The npm package ded-aa-common-ded-aa-common-core version 35.1.6 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, loads a script which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts. This binary is saved to temporary directories under disguised names, made executable, and executed detached from the main process. The code uses obfuscated domain assembly and can fallback to retrieving the payload covertly via DNS TXT records, evading static analysis and network filtering. No integrity checks are performed on the fetched payload, increasing risk. A marker file suppresses repeated execution visibility. This behavior indicates a sophisticated malicious package designed for stealthy code execution.
The npm package dolyame-ui-checkbox version 35.6.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes attacker-controlled binaries. Upon requiring the package, it reconstructs command-and-control (C2) hostnames using string-splitting and DNS TXT record techniques to evade detection. It then downloads a binary payload, saves it to temporary directories with deceptive filenames, sets executable permissions, and runs it detached from the main process. A secondary dropper disguised as an analytics SDK performs similar actions using base64-decoded payloads. These behaviors indicate a sophisticated malware dropper embedded in the package.
The npm package dolyame-ui-editor version 35.6.6 contains malicious code that executes attacker-controlled binaries upon installation or require. It fetches obfuscated, opaque binaries from rotating Cloudflare Workers hosts and DNS TXT-record fallback channels, writes them to temporary locations with disguised names, sets executable permissions, and spawns them detached from the main process. No verification of the downloaded payload is performed. This package acts as a lure, executing unauthorized code unrelated to its stated purpose as a UI editor.
The npm package dolyame-ui-footer version 35.5.8 contains malicious code that, when required, loads a runtime script which fetches a binary payload from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts. The payload is reconstructed using DNS TXT records from specific domains and executed on the host system, disguising itself as a UI/footer component. This behavior is unexpected given the package's declared purpose and indicates a supply chain compromise.
The npm package dolyame-ui-input version 35.7.6 is a malicious React component library that does not contain UI code but instead downloads and executes a platform-specific binary automatically upon module load. The binary is fetched from multiple Cloudflare Workers hostnames or, if those fail, reconstructed from base64-encoded DNS TXT records from suspicious domains. The payload is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and spawned detached without user interaction or verification. This behavior occurs without integrity checks despite misleading comments. A related module contains similar drop-and-execute logic but is not currently triggered. The package executes untrusted code automatically, posing a significant risk to users who install or require it.
The npm package dolyame-ui-layout version 35.9.8 contains malicious code that, upon being required, downloads and executes a native binary payload from dynamically constructed Cloudflare Workers domains and a fallback DNS-TXT base64 source. The payload is saved to temporary directories with names mimicking system diagnostic files, given executable permissions, and launched detached from the main process. The package hides dangerous API calls and module names via string concatenation and does not verify the authenticity or integrity of the downloaded binary. Execution occurs immediately on module load without any lifecycle hook. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided.
The npm package dolyame-ui-label version 35.7.8 is a malicious package masquerading as a UI component library. Upon requiring the package, it reconstructs command-and-control (C2) hostnames at runtime to evade static detection, selects platform-specific endpoints, and downloads a native binary payload. This binary is saved to temporary directories on Unix or Windows systems, given executable permissions, and executed detached from the main process. The package's declared purpose does not justify this behavior, and the network destinations are unrelated to any legitimate publisher. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available.
The npm package dolyame-ui-navigation (version 35.7.3) contains malicious code that executes an attacker-controlled binary upon being imported. The package fetches a platform-specific executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers URLs and falls back to DNS-TXT resolution from suspicious domains. The downloaded payload is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and executed detached from the main process. This behavior occurs immediately on require() of the package, causing automatic execution of malicious code on the host system.
The npm package dolyame-ui-menu, advertised as a React UI component library, contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific native binary from attacker-controlled hosts. The malicious payload is fetched using obfuscated runtime-assembled hostnames and a DNS-TXT fallback channel, then saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames and executed without signature verification. Execution is conditionally gated by environment variables and filesystem markers to evade detection and analysis. The package version 35.6.1 is affected.
The npm package dolyame-ui-portal version 35.3.6 contains malicious code that executes attacker-controlled binaries upon installation or requiring. The malicious payload downloads platform-specific binaries from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hostnames and a DNS-TXT discovery domain, writes them to temporary directories with disguised filenames, sets executable permissions, and spawns them detached from the main process. The dropper attempts to evade sandbox detection by checking environment variables. A secondary dropper exists but is not currently reachable. This results in remote code execution from non-publisher infrastructure.
The npm package dolyame-ui-popover version 35.8.7 contains malicious code that, upon being required, downloads and executes attacker-controlled native binaries specific to the host OS and architecture. These binaries are fetched from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints and fallback DNS TXT records, saved under deceptive filenames in temporary directories, given execute permissions, and launched detached from the main process. The package masquerades as a payments UI library but its sole runtime effect is to execute this malicious payload. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently provided.
The npm package dolyame-ui-tabs version 35.3.2 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary native binaries on the host system upon package load. It fetches platform-specific binaries from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains and uses a DNS-TXT fallback channel to retrieve payloads. These binaries are saved with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and executed detached from the main process, enabling remote code execution at library load time. The package masquerades as a React UI component library but includes no legitimate reason for native code execution or network payload retrieval. A dormant dropper with similar capabilities is also present but not triggered by default. The behavior indicates deliberate evasion and malicious intent.
The npm package dolyame-ui-test version 35.2.5 contains malicious code that executes a supply-chain attack. It fetches attacker-controlled native binaries from Cloudflare Workers hosts and, if HTTPS fails, uses a DNS-TXT covert channel to retrieve payload chunks. The binaries are saved under decoy filenames in temporary directories and executed to achieve full-host remote code execution. A secondary dropper module uses obfuscated APIs under a telemetry SDK cover story. This behavior is not legitimate for a UI package and indicates a deliberate compromise.
The npm package eacq-acq-menu-core version 35.9.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes platform-specific binaries from covert command-and-control (C2) servers. It reconstructs obfuscated hostnames at runtime to evade detection, downloads binaries via HTTPS, and falls back to retrieving payloads through DNS TXT record queries if HTTPS delivery fails. The payload is written to temporary directories under disguised filenames and executed in the background. The package's README falsely presents it as a benign base framework module, masking its malicious behavior.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (117b4f6c7e9e402d92085e427c4b40874e9b6838e16c15562408a0bda241f9ae)
The package presents itself as a UI dropdown library but on require executes _init.js, which selects a platform-specific asset (linux/darwin/win32), fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from string-fragmented `*.workers.dev` hosts (assembled via `.join('')` to hide the hostname from static scanners) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback to `*.dl.wel1.ru`, writes the payload to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (`dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` on Windows, `.cache_<hex>` on Unix), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c "<file> &"` or `cmd.exe /c start /b`. The `require("child_"+"process")` split, the fragmented CDN host arrays, the.NET-diagnostics filename masquerade, and an `analytics_state` marker file provide cover-story framing. There is no pinning, hash verification, publisher-matched origin, or relation to a UI dropdown component. Installing or importing the package results in arbitrary attacker-controlled code executing on the installer's host.
## Source: ghsa-malware (5aa96551428ffa96321135f6a2df75bfddc6d1a28627a94dc3d689940e13e377)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (7a591855b5f44a53d20e6258728aeb5c0254fb10dac285f579fffcfc97608061)
The package's main entry (index.js) unconditionally requires./setup on load. setup.js selects an OS/arch-specific endpoint and downloads a binary from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) whose hostnames are assembled via array-join string splitting to evade static analysis, with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback across sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to a temp path under a disguised name ('dotnet_diag_<tag>.exe' on Windows or '.cache_<tag>' on POSIX), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c "fp &". There is no hash or signature verification of the downloaded payload; the source hosts are attacker-controlled infrastructure unrelated to the package's stated Vite-plugin purpose. Execution is suppressed by DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK environment variables and cached via a marker file with a ~21329s TTL, framing the behavior as telemetry while dropping and running an opaque binary. Any consumer that requires or imports this package triggers full-host code execution under attacker control.
## Source: ghsa-malware (8c85582964f88194107914cd82214c07879ac0ae310f6fd7af6c885b30145a71)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (c55e2e080b0f20c0c5942c16bddb3bb7894ab6e0e88eee29acd86d16db9d15bf)
On require() of devplatform-table, index.js loads./_compat which selects a platform-specific payload path, downloads an executable from string-concatenation-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (reconstructed from fragments such as ["oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.d","ev"].join("")) with a DNS-TXT fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Sensitive API identifiers including 'child_process' and 'chmodSync' are also reassembled at runtime from fragments to evade static analysis. The fetched binary is unpinned, unverified, and comes from anonymous worker hosts unrelated to any package publisher domain, giving whoever controls those hosts arbitrary code execution on any machine that installs or imports this package.
## Source: ghsa-malware (23fce942e6ee47af9c4b4307a39ae0610e74959875c3a7cd1ecea82c97bc46a7)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package 'bi-core-bi-core-core' version 35.8.5 is a malicious typosquatting package that downloads and executes external binaries from Cloudflare Workers and fallback domains. It disguises its payload by dynamically constructing URLs and filenames, writes executables to temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and runs them detached on both Unix and Windows systems. The package itself contains no legitimate functionality and acts as a dropper for malicious code. Any system with this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised.
The npm package bigops-tcrm-identity-auth version 35.9.3 is a malicious dropper disguised as a session-management utility. Upon installation or requiring the package, it fetches a platform-specific binary payload from dynamically assembled Cloudflare Workers URLs and fallback DNS-TXT channels. This payload is saved to temporary directories under misleading filenames, made executable, and then executed detached from the main process. The package includes mechanisms to evade detection and re-execute conditionally. Installing or running this package results in arbitrary attacker-controlled native code execution on the host, effectively compromising the system.
The npm package bigops-tcrm-auth version 35.8.5 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from obfuscated and suspicious hosts. It disguises its payload delivery using runtime hostname assembly, DNS TXT record fallback, and file name obfuscation. The package masquerades as an authentication module but performs unauthorized code execution, posing a severe risk to any system where it is installed.