Chinese cyberespionage group APT41 conducted a targeted attack against government IT services in Africa. The attackers used various tools including Impacket, Cobalt Strike, and custom malware for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. They leveraged DLL sideloading techniques and a compromised SharePoint server as a command and control center. The attack involved credential harvesting, use of web shells, and custom stealers to collect sensitive data. Notable TTPs included using hardcoded internal service names and proxy servers in malware, and exploiting a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication. The incident highlights the importance of comprehensive infrastructure monitoring and proper access controls.
A sophisticated backdoor targeting Exchange servers of high-value organizations in Asia has been discovered. The malware, named GhostContainer, is a multi-functional backdoor that can be dynamically extended with additional modules. It leverages several open-source projects and employs various evasion techniques to avoid detection. The backdoor grants attackers full control over the Exchange server and can function as a proxy or tunnel. The malware is believed to be part of an APT campaign targeting government and high-tech companies in Asia. It includes components for C2 parsing, virtual page injection, and web proxy functionality. The attackers demonstrated expertise in exploiting Exchange systems and assembling sophisticated espionage tools.
A cluster of suspicious activity, tracked as CL-STA-1020, has been targeting governmental entities in Southeast Asia since late 2024. The threat actors have developed a new Windows backdoor called HazyBeacon, which uses AWS Lambda URLs for command and control communication. This technique leverages legitimate cloud functionality to create a covert, scalable, and hard-to-detect communication channel. The attackers' primary goal appears to be covert intelligence gathering, focusing on sensitive government data related to trade disputes. They also use Google Drive and Dropbox for data exfiltration, blending with normal network traffic. The attack involves DLL sideloading, persistence through a Windows service, and various payloads for file collection and exfiltration.
Silent Lynx, a persistent cyber espionage threat actor, has conducted targeted intrusion campaigns against government ministries, diplomatic missions, and civil society organizations across Central Asia since 2024. The group focuses on high-value public sector organizations in Commonwealth of Independent States countries, leveraging spear-phishing campaigns through compromised government email accounts and malware staging via GitHub. Operations from late 2024 through 2026 reveal extensive infrastructure including exposed open directories, newly registered domains, and GitHub repositories. The actor employs lightweight reverse shells, PowerShell scripts, proprietary tools, and commodity utilities. Recent activity shows adoption of exploit-assisted delivery via CVE-2025-8088, expanding focus on Linux systems, and interest in FortiWeb vulnerability CVE-2025-25257. Attribution indicators point to Russian-speaking operators likely based in Kazakhstan, with targeting concentrated on water resources, environmenta...
TAG-140 Targets Indian Government Via 'ClickFix-Style' Lure
Source: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/tag-140-indian-government-clickfix-lure
A new email attack distributing DCRAT, a Remote Access Trojan, has been uncovered. The threat actor impersonates a Colombian government entity to target organizations in Colombia. The attack employs multiple evasion techniques, including password-protected archives, obfuscation, steganography, base64 encoding, and multiple file drops. DCRAT features a modular architecture, comprehensive surveillance capabilities, information theft functions, system manipulation tools, file and process management, and browser credential harvesting. The attack chain involves a phishing email with a ZIP attachment containing a bat file, which drops an obfuscated vbs file. This file eventually runs a base64-encoded script that downloads and executes the final payload. The RAT employs various persistence mechanisms and anti-analysis techniques. It attempts to bypass Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and continuously tries to connect to its command-and-control server.
Switzerland says government data stolen in ransomware attack
Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/switzerland-says-government-data-stolen-in-ransomware-attack/
TAG-140, a threat actor group overlapping with SideCopy, has deployed an updated version of their DRAT remote access trojan, dubbed DRAT V2. This new variant, developed in Delphi, introduces enhanced command and control capabilities, including arbitrary shell command execution and improved C2 obfuscation techniques. The malware was distributed through a ClickFix-style social engineering attack, using a cloned Indian Ministry of Defence press portal. DRAT V2 demonstrates TAG-140's ongoing refinement of their tooling and their continued focus on Indian government and defense targets.
ESET researchers uncovered a cyberespionage campaign by BladedFeline, an Iran-aligned APT group likely tied to OilRig. The group has targeted Kurdish and Iraqi government officials since at least 2017, using various malicious tools including the Whisper backdoor, PrimeCache IIS module, and reverse tunnels. BladedFeline maintains persistent access to high-ranking officials in both the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi government, likely for espionage purposes. The group's toolset includes sophisticated backdoors, webshells, and custom tunneling applications. ESET assesses with medium confidence that BladedFeline is a subgroup of OilRig, based on shared code, targets, and tactics. The campaign also extended to a telecommunications provider in Uzbekistan.
APT41, a sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, blends cyber espionage with cybercrime tactics. They target various sectors globally, including healthcare, telecom, and government entities. Recently, APT41 was observed using Google Calendar for malware command-and-control on a Taiwanese government website. Their attack chain involves spear-phishing emails, malicious ZIP archives, and a three-module malware system called ToughProgress. This malware uses stealthy techniques like in-memory execution, encryption, and process hollowing to evade detection. The unique aspect of ToughProgress is its use of Google Calendar events for covert data exchange, creating a stealthy communication channel for remote command execution and data exfiltration.
ESET researchers have uncovered a cyberespionage campaign conducted by BladedFeline, an Iran-aligned APT group likely tied to OilRig. The group has been targeting Kurdish and Iraqi government officials since at least 2017, using various malicious tools including reverse tunnels, backdoors, and a malicious IIS module. Key malware includes the Whisper backdoor, which communicates via compromised email accounts, and PrimeCache, a malicious IIS module with similarities to OilRig's RDAT backdoor. The campaign also targeted a telecommunications provider in Uzbekistan. BladedFeline's sophisticated tactics and tools indicate a focus on maintaining strategic access to high-ranking officials for espionage purposes.
Operation Sindoor, a coordinated cyber campaign targeting critical Indian sectors, involved state-sponsored APT activity and hacktivist operations. The campaign utilized spear phishing, malicious scripts, website defacements, and data leaks. APT36, a Pakistan-aligned threat group, deployed advanced tactics including the Ares RAT for cyber espionage. The operation targeted defense, government IT, healthcare, telecom, and education sectors. Hacktivists conducted parallel disruptive attacks, using DDoS and defacements. The campaign revealed a convergence of cyber espionage and ideological warfare, showcasing the evolution of modern cyber conflicts. It resulted in data exfiltration, service disruptions, and website defacements, significantly impacting India's cybersecurity landscape and public trust.
This analysis explores the infrastructure of APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe, using passive DNS and host response history. Starting with indicators from a CyberXTron report on a targeted phishing attack against Indian Government and Defense, the investigation expands through DNS history, IP pivoting, and host response analysis. Key findings include shared name server patterns, non-Cloudflare IP addresses, and connections to previously unreported domains. The research identifies potential new infrastructure using ETag pivoting, revealing domains with similar subdomain conventions to known Transparent Tribe assets. The methodology demonstrates the power of comprehensive DNS data and host response history in uncovering hidden connections and potential threat infrastructure.
In late October 2024, a government website was discovered hosting malware targeting multiple government entities. The malware, dubbed TOUGHPROGRESS, utilized Google Calendar for command and control. Attributed to APT41, a PRC-based actor, the campaign targeted global organizations in various sectors. The malware infection chain involved three modules: PLUSDROP, PLUSINJECT, and TOUGHPROGRESS, employing stealth and evasion techniques. TOUGHPROGRESS used encrypted Calendar events for communication. Google Threat Intelligence Group disrupted the campaign by developing custom fingerprints, terminating attacker-controlled infrastructure, and updating Safe Browsing. APT41 has been observed using free web hosting tools and URL shorteners for malware distribution since August 2024. The blog post provides indicators of compromise and YARA rules to aid in detection and defense against similar attacks.
Operation Sindoor, a coordinated cyber campaign targeting India's critical sectors, involved state-sponsored APT activity and hacktivist operations. The attack utilized spear phishing, malicious scripts, website defacements, and data leaks. APT36, a Pakistan-aligned threat group, employed advanced tactics including the Ares RAT for persistent access. The campaign targeted defense, government IT, healthcare, telecom, and education sectors. Multiple hacktivist groups participated in DDoS attacks and defacements. The operation showcased a convergence of cyber espionage and ideological warfare, significantly impacting national cybersecurity and trust. It underscored the need for enhanced threat intelligence and robust incident response frameworks to counter evolving hybrid threats.
International law enforcement agencies have taken additional actions in Operation Endgame, targeting cybercriminal organizations, particularly those behind DanaBot. DanaBot is a powerful modular malware family written in Delphi, capable of keylogging, capturing screenshots, recording desktop videos, exfiltrating files, injecting content into web browsers, and deploying second-stage malware. It operates as a Malware-as-a-Service platform, enabling various attacks. DanaBot has been used in targeted attacks against government officials in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and for DDoS attacks against Ukrainian servers. The malware implements a custom binary protocol encrypted with RSA and AES, and uses hardcoded C2 servers with Tor as a backup communication channel. Over 50 nicknames have been associated with DanaBot affiliates.
In May 2025, Pakistan-linked hacktivist groups claimed over 100 cyberattacks on Indian government, education, and critical infrastructure websites. However, an investigation reveals most breaches were exaggerated or fake. Alleged data leaks contained primarily public information, website defacements left no real impact, and DDoS attacks caused minimal disruption. The more significant threat came from APT36, which used Crimson RAT malware to target Indian defense networks following the Pahalgam terror attack. The malware, delivered through phishing emails with malicious attachments, allows remote execution of commands and data exfiltration. While hacktivist claims generated alarming headlines, the actual impact was limited, with most targeted websites operating normally.
Russian government-backed threat group COLDRIVER has developed a new malware called LOSTKEYS, capable of stealing files and system information. The group targets high-profile individuals, NGOs, and former intelligence officers through credential phishing and malware delivery. LOSTKEYS is delivered through a multi-step infection chain, starting with a fake CAPTCHA and involving PowerShell commands. The malware evades detection in VMs and uses a substitution cipher for decoding. COLDRIVER's primary goal is intelligence collection for Russia's strategic interests, targeting Western governments, militaries, journalists, and Ukraine-related individuals. The group has been linked to hack-and-leak campaigns in the UK and against NGOs.
A recent campaign attributed to APT36 has been observed spoofing India's Ministry of Defence to deliver cross-platform malware. The attackers used a ClickFix-style infection chain, mimicking government press releases and leveraging a compromised .in domain for payload staging. The campaign targeted both Windows and Linux users, employing clipboard-based execution techniques. On Windows, the attack utilized mshta.exe to execute a heavily obfuscated HTA file, while on Linux, it attempted to execute a shell script. The tradecraft observed, including government-themed lures, HTA-based delivery, and decoy documents, aligns with known APT36 tactics. This activity demonstrates the continued evolution of ClickFix techniques in new contexts.