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| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
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| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research Tenable CTO Vlad Korsunsky talks about participating in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity and Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference, where he talked with global leaders about new game-changing AI threats and the groundbreaking benefits of exposure management. Key takeaways The patching cycle is obsolete. Advanced AI models have compressed exploitation timelines into “negative days,” meaning adversaries actively weaponize vulnerabilities before vendor patches are even released. Shift from static CVE severity scores to AI-powered exposure management. Point-in-time vulnerability-risk snapshots fall short. You need AI insights to prioritize remediation based on real-world exploitability of your entire attack surface. Secure the agentic economy. The rapid explosion of autonomous non-human AI identities demands the immediate application of zero trust and least-privilege cryptographic primitives to mitigate severe, systemic internal risks. Don’t focus only on vulnerabilities. While the 2026 Verizon DBIR ranks vulnerability exploitation as the top initial access vector for breaches (about 30%), the majority of breaches (70%) stem from human errors, such as misconfigurations and identity flaws. Tenable Chief Technology Officer Vlad Korsunsky recently participated in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva, Switzerland, an annual summit that takes the pulse of global cyber risk. Korsunsky was one of 150 senior leaders from global industry and government who gathered to discuss how to strengthen businesses’ cyber defenses. The sobering, collective consensus: The traditional cybersecurity playbook is obsolete, as AI becomes an unprecedented threat multiplier. For Tenable, participating in foundational, high-level dialogues and collaborations such as this one is both a privilege and an immense responsibility. As the cybersecurity operating model gets rewritten in real-time, Tenable feels a duty to help shape cyber defenders’ collective insights and strategies. Tenable has spent years addressing the structural cybersecurity operational gaps that worry C-level executives and government leaders worldwide. Korsunsky also had a chance to sit down with many of the hundreds of cybersecurity executives who gathered recently at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference . The EXPOSURE 2026 discussions ranged from the death of reactive patching cycles to the need to counter AI threats with systemic cyber resilience, and signaled an urgent need to shift away from a siloed, fragmented approach to cybersecurity and move toward AI-powered exposure management . Below is an in-depth Q&A with Korsunsky, expanding on his participation in the Geneva and Tenable meetings, the rapid escalation of AI threats, and the way to tame cyber risk today and in the coming years. Q: Vlad, you recently returned from the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva. What was the overarching energy in the room among these 150 global leaders, which included CEOs, CTOs, CISOs and government leaders? Vlad Korsunsky: The energy was highly focused and, frankly, deeply sober. We are witnessing an unprecedented compression of the threat landscape, and everyone in that room, whether they were running a multinational bank, directing a national cyber defense agency, or leading an NGO, realized that conventional cyber defenses cannot keep up with this velocity. A telling example of how high the stakes have jumped occurred just recently in Washington, D.C. The then Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent convened an emergency, high-level meeting with the CEOs of some of America's largest financial institutions, including Wall Street giants like Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley. The entire meeting focused on a single AI model: Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview . Anthropic had flagged that while it built Mythos to bolster cyber defense, its raw capabilities were so advanced that, if weaponized or leaked, it could pose a major threat to the structural stability of the global financial system. When the highest echelons of fiscal and state power are holding emergency briefings over the capabilities of a single generative AI model, you know you’re dealing with a fundamentally different cyber threat landscape. Q: When asked, "What are the top cyber concerns for 2027?," meeting participants ranked the capacity of AI to be a threat multiplier as number one. Is this a future problem, or are we living it now? Vlad Korsunsky: The threat of AI in the hands of attackers is absolutely a global concern today. Look at the empirical metrics tracking adversary speed over the last decade and a half. For years, Mandiant tracked a linear trend that actually looked like a win for defenders. Time-to-exploit, which is the window between a vulnerability being disclosed and an active exploit hitting the wild, shrank steadily from 63 days in 2018 down to 32 days by 2022. Concurrently, average attacker dwell time — the time an attacker remains undiscovered after breaching a network – plummeted from more than 400 days in 2011 down to just 14 days in 2025. In short, defenders were actively closing the gap. Then came 2023, and the trend broke violently. Time-to-exploit collapsed from 32 days to just five. By 2024, it went negative: minus one day. According to Mandiant’s latest “M-Trends 2026 Report ,” published last month, the average time-to-exploit sits at minus seven days . Think about that structural asymmetry. Attackers are successfully weaponizing and exploiting vulnerabilities a full week before a vendor compiles and ships a patch. Meanwhile, the median timeline for an enterprise to deploy a patch across their environment is roughly 43 to 55 days, according to this year’s Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) . If adversaries are operating in negative time and defenders are operating across months, the traditional patching cycle is effectively a dead strategy. Q: What is driving this terrifying acceleration? How are attackers moving so quickly? Vlad Korsunsky: It is driven entirely by advanced frontier LLMs doing in minutes what used to require weeks of highly specialized human labor. Back in February, Anthropic’s Opus 4.6 model uncovered more than 500 zero-day vulnerabilities in widely utilized open-source software, flaws that had remained undiscovered despite decades of manual peer review by brilliant human engineers. Less than two months later, Anthropic’s Mythos model found thousands more vulnerabilities across foundational operating systems, web browsers, and core cryptographic libraries. More importantly, Mythos went further after spotting them; it boasted an 83% autonomous success rate in chaining disparate, low-severity logic flaws into devastating, end-to-end critical exploits. Essentially, we have reached a watershed moment reminiscent of when Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeated human Go champions . Experts believed a computer was decades away from mastering the Go game because the game features more potential board configurations than there are atoms in the observable universe. Brute force was impossible. Yet, AlphaGo won by leveraging deep neural networks to synthesize a form of machine intuition, discovering creative moves no human had conceived in 2,500 years of play. Today, frontier AI models are applying that exact evolutionary leap to cybersecurity. The most powerful LLMs can now execute 32-step complex reasoning chains to autonomously map and compromise simulated corporate networks. The asymmetry is stark. This massive capability curve means the absolute volume of known exposures is poised for a massive step-change, and GenAI has poured pure gasoline on the fire. Q: With zero-days dropping in droves thanks to AI-aided discoveries, should enterprises focus all their engineering resources on hunting down these vulnerabilities? What did you hear from CISOs and other high-level cybersecurity leaders about this issue at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026? Vlad Korsunsky: This is where we have to look at the whole board and avoid panic. While the influx of AI-driven zero-day disclosures is a massive upstream pressure on software vendors, data from this year’s Verizon DBIR shows that breaches directly leveraging software exploits account for about 30% of incidents. It's a significant percentage, yes, but what about the other 70%? Cybersecurity leaders I talked to at EXPOSURE 2026 realize that the overwhelming majority of enterprise breaches do not begin with an ultra-sophisticated, state-sponsored zero-day exploit. They start with incredibly simple, unforced human errors: unsecured shadow IT cloud assets running outside corporate governance; misconfigured databases left wide open to the public internet; over-privileged corporate identities; a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA); and highly targeted, AI-driven spear phishing. This is a critical insight for guiding your cyber strategy today. These misconfigurations and unsecured cloud credentials are the dry fuel sitting inside an enterprise network. When an AI hacking agent comes looking, that fuel ignites faster than any traditional cybersecurity team can react. So organizations must be diligent about proactively maintaining stringent security hygiene. Q: If paddling faster inside the old patching model won't save us, how do defenders change the rules of the game? Vlad Korsunsky: We have to look at this the way wildland firefighters have looked at massive forest fires for over a century. When a wildfire is roaring toward a town faster than a human can run, firefighters don’t just stand at the edge of the flames reaching for a bigger water hose. They get ahead of the blaze and light a controlled burn. They intentionally clear out the brush, trees, and fuel ahead of time. When the main fire line reaches that cleared zone, it starves and dies because there is nothing left to consume. Enterprise security must adopt this exact philosophy. We have to stop reacting to the fire and start aggressively clearing the fuel before the adversary arrives. This requires a wholesale shift from reactive vulnerability patching to continuous exposure management . The traditional Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is effectively dead as a primary prioritization tool . A static CVSS score tells you the theoretical severity of a single CVE in a vacuum; it tells you absolutely nothing about real-world exploitability within the specific context of your unique enterprise environment. At EXPOSURE 2026, we heard from our customers how continuous, AI-driven exposure management is helping them counter today’s evolving AI threats successfully. With exposure management, you use advanced analytics to gain unified, real-time visibility across your entire modern attack surface, encompassing data centers, cloud infrastructure, OT/IoT environments, corporate identities, and newly deployed AI pipelines. We must use AI on the defense side to continuously map true attack paths ; for example, pinpointing exactly where a minor misconfiguration chains into a critical business asset. Q: You mentioned using AI on the defense side. How does Tenable view the balance between human security analysts and autonomous AI defenders? Vlad Korsunsky: Security is fundamentally a team sport, and AI vendors like OpenAI and Anthropic are not our adversaries. AI is the single most potent tool ever introduced into the defender’s toolkit; we simply need to wield it with machine-speed orchestration. Because our adversaries are deploying fully autonomous hacking agents today — tools that are already topping commercial bug bounty leaderboards — the only fair fight is to meet machine speed with machine speed. This means building and deploying agentic AI workflows on the side of the defense to power autonomous exposure management. However, this must always be balanced with strict human-in-the-loop oversight. In Geneva, we spent a great deal of time discussing the systemic risks of unchecked automation. If an autonomous system applies a sweeping remediation script without understanding the broader business context, it can inadvertently trigger a massive operational outage: a self-inflicted systemic failure. Defenders must maintain deep visibility into the “behind-the-scenes” logic of their automation. We need human control to govern business context, while leveraging machine speed to continuously ingest, prioritize, and neutralize exposures before an attacker can strike. Q: Another major pillar of the WEF discussion centered on AI safety and non-human identities. What are the hidden risks enterprises are overlooking as they rush to adopt AI? Vlad Korsunsky: We are transitioning rapidly into what we call the “Agentic Economy.” Historically, enterprise security focused on securing human users and a relatively manageable set of non-human service accounts. As organizations embed AI agents into core business workflows — from code generation to customer operations to financial automation — we are seeing an exponential growth of non-human, agentic identities and agentic workflows. These autonomous agents are fundamentally different. Instead of operating just “on behalf” of a human in a tightly bound session, they execute complex tasks independently. The alarming reality discussed in Geneva and in our EXPOSURE 2026 conference is that our current security frameworks lack effective, native guardrails for these agents. LLMs routinely bypass system prompts or ignore markdown safety files. They can even actively manipulate or hack neighboring AI agents to achieve their algorithmic goals. We’ve seen anecdotal instances of an enterprise AI agent autonomously writing a script to bypass an internal access restriction, and when flagged, its underlying logic essentially argued that the script committed the violation, not the agent itself. Because AI agents behave essentially like trusted corporate insiders that have been let loose across internal data silos, we must immediately apply foundational cryptographic primitives to agentic identities. We need strict zero-trust architectures, rigorous least-privilege access controls, and absolute defense-in-depth tailored specifically for non-human identities before they morph into the next great vector of unmanageable global risk. Q: Any final thoughts for organizations trying to navigate this massive technological shift? Vlad Korsunsky: Attackers are increasingly rocketing laterally across enterprise networks after the initial breach, often in minutes and even seconds, whereas before it could take them days or weeks. The adversary’s inherent advantages will always be timing, velocity, and the luxury of only needing to find a single weak link in your exposure landscape. But as defenders, we possess the ultimate home-field advantage: We can see the whole board, and we have the power to fundamentally alter the terrain. By abandoning obsolete point-in-time checkmarks, embracing continuous, AI-driven exposure management, and proactively clearing out our operational fuel at machine speed through foundational cyber hygiene, we can break the adversary’s curve and effectively secure our environments. | Tenable Research | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Other noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: Nvidia cloud gaming data breach, Android 17 security upgrades, FBI warning after ShinyHunters hacks Canvas. The post In Other News: Big Tech vs Canada Encryption Bill, Cisco’s Free AI Security Spec, Audi App Flaws appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A supply chain operation dubbed 'Mini Shai Hulud' compromised SAP-related npm packages by injecting malicious preinstall scripts that execute during installation. The campaign leverages multi-stage payloads to harvest developer and CI/CD secrets from GitHub, npm, and major cloud providers, exfiltrating data via attacker-controlled GitHub repositories. Malicious versions of legitimate SAP ecosystem packages execute obfuscated payloads that collect GitHub tokens, npm credentials, cloud secrets from AWS, Azure and GCP, Kubernetes tokens, and GitHub Actions secrets. The malware includes propagation logic to infect additional repositories and features browser credential theft capabilities. It performs language checks to avoid Russian-speaking systems. Attribution points to TeamPCP based on shared RSA public keys and overlapping techniques from previous operations. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An AWS environment was targeted in a sophisticated attack, with the threat actor gaining administrative privileges in under 10 minutes. The operation showed signs of leveraging large language models for automation and decision-making. Initial access was obtained through credentials found in public S3 buckets, followed by rapid privilege escalation via Lambda function code injection. The attacker moved laterally across 19 AWS principals, abused Amazon Bedrock for LLMjacking, and launched GPU instances for potential model training. The attack involved extensive reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and attempts to establish persistence. Notable techniques included IP rotation, role chaining, and the use of AI-generated code. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec This offering provides free honey tokens such as AWS access keys, SSH private keys, and S3 bucket tokens designed to detect unauthorized access and breaches by alerting defenders when these tokens are used. The tokens are intended to be planted in locations where attackers might find them, such as hardcoded credentials in code repositories or backup folders. When an adversary uses these tokens, the platform sends alerts with detailed metadata including source IP, geolocation, and VPN/proxy detection. This approach leverages deception technology to identify attackers early in their reconnaissance or exploitation phases. While the service is free with limited tokens, it uses the same detection pipeline as the paid version, aiming to provide effective breach detection without signup friction. The threat is not a direct vulnerability or malware but a detection mechanism to expose attacker activity. European organizations can benefit from deploying such tokens to detect lateral movement or credential theft, especially in cloud environments. Countries with high cloud adoption and significant AWS usage are most likely to benefit. The severity is assessed as high due to the potential to detect critical breaches early, though it requires proactive deployment and monitoring by defenders. | Reddit NetSec | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Sha1-Hulud is a sophisticated new variant of an NPM supply chain attack that executes during the preinstall phase of popular packages like Postman, Zapier, and AsyncAPI. It harvests cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP, and establishes persistence by creating a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner named 'SHA1HULUD' with an injection-vulnerable workflow. This enables attackers to move laterally across cloud environments beyond the initial development environment. Immediate mitigation includes removing compromised packages, revoking and regenerating all tokens and credentials, and enforcing hardware-based MFA for developer accounts. The attack leverages multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to execution, persistence, credential access, and lateral movement. No known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, but the threat poses a medium severity risk due to its potential impact on cloud infrastructure security and software supply chains. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The ShadowV2 botnet malware recently leveraged an AWS outage as a testing ground for its operations, indicating opportunistic behavior by threat actors to exploit cloud service disruptions. This malware represents a high-severity threat due to its botnet capabilities, which can facilitate large-scale distributed attacks, data exfiltration, or service disruption. Although detailed technical specifics and affected versions are not disclosed, the malware's use of a major cloud provider outage highlights its potential to exploit infrastructure instability. European organizations relying on AWS or interconnected cloud services may face increased risk from such botnets, especially during service interruptions. Mitigation requires enhanced monitoring during cloud outages, network segmentation, and proactive threat hunting to detect botnet activity. Countries with significant AWS usage and critical cloud-dependent infrastructure, such as Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands, are likely to be most affected. Given the malware's botnet nature, ease of exploitation during outages, and potential for widespread impact, the threat severity is assessed as high. Defenders should prioritize detection capabilities for anomalous traffic patterns and ensure incident response plans account for cloud service disruptions exploited by malware. | Reddit InfoSec News | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News Recent reports highlight dangerous vulnerabilities in runC, the container runtime used by Docker, that could allow attackers to escape container isolation. Exploiting these flaws would enable malicious actors to break out of Docker containers and gain unauthorized access to the host system. Although no known exploits are currently in the wild, the high severity rating underscores the critical nature of these vulnerabilities. The threat primarily impacts environments running containerized applications using vulnerable versions of runC. European organizations relying heavily on Docker for cloud-native deployments and microservices architectures are at risk, especially those in countries with large tech sectors and cloud infrastructure. Mitigation requires prompt patching of runC once updates are released, restricting container privileges, and employing runtime security tools to detect anomalous behavior. Countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands are likely most affected due to their extensive use of container technologies and cloud services. Given the potential for complete host compromise without user interaction, the suggested severity is critical. Defenders should prioritize monitoring for updates from runC maintainers and prepare incident response plans for container breakout scenarios. | Reddit InfoSec News | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec An individual reported their AWS account was compromised, sharing their experience on a public blog linked from a Reddit NetSec post. The incident highlights risks associated with cloud account security, though specific technical details on the attack vector or exploited vulnerabilities are not provided. No known exploits or automated attacks are currently linked to this breach. The severity is assessed as medium due to potential exposure of sensitive cloud resources, but the lack of detailed indicators limits broader impact assessment. European organizations using AWS should be aware of the risks of credential compromise and ensure robust identity and access management. Countries with high AWS adoption and significant cloud infrastructure usage are more likely to be affected. Mitigation should focus on enforcing multi-factor authentication, monitoring account activity, and securing credentials beyond generic advice. Given the limited technical detail, the threat is rated medium severity based on potential impact and ease of exploitation through credential theft or phishing. Defenders should prioritize cloud account security hygiene and incident response readiness. | Reddit NetSec | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec A recently reported security issue involves a path traversal vulnerability that can lead to a supply chain compromise affecting MCP server hosting environments. This vulnerability allows attackers to access unauthorized files and potentially manipulate server hosting infrastructure, escalating to a broader supply chain attack. Although no specific affected versions or patches are detailed, the threat is considered medium severity due to its potential impact and exploitation complexity. There are no known exploits in the wild yet, and technical details remain limited, primarily sourced from a Reddit NetSec discussion linking to a GitGuardian blog post. European organizations using MCP server hosting or related supply chain components should be vigilant. Mitigation requires thorough code audits for path traversal flaws, strict input validation, and enhanced supply chain security practices. Countries with significant cloud infrastructure and supply chain dependencies, such as Germany, France, and the UK, are more likely to be impacted. The threat's medium severity reflects moderate impact potential with some exploitation difficulty and limited current exposure. Defenders should prioritize monitoring for unusual file access patterns and supply chain anomalies while awaiting further technical disclosures and patches. | Reddit NetSec | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The Crimson Collective hacker group has been reported targeting AWS cloud instances with the intent of stealing data. This threat involves unauthorized access to cloud environments, specifically those hosted on Amazon Web Services, aiming to exfiltrate sensitive information. Although detailed technical specifics and exploited vulnerabilities are not disclosed, the high severity rating indicates significant risk. European organizations using AWS cloud infrastructure are at risk of data breaches, potentially impacting confidentiality and operational integrity. The threat does not currently have known exploits in the wild, and minimal public discussion limits detailed understanding. Mitigation requires enhanced cloud security posture, including strict access controls, continuous monitoring, and incident response readiness. Countries with high AWS adoption and critical cloud-dependent sectors, such as the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, are more likely to be affected. Given the potential for data theft without requiring user interaction, the threat severity is assessed as high. Defenders should prioritize securing AWS environments against unauthorized access and data exfiltration attempts. | Reddit InfoSec News | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Darktrace uncovered a sophisticated cybercrime-as-a-service campaign utilizing Python and Go-based malware, Docker containerization, and a full operator UI. The attack combines DDoS techniques with targeted exploitation, featuring HTTP/2 rapid reset, Cloudflare UAM bypass, and large-scale HTTP floods. The infrastructure resembles a DDoS-as-a-service platform, mirroring legitimate cloud-native applications in design and usability. Initial access is gained through exposed Docker daemons on AWS EC2, with a multi-stage deployment process. The malware uses a Go-based RAT with RESTful communication and includes advanced evasion techniques. The campaign highlights the need for defenders to monitor cloud workloads, container orchestration, and API activity to counter evolving threats. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An AWS access key compromise led to a sophisticated SES abuse campaign in May 2025. The attacker exploited the stolen key to bypass SES restrictions, verify new sender identities, and conduct a large-scale phishing operation. They used multi-regional PutAccountDetails requests to escape the SES sandbox, a novel technique in SES abuse. The campaign involved creating multiple email identities using attacker-owned and legitimate domains with weak DMARC protections. The subsequent phishing campaign targeted various organizations, using tax-related lures to steal credentials. This incident highlights the importance of monitoring cloud service usage, especially for services like SES that can be exploited for monetization. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A cluster of suspicious activity, tracked as CL-STA-1020, has been targeting governmental entities in Southeast Asia since late 2024. The threat actors have developed a new Windows backdoor called HazyBeacon, which uses AWS Lambda URLs for command and control communication. This technique leverages legitimate cloud functionality to create a covert, scalable, and hard-to-detect communication channel. The attackers' primary goal appears to be covert intelligence gathering, focusing on sensitive government data related to trade disputes. They also use Google Drive and Dropbox for data exfiltration, blending with normal network traffic. The attack involves DLL sideloading, persistence through a Windows service, and various payloads for file collection and exfiltration. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Skeleton Spider, also known as FIN6, is a financially motivated cybercrime group that has evolved from POS breaches to broader enterprise threats. They employ social engineering tactics, posing as job seekers on platforms like LinkedIn to deliver phishing messages. Their preferred payload is more_eggs, a JavaScript-based backdoor. The group uses trusted cloud services like AWS to host malicious infrastructure, evading detection. Their phishing emails impersonate job applicants, with domains mimicking real names. FIN6 employs sophisticated filtering techniques to ensure malware delivery only to intended targets. The more_eggs malware, developed by Venom Spider, allows for command execution and credential theft. Defense strategies include cautious handling of resume links, blocking execution of suspicious files, and implementing EDR policies. | AlienVault OTX General |
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