Search: net.exe
484 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (809274addc0525244480b108485ad3dbdba1a92b65025c1c48d549dd03c45f0b) On require of the package, index.js loads _bridge.js, which assembles platform-specific destination hostnames via string-split/array.join obfuscation and downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback channel (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<rnd>, dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true}).unref(), with a marker file used to gate re-execution. A sibling module in lib/telemetry.js resolves child_process via 'child_' + 'process' string concatenation, corroborating deliberate static-analysis evasion. Importing this package causes an attacker-controlled native binary to execute on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6eae746404d92a5c5a06e6a6c0f193dfe1cd697841d04c825513c6d711fad214) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (88e8b3586c4dee4e4e812d6dc1771ec4bc99bc01058c0ae3d2e8c0cdaa8072c8) index.js unconditionally requires./_loader on load. _loader.js reassembles Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) from split-string arrays, with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru (chunk-count from c.<domain>, base64 chunks from numbered subdomains). It fetches a platform-specific native binary, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under cover names such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<file> &' or cmd /c start. A second module lib/telemetry.js (~81KB, disguised as an analytics SDK) duplicates the same fetch+chmod+spawn primitives using string-concatenated identifiers (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) as a redundant stage. The i18next plugin name and analytics_state marker do not correspond to any translation functionality shipped in the tarball. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b670b9722893bc27a1131c64b73b381cba3d68d041a280457e8806a427ed5e2c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (282ec333b26c6283eb35916acab1db10c1362d296d0694b1548882c6e48c06be) The package's main index.js unconditionally requires./_ext, which runs at load time and fetches a per-platform binary over HTTPS from string-concatenation-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev). If HTTPS fails, _ext.js falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), querying c.<domain> for a chunk count then 0.<domain>, 1.<domain>,... and base64-decoding the concatenation into a binary. The fetched bytes are written to a randomly-named file in the temp directory (masquerading as.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, analytics_state), chmod'd 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b. There is no version pinning, hash verification, or publisher-owned CDN, and the package's stated purpose (an SPA error-boundary component) has no legitimate reason to fetch and execute a native binary. Endpoint hostnames are assembled from split array literals at runtime to defeat static string scanning. Loading this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to run on the installer's host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (52a6a2f9ca87decad3081725ea4293dce82d4c33a5afe1fdb9774776b95760be) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a5ac277cf4ba72cf1040b5e06d6875a7228d7ec491d93423198e2b2f92ecb6a) Package presents as a Sentry-related SPA plugin but the exported class is an empty stub; index.js requires _bootstrap.js, which on load selects a platform-specific endpoint, fetches an opaque binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with hostnames reconstructed at runtime via array-join to evade literal detection, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. If HTTPS mirrors fail, a DNS-TXT fallback channel queries c.<domain> at sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru for a chunk count and reassembles base64-encoded payload chunks from N.<domain> TXT records. A second file lib/telemetry.js contains an unreferenced variant of the same dropper. The Cloudflare Workers and wel1.ru destinations are unrelated to any legitimate Sentry infrastructure, and the package's advertised functionality is a cover story around the dropper. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f76cb55af9e854ca5d57e6b318ae84ac06c517b98e7628117cc949f69c5c84fc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package devplatform-spa-route-tree version 35.1.3 contains malicious code that dynamically downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains and fallback domains. The binary is saved to temporary directories, masquerades as .NET diagnostic tooling, and is executed detached from the main process. The downloaded binary is unverified and served from infrastructure unrelated to the package publisher, indicating a supply chain compromise or intentional malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0cbc392b622da2cfe503443ce6a7ee67083df8a9f6e371f13e1a7625f3379bd7) index.js requires setup.js at load, which downloads a platform-specific native binary from string-concat-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf99-9b3, cf100-416) with DNS-TXT-record fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or a Windows temp path named dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod'd 0o755, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. Hostnames and dangerous API names (child_process, chmodSync) are reconstructed from split literal arrays to evade static analysis, and there is no hash or signature verification of the downloaded payload. A second implementation of the same download-chmod-spawn pattern is present in lib/telemetry.js (~81KB), framed as an 'Analytics SDK', though it is not reached from the current main entry. Executing require() on this package causes attacker-controlled native code to run on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ccbbaf9a76f0fb8271605d97295f16ee50f771f45057412a890cd08a0b0623e6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8f27a3b0f4b5c8f210576fe33a1251d774926e6c7405591948c5bc3dfa00e7aa) On require, index.js loads _init.js which selects an OS/arch-specific staging path, downloads a binary payload from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled by joining split character arrays (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel across *.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), writes the bytes to disguised paths such as /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> or a Windows Temp/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods to 0755, and spawn-detaches /bin/sh (or cmd) to execute the binary in the background. Destination hostnames are obfuscated by array-split-and-join to defeat static scanners; the payload is staged under decoy filenames posing as.NET diagnostics or cache files. A second full copy of the dropper is bundled in lib/telemetry.js (not reached from the current entry graph) using the same base64-decode, chmod 0755, and /bin/sh spawn shape, providing an alternate loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3b82b8abbaab89079233a8bd4e99a3a23c618d6bf481e8d0eaeb29805ed52ee1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4736a188169920cb89859c87cc5d53ed9a51db4f368f15546f2b999a6ec12045) On require() of bpm-foundation-feature-flags, index.js loads _init.js which downloads a platform-specific native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel to sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru that reconstructs base64-encoded binary bytes from TXT records. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments to evade static analysis. The behavior is framed as opt-out 'telemetry/analytics' (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK env checks and a /tmp/.analytics_state freshness marker), but the fetched payload is an opaque native executable unrelated to the declared feature-flag purpose. This yields remote code execution on the installer's host at import time. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package tms-x-headers version 20.2.9 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, fetches a platform-specific binary from attacker-controlled hosts. This binary is saved to a temporary file with a name mimicking legitimate .NET diagnostic tools, made executable, and then executed without any signature verification. The code uses obfuscation techniques to evade detection, including fragmented hostnames and split strings for requiring modules. Installing or loading this package results in execution of attacker-controlled native code on the host system. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-form version 20.1.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes payloads from hardcoded external hosts. It disguises the payload as .NET diagnostic or cache files and executes them on the host system, potentially giving full control to an attacker. The package name mimics a legitimate brand to evade suspicion, but exports only an empty stub. Systems with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package scandoc-scandoc-core version 20.8.5 contains malicious code that downloads and executes platform-specific binaries from dynamically constructed Cloudflare Workers hostnames. It uses covert DNS-TXT record channels to fetch payloads, writes them to temporary locations disguised as legitimate .NET diagnostic files, and executes them detached from the main process. The package includes a secondary dropper module masquerading as an analytics SDK with similar malicious behavior. Any system with this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, and all secrets and keys on the system must be rotated immediately from a different machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package tinkoff-pfp-block-mobile-advert-footer version 20.3.3 contains malicious code that, upon require(), silently loads a script which reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames and downloads an unsigned platform-specific binary. This binary masquerades as a .NET diagnostic tool, is saved to temporary directories, made executable, and executed detached from the parent process. The package name impersonates legitimate internal tooling, but its only functional code is a dropper that facilitates remote code execution and persistence with anti-analysis evasion techniques. Any system with this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (86ba5710d957735b0f3fde73e6b6ba99347296b8dc992db5f1807924f3ffc139) The package's declared main (index.js) unconditionally loads _ext.js, which on require fetches a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to a temporary path under hidden filenames (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), sets executable permissions via fs.chmodSync(path, 0o755), and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true}) or cmd. When HTTPS fetch fails, _ext.js falls back to DNS TXT resolution against *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk., ext., pkg., net.), reassembling base64 chunks from the TXT records into a Buffer and executing it — a covert channel designed to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. Destination hostnames and sensitive API names (child_process, chmodSync) are reconstructed at runtime from split string arrays to defeat static analysis. Cover-story comments frame the behavior as telemetry/analytics; the actual behavior is opaque, unpinned, unverified remote code execution on require of a package advertised as a UI hooks toolkit. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f5a1e30a7990931ff5444563b7075bb0571d6924bac069bc78c4c2f288f6b4b8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e20e151930946a17e9bea02eb51c760264c27138792955452acc4231196ceaae) On require() of bigops-voximplant, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads an OS/arch-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS-over-TXT base64 chunked fallback resolving from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 0755 via fs['chmod'+'Sync'], and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start /b, with no hash or signature verification and no source-of-truth publisher domain. A second, structurally identical dropper is bundled as lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story, using the same base64 chunk assembly, string-concatenated child_process require, and detached /bin/sh spawn. Hosts and dangerous APIs are constructed via runtime string joins ('child_'+'process', split-and-join hostname fragments) to defeat static inspection. The destinations are anonymous Cloudflare Workers and a.ru DNS-TXT channel unrelated to the package's stated Voximplant integration purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (883fad29cd53f12c99b7191ee77a0400cca0ee0911467b88f5d64f8b3402798a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64577 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: check skb_pull_data() return in gtp1u_send_echo_resp() gtp1u_send_echo_resp() ignores skb_pull_data()'s return value. Its caller gtp1u_udp_encap_recv() only guarantees 16 bytes (udphdr + gtp1_header), but the pull requests 20 (gtp1_header_long + udphdr). For a 16-19 byte echo request the pull fails and returns NULL without advancing skb->data; execution continues, and the following skb_push() plus the IP header pushed by iptunnel_xmit() move skb->data below skb->head, tripping skb_under_panic(). Fix it by dropping the packet when skb_pull_data() fails. skbuff: skb_under_panic: ... kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:2648) iptunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82) gtp_encap_recv (drivers/net/gtp.c:701 drivers/net/gtp.c:808 drivers/net/gtp.c:920) udp_queue_rcv_one_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:2388) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-12383Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Product Security and Bug Fix Update High7.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-12383 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform provides an enterprise framework for building, deploying and managing IT automation at scale. IT Managers can provide top-down guidelines on how automation is applied to individual teams, while automation developers retain the freedom to write tasks that leverage existing knowledge without the overhead. Ansible Automation Platform makes it possible for users across an organization to share, vet, and manage automation content by means of a simple, powerful, and agentless language. Security Fix(es): * automation-controller: PyJWT: Authentication bypass due to forged JSON Web Tokens (CVE-2026-48526) * automation-eda-controller: ExternalEventStreamViewSet trusts Subject header without validation and leaks expected DN (CVE-2026-12383) * automation-eda-controller: Authentication bypass in Event-Driven Ansible via forged HTTP header (CVE-2026-18141) * automation-gateway-proxy: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811) * python3.12-aiohttp: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() (CVE-2026-34993) * python3.12-daphne: daphne: Denial of Service via excessive WebSocket message size (CVE-2026-44545) * python3.12-pillow: Denial of Service via crafted GD 2.x image file (CVE-2026-55380) * python3.12-pillow: Denial of Service via crafted BDF font file (CVE-2026-55379) * python3.12-pillow: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation when processing font files (CVE-2026-54060) * python3.12-pillow: Denial of Service via crafted PCF font data (CVE-2026-54059) * python3.12-pillow: Native heap out-of-bounds write (CVE-2026-59197) * python3.12-pyasn1: Denial of Service via crafted ASN.1 REAL values (CVE-2026-59886) * python3.12-pyasn1: Denial of Service via crafted ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (CVE-2026-59885) * receptor: quic-go: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in HTTP/3 trailers (CVE-2026-40898) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. For details about this release, refer to the release notes listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Threat actors are conducting a multi-wave campaign using social engineering lures themed around Zoom updates, business documents, and system utilities to deploy ScreenConnect Remote Monitoring and Management agents. The operation employs VBScript droppers, batch loaders, compiled .NET executables, and HTML phishing pages, all retrieving payloads from a WsgiDAV staging server at 207.174.0.143:8080. Victims receive silently installed ScreenConnect agents that beacon to three attacker-controlled relay servers, providing persistent remote access. The campaign demonstrates technical evolution from obfuscated VBScript with XOR encryption to aggressive .NET loaders executing nine-step Windows Defender destruction sequences. Cross-platform variants target both Windows and macOS systems. All payloads are legitimately signed ConnectWise ScreenConnect MSIs, designed to evade security controls that trust code signing. The threat actor actively rotates payload hashes and recently pivoted to stealth tactics specifically... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-10773zephyrproject zephyr · Bounds Medium5.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10773 The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array. The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion. The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 2.8% | CVE-2026-38709TR1200 · Command Injection Critical9.8EPSS 2.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-38709 TR1200 v2.4.15, TR3000 v2.4.21, WR300 v2.4.25, WR1200 v2.4.23, WR1300 v2.4.22, WR1500 v2.3.10, WR3000 v2.4.19, WR3600 v2.3.16, and WR6500 v2.3.15 were discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the net.set_wan interface. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root via a crafted input. | CVE Database V5 |
Page 14 of 32 · 1 duplicate CVE record merged