ae)
On require() of the package, index.js loads _ext.js which fetches a platform-specific executable from split-string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> for chunk count, i.<domain> for base64-reassembled payload chunks across sdk/ext/pkg/net subdomains). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe /.cache_<hex>), chmod 755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. Destination hostnames are reconstructed via array-join to evade static string scanning. The behavior is framed as opt-out telemetry (DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK env checks,.analytics_state file), and lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel Buffer.from(chunks,'base64') + fs.chmodSync + cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &']) code path that corroborates the write-chmod-exec pattern.
## Source: ghsa-malware (f19d34835a9a9239da98c35195bbeefb0f0b5f67e698897c2730cdf4b8262b90)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (2a3d08e3dbef59d66846b1b2ef0080f02c8f2c3597eb4725db3c6f62c8fcb231)
index.js unconditionally requires./_loader on load. _loader.js selects a platform-specific payload path (linux_x64, linux_arm64, darwin, win32) and downloads a binary from Cloudflare Workers hostnames assembled at runtime by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback across sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", path + " &"]) or spawn("cmd.exe", ["/c", "start", "/b", path]). A sibling lib/telemetry.js wraps the same primitives (require("child_" + "process"), fs["chmod" + "Sync"], base64 chunk decode, spawn of /bin/sh and cmd.exe) inside Sentry-mimicking scaffolding as an alternate loader. No hash, signature, or publisher verification is performed on the fetched payload. The typosquat-style package name, split-string hostname reassembly, cover-story filenames (.cache_, dotnet_diag_), and detached/unref'd execution are consistent with a purpose-built import-time dropper.
## Source: ghsa-malware (9798a6a34ba04688210f68cbf4582d669ef1a91abeeb44a27ffd05c73921240c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (e31cd37951ea782d9a4a5cd23ad0524d154dccddbf0aef0d96cfdcaa29d03698)
index.js unconditionally requires./_bridge on load. _bridge.js selects a per-platform payload (linux x64/arm64, darwin, win32), fetches a native binary over HTTPS from a hardcoded list of Cloudflare *.workers.dev endpoints (assembled at runtime by joining split string arrays such as ["oob-worker.cf101-adf.work","ers",".de","v"]), writes it to /tmp/.cache_<uid> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe under names that impersonate benign artifacts, chmods 0755 on POSIX via fs["chmod"+"Sync"], and spawns it detached through /bin/sh -c on POSIX or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows. A DNS TXT covert-channel fallback resolves alternate payload sources under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, with the discovery domains also reconstructed from split arrays. lib/telemetry.js ships a second parallel dropper implementation labelled as an "Analytics SDK" (base64 payload assembly, chmodSync 0755, /bin/sh -c spawn) that is not reached from the current index.js but is packaged in the tarball. The advertised purpose (a BNPL banner abstraction) has no relationship to fetching and executing platform-specific native executables, and the destinations are not publisher-owned.
## Source: ghsa-malware (136bb556f5d69b483536f852deeebae245dcd87809dd2dd7e39f1909acabefae)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (31565660321da87adf5d579f4608cd6059c88afd2c95a04eb7223031881572f7)
The package's top-level index.js unconditionally requires./_platform on load. _platform.js reconstructs a set of mirror hostnames via string-split concatenation (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev family) and a DNS-TXT discovery fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, selects a per-architecture endpoint from an internal _BIN_MAP, fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under a cover filename, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. lib/telemetry.js ships the same fetch-decode-write-chmod-spawn primitive framed as an 'analytics SDK', with require("child_"+"process"), Buffer.from(chunks,"base64") decoding, fs["chmod"+"Sync"](...,0o755), and cp.spawn("/bin/sh",["-c",filePath+" &"]). Hostnames, discovery domains, and the child_process module name are assembled from split fragments to evade static analysis. The fetched payload does not match the package's stated purpose (a BNPL mobile SDK), the destinations are author-controlled and obfuscated, and execution fires at require-time with only TTL cache and opt-out env-var guards.
## Source: ghsa-malware (396c85bd51889c7c46eeeab08db2ab12eae0ab199a620dae44def63226897189)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (4f29e1e3b6b3a01a935dbcd19077e516c17d31c3674078ecfe2cd112b0137437)
On require, index.js loads _init.js which reconstructs hostnames from split-string arrays (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf102','-baf.workers.','dev'].join('') and ['sdk.dl.','wel1.ru'].join('')) to build URLs against four Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. A platform-specific binary is downloaded via https.get, written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmodded 0755, and launched detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). The fetched payload is unverified, comes from mutable non-publisher hosts, and executes on module load rather than through any documented API of the package.
## Source: ghsa-malware (7cd7386bf67dcd89be60f275d29aa374bf07fa12a56f1ff56bef400c7b2ddf17)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package 'dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-title' version 35.7.3 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, downloads and executes attacker-controlled binaries from Cloudflare Workers subdomains or via a DNS covert channel. The malicious payload is saved to disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process, enabling remote code execution on the host machine. This behavior is consistent with a hostile dropper delivering unauthorized code at package load time.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-swagger version 35.6.8 contains malicious code that downloads and executes untrusted binary payloads from remote hosts. The package's setup.js reconstructs obfuscated hostnames to evade detection, downloads platform-specific binaries, writes them to temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and executes them detached from the main process. If HTTPS delivery fails, it uses a covert DNS TXT record channel to retrieve the payload. The malicious payload is unrelated to the package's declared functionality and is unsigned and unpinned. A secondary malicious module with similar capabilities is present but not currently reachable from the main entry point.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-video version 35.4.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes an opaque binary payload from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts and fallback DNS-TXT sources. The payload is saved under decoy filenames in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and spawned detached from the main process. The code uses string-splitting and runtime assembly to hide destination hostnames and module names, masquerading as telemetry or analytics functionality. This behavior identifies the package as a supply-chain dropper rather than legitimate software.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-table version 35.3.4 contains malicious code that, upon require(), downloads and executes an obfuscated platform-specific binary payload. The payload is fetched from dynamically assembled Cloudflare Workers hostnames with a DNS-TXT fallback resolver, saved to temporary directories under disguised names, permissioned for execution, and spawned detached. The package masquerades as an analytics SDK, honoring environment variables to disable telemetry as a cover story. A second bundled module exhibits similar malicious behavior with additional obfuscation. The package name and framing do not correspond to the observed malicious activity.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-tiles version 35.7.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes attacker-controlled binaries. Upon requiring the package, it reconstructs hostnames to fetch opaque platform-specific binaries over HTTPS, writes them to disguised temporary paths, sets executable permissions, and spawns them detached. A fallback channel uses base64-over-DNS TXT records to retrieve payload chunks from suspicious domains. No legitimate native source justifies these binaries, and the domains are unrelated to the declared publisher. A secondary module with similar behavior exists but is not triggered in this version.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-button-set version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes opaque native binaries from multiple Cloudflare Workers endpoints and fallback DNS-TXT domains. The malicious payload is saved to temporary directories with decoy filenames, given executable permissions, and launched detached from the main process. The package masquerades this behavior as telemetry, but its declared functionality does not require native binary execution. There is no known patch or fix available at this time.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-picture-gallery version 35.2.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from attacker-controlled servers. The package masquerades as a payments or BNPL gallery SDK but unconditionally loads a script that reconstructs command-and-control hostnames, downloads an opaque native payload, writes it to a hidden file, sets executable permissions, and executes it detached from the main process. This behavior results in arbitrary code execution on any host that installs or imports this package version.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-popup version 35.1.9 contains malicious code that, upon being required, loads a platform-specific payload from obfuscated remote hosts. This payload is fetched over HTTPS or reconstructed via DNS TXT records, saved to temporary directories, made executable, and then executed without any signature or hash verification. The package name falsely implies a legitimate payments-related context but actually executes arbitrary binaries at import time, posing a significant security risk.
The npm package dolyame-ui-badge version 35.4.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts. The binary is saved under disguised names in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and run detached from the main process. The package falsely claims to verify the payload via SHA-256 and offers opt-out flags, but no such verification exists. This behavior is unexpected for a UI badge component and indicates malicious intent.
The npm package dolyame-ui-breadcrumbs version 35.6.5 contains malicious code that, upon being required, dynamically reconstructs command-and-control hostnames and fetches a binary payload from attacker-controlled servers. This payload is saved to disk under disguised filenames and executed with full remote code execution capabilities on the host system. The malicious behavior includes platform-specific execution methods and persistence markers, enabling an attacker to run arbitrary code on the installer's machine.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-scroll version 35.9.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes an attacker-controlled binary on the host system. Instead of providing the benign scroll abstraction described in its README, the package loads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts, saves it under a disguised name in temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and runs it detached. If the HTTPS fetch fails, it uses a DNS-TXT record fallback to reconstruct the payload. The downloaded binary is not verified by hash or signature, allowing arbitrary code execution upon import of the package.
The npm package dolyame-ui-block version 35.1.8 contains malicious code that, upon requiring its main entry, fetches and executes a remote binary payload without verification. This payload is retrieved from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hostnames and a DNS-TXT fallback, saved to a hidden temporary file, marked executable, and launched via a detached shell process. The behavior is unrelated to the package's purported UI functionality and represents a remote code execution dropper with deliberate evasion techniques.
The npm package 'dolyame-boxy-stories-of-block' version 35.8.6 contains malicious code that downloads and executes platform-specific binaries from remote servers without integrity verification. It writes these binaries to temporary locations on the host system, sets executable permissions, and runs them detached from the main process. The package uses obfuscated hostname reconstruction and mimics system artifacts to evade detection, presenting itself as an analytics SDK. A secondary module performs similar malicious actions with payload chunking and endpoint rotation.
The npm package dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-text-block version 35.1.8 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, downloads and executes a native binary payload from fragmented Cloudflare Workers hosts and fallback DNS TXT records. The payload is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and spawned detached without user consent or integrity checks. A dormant secondary dropper exists in the package but is not activated in this version.
The npm package ded-aa-liza-ded-aa-liza-core (version 35.2.5) is a malicious package that, upon being required, downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints and fallback DNS TXT channels. The binary is saved under disguised filenames mimicking diagnostic tools, made executable, and run detached on the host system. The package falsely advertises itself as providing foundational type definitions but performs no legitimate function other than executing this remote payload.