Search: aws-cloud.tech
35 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek This news roundup highlights multiple cybersecurity threats and developments including ransomware attacks targeting Synology NAS devices exploiting a patched vulnerability, a Chinese-language attack framework abusing a Flowise code injection flaw, LLMJacking incidents involving hijacked enterprise AI access generating fraudulent bills up to $1 million, and a reported hardware implant in Trezor wallets sold by a reseller that could steal recovery seeds. Additionally, SAP vulnerabilities are being weaponized within days of patch release, increasing ransomware interest. Chainalysis disclosed a breach exposing sensitive user credentials, and phishing campaigns impersonate major AI and tech events. These incidents collectively illustrate evolving threat tactics across hardware, software, AI, and cloud environments. | SecurityWeek | |||
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium5.9EPSS 0.4%AWS Security BulletinsCVE-2026-87912 CVE-2026-87912 and CVE-2026-87913 refer to missing S3 bucket ownership verification vulnerabilities in the AWS Security Agent plugin for aws-agents-for-devsecops and MCP Server. The vulnerabilities relate to improper validation of S3 bucket ownership, which could potentially lead to security issues. No specific affected versions or detailed technical information are provided. No known exploits are reported in the wild. No patch or remediation information is available at this time. | AWS Security Bulletins | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Aokigahara is an infostealer malware targeting traditional data sources such as browsers, VPN clients, cryptocurrency wallets, FTP/SFTP clients, password managers, and email applications. It uniquely targets AI applications and development tools, stealing authentication files, session data, and configuration files from services like Claude, ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, and GitHub Copilot. It also collects developer credentials including Git files, SSH private keys, and cloud service credentials (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud). The stolen AI credentials may be used for unauthorized access, account resale, or data extortion. The malware uses anti-analysis techniques and secures its command-and-control communications with AES-256 encryption and X25519 key exchange. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | KEVMirageEPSS 99% | Critical9.2KEVMirageEPSS 99%SecurityWeekCVE-2026-109618 Two critical PHP remote code execution vulnerabilities will be patched in an emergency release on October 21. Fixes are only expected for supported PHP 8.x branches. Key takeaways CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are critical vulnerabilities in PHP, both rated CVSSv4.0 9.2 by the PHP security team. Public reporting describes both as remote code execution vulnerabilities. watchTowr says it believes it has reproduced CVE-2026-109618, and Cloudflare CTO Dane Knecht says the company is seeing early attacks emerging. The patch release is scheduled for October 21, 2026 at 14:00 UTC. Version numbers reported before the release point to PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. End-of-life branches are not expected to receive fixes. Background Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) team has compiled this blog to answer Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) regarding two critical vulnerabilities in PHP that were announced on October 20, 2026. FAQ When were these PHP vulnerabilities first disclosed? On October 20, 2026, the CVE identifiers circulated on Hacker News and social media. Later that day, the PHP security team published an advance notice of a security release scheduled for October 21 at 14:00 UTC (10:00 AM ET) to address two critical vulnerabilities. The notice said the team could release earlier if details became public or if exploitation appeared in the wild. CERT-EU also published an advisory (2026-018) naming both CVEs. According to watchTowr , the vulnerabilities were originally set to be disclosed on Thursday, October 22, under embargo. A video shared by researcher Kirill Firsov demonstrates the exploit chain, dubbed php2shell. Firsov credited the video and exploit to researcher LCFR and Calif.io. The PHP security team is giving advance notice: Upcoming security release Wed, Oct 21st 2026, 14:00UTC, two critical vulnerabilities, both rated CVSSv4 9.2. PHP users are encouraged to prepare to update. Earlier release if details become public or active exploit evidence. — The PHP Foundation (@ThePHPF) October 20, 2026 What are CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619? CVE Description CVSSv4.0 CVE-2026-109618 Unspecified PHP Vulnerability 9.2 CVE-2026-109619 Unspecified PHP Vulnerability 9.2 CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are critical vulnerabilities in PHP. Public reporting describes both as remote code execution vulnerabilities. The PHP security team has not published technical details before the patch release. CVSS scores differ across sources. The PHP security team rates both vulnerabilities as CVSSv4.0 9.2. Some early reports, including watchTowr and a Hacker News post, describe them as CVSS 10.0. We will update this blog once PHP publishes its advisory. Which PHP versions are affected? CERT-EU says these vulnerabilities could affect all PHP versions from PHP 5 onwards, and the demonstration video references PHP 5.4.0 and later. PHP will publish the official list of affected and fixed versions with the release. Before the release, security researcher Kevin Beaumont reported the following fixed versions: Affected Versions Fixed Version (expected) PHP 8.5.x 8.5.12 PHP 8.4.x 8.4.27 PHP 8.3.x 8.3.36 PHP 8.2.x 8.2.35 PHP 5.x through 8.1.x End-of-life, no fix expected Linux distributions that ship older PHP packages may backport fixes, so organizations using distribution packages should check their vendor's advisories. How widespread is PHP, and how many hosts are potentially affected? According to W3Techs , PHP is used by 69.3% of websites whose server-side language is known. Platforms such as WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, Laravel and Magento all run on PHP. Security researcher Silas Cutler's rough estimate is that over 1.3 million internet-exposed hosts are potentially vulnerable. A Shodan search by Henk Poley counts over 1.9 million internet-exposed hosts running PHP. Has exploitation been observed in the wild? On October 21, Cloudflare CTO Dane Knecht said the company is "seeing early attacks emerging" and is updating its miti… | SecurityWeek | ||
| High | – | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2025-4318Incomplete fix for CVE-2025-4318 code injection in Amazon @aws-amplify/codegen-ui-react HighEPSS 1.0%AWS Security BulletinsCVE-2025-4318 CVE-2025-4318 is a code injection vulnerability in the Amazon @aws-amplify/codegen-ui-react package. The fix for this vulnerability was incomplete, indicating that the issue may still pose a risk. No specific affected versions or detailed technical information are provided. | AWS Security Bulletins | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Attackers who obtain AWS credentials are actively validating them to determine if they can access Amazon Bedrock services. They use stolen keys to call AWS APIs like GetCallerIdentity, ListFoundationModels, and Converse to check access to Anthropic Claude models and promotional credits. This enables attackers to assess the financial value of credentials for resale in token-jacking markets, where stolen AI model access is sold below retail price. This represents an evolution in credential validation techniques targeting cloud AI services. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | – | HighSecurityWeek A $1 million bug bounty challenge by Vercel uncovered multiple vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel's networking stack used in their Firecracker-based microVM sandbox environment. The challenge generated 1,285 reports over two weeks, identifying one critical and several high- and medium-severity issues. Notably, two independent Linux kernel flaws were found: one causing memory leaks and another causing deterministic host crashes. These vulnerabilities have broad implications for cloud providers using similar Linux kernel isolation techniques. No customer data was accessed during the challenge. Fixes are under private review with CVEs pending. Vercel automated report triage using AI to handle the high volume of submissions and improved their sandbox security based on findings. | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Palo Alto Unit 42 This analysis discusses a behavioral clustering model designed to map cloud identity roles from audit logs, enabling continuous threat detection through standard SQL queries. The model uses unsupervised machine learning techniques to categorize cloud identities based on their activity patterns, improving visibility into cloud environments and aiding detection of malicious behavior masked by legitimate permissions or labels. The research focuses on AWS CloudTrail data but is extendable to other cloud and SaaS environments. It highlights the challenge of distinguishing between what identities can do (permissions) and what they actually do (behavior), emphasizing the importance of behavioral context in cloud security detection. | Palo Alto Unit 42 | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Aesto Health, a healthcare technology company, experienced a data breach impacting over 9.5 million individuals. The breach involved unauthorized access to the company's AWS infrastructure, resulting in the theft of personal and protected health information. The compromised data includes names, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers, medical information, health insurance details, and taxpayer identification numbers. The breach was discovered in December 2025, with data exfiltration occurring between December 2 and 18. Aesto Health has notified the US Department of Health and Human Services and engaged cybersecurity experts to investigate and contain the incident. | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Security teams are being asked to defend a growing attack surface with fewer people and around the clock, against threat actors who never take a night off. As cyberattackers increasingly use AI to launch and scale campaigns, the volume, speed, and sophistication of threats continue to rise. Closing that gap takes more than tooling. It takes a partner that pairs a leading security platform with scaled intelligence and human experts who can act on your behalf at any hour. That’s exactly what Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is built to do. We are excited to announce that we have been named a Leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape: Worldwide MDR/MXDR for the Enterprise Vendor Assessment (Doc #US54792426, July 2026). Read the excerpt here . Scale your SOC with Microsoft Defender Experts MDR Expert-led MDR, built on the Microsoft Defender platform Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is a round-the-clock, expert-led managed detection and response service that helps security teams triage, investigate, and respond to incidents so they can stop cyberattackers in their tracks and prevent future compromise. Rather than bolting a separate stack of tools and connectors onto your environment, the service operates natively on Microsoft Defender , with built-in protection across endpoints, identities, email, cloud apps, cloud workloads, and network security, as well as around-the-clock proactive threat hunting with Microsoft Defender Experts Hunting . Because the service is delivered on the same platform it monitors, detection and intelligence improvements reach customers continuously. The insights our experts generate also strengthen protection across the broader Defender ecosystem, so every customer benefits from what we learn defending the next environment. The IDC MarketScape vendor assessment model is designed to provide an overview of the competitive fitness of technology and service suppliers in a given market. The research uses a rigorous scoring methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria that results in a single graphical illustration of each supplier’s position within a given market. The Capabilities axis measures supplier product, go-to-market, and business execution in the short term, while the Strategy axis measures how well a supplier’s strategy aligns with customer requirements over a 3-5-year timeframe. Supplier market share is represented by the size of the icons . Threat intelligence at internet scale Great detection starts with great intelligence. Defender Experts MDR draws on Microsoft’s global threat intelligence: more than 10,000 security researchers and 100 trillion signals analyzed every day across billions of users and millions of organizations. 1 That breadth lets our analysts recognize subtle patterns early, often before a campaign escalates, and respond with higher-confidence attribution than intelligence sourced from any single customer’s telemetry could provide. AI-accelerated operations, expert-led decisions Defender Experts MDR also combines advanced AI and generative AI with seasoned human experts. AI filters noise, grades and classifies incidents, and accelerates investigation at machine speed and scale, while our analysts own the outcome. According to the IDC MarketScape, “70% AI-assisted workflows are enabled through automated noise filtering, AI-based grading, and agentic operations while maintaining expert decision-making.” Furthermore, “quantified outcomes noted include 97% AI classification accuracy, 77% malware/phishing agent-investigated, 72% faster resolution combining AI and humans, and 45% autonomous investigations.” The impact shows up in the work. Over the past year, Defender Experts mitigated 27,000 high-severity incidents, and the team’s threat research now contributes a meaningful share of all Defender detections, enriching protection for customers well beyond the MDR service itself. Throughout, a dedicated security delivery expert and on-demand access to our experts keep customers i… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An investigation reveals a thriving underground economy of fraudulent account marketplaces that openly sell verified accounts across major platforms including email providers, social media, cloud services, and payment processors. These operations exploit lax fraud prevention by major tech companies, which often prioritize user growth metrics over security. The report identifies numerous Chinese, Vietnamese, and English-language websites selling accounts for services like Gmail, AWS, Stripe, TikTok, and Reddit at prices ranging from $1 to $300. These marketplaces offer fresh accounts, aged accounts with established trust signals, and hijacked high-karma accounts. The investigation highlights how internal corporate pressures to inflate user adoption numbers create security vulnerabilities, with some companies admitting up to 14% of their user base may be fraudulent. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog The news coverage surrounding the breach of the AI platform Hugging Face by OpenAI’s autonomous agents reads like a scene straight out of a Terminator movie (apparently, a prequel). Yet for enterprise security teams — even those that don’t develop or deploy artificial intelligence — the detailed incident report published by Hugging Face provides a critical operational roadmap. The incident needs to be evaluated on the basis of a single, fundamental question: “Which organizational security flaws, missing controls, configurations, or technologies allowed this attack to succeed?” What happened? During cyber-capability testing of OpenAI’s advanced AI models against the ExploitGym benchmark, an agent found a way to break out of its confinement, reached the internet, and breached the infrastructure of several companies — one of them being Hugging Face. The model reasoned that it could find solutions to the benchmark challenges on these external systems. Dozens of articles have since covered these incidents in detail , so no need to go over that here. What truly matters is what transpired within Hugging Face’s systems between July 9 and 13 while the AI agent operated unchecked inside. The Hugging Face incident report includes an interactive attack timeline, so we’ll just list the key stages. A malicious configuration in a dataset uploaded by the agent allowed it to exfiltrate credentials for a worker pod , and execute code within it. The agent then exploited cloud environment metadata and escaped the privileged pod to obtain root-level access on the host. It retrieved a substantial number of secrets from storage and used a stolen VPN key and shared cluster administrator credentials to pivot deeper into the internal network and source code repository before the Hugging Face security team blocked its access. How significant is the fact that this was next-generation AI? Regardless of the specific area of activity of a company, tomorrow it may become a target of human attackers, fully autonomous systems, or AI agents manually controlled by human hackers. Many AI practitioners have rushed to dismiss this incident based on assumptions that OpenAI will never allow its tech to get into serious hacking. However, security researchers have argued for months that even currently available open-source models can be used to launch both offensive research and real-world attacks. Human oversight, while still a requirement, can be minimal. Even mid-tier models can easily iterate through a dozen vulnerabilities, inventory a compromised infrastructure, and quickly figure out how to expand their reach across a network. Defenders must analyze incidents like this in detail, map the key findings to their own environments, and adapt security controls to counter both stealthy human actors and rapid, noisy AI agents. Three distinguishing features of AI-powered attacks The techniques detailed in the Hugging Face report are not novel — the agent didn’t invent anything new. However, three factors regarding the attack’s speed and scale fundamentally shift the economics for both attackers and defenders: Trial and error becomes significantly cheaper. Where a human hacker might test five attack vectors, an agent can iterate through five hundred. Scenarios that security teams previously dismissed as “theoretically possible, but impractical and unlikely” and placed them on the backlog can now become active threats. Attack execution and incident response windows shrink. High-speed attacks are not unheard of, while some ransomware operators achieve compromise within hours even without AI. However, this accelerated pace will likely become the new baseline in cybersecurity, as demonstrated by the agent obtaining admin privileges at Hugging Face within 13 hours. Numerous alerts and log entries generated by the agent’s trial-and-error attempts can both help and hinder attackers as well as defenders. This noise can serve both as an indicator for threat detection, and as cam… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 27th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Minnesota IT Services has confirmed coordinated cyberattacks affecting more than 30 community water utilities across the state. The incidents briefly disrupted a treatment plant in Braham and affected industrial control systems. Officials reported that drinking water safety was not affected. While the attack was not officially attributed, federal officials previously posted warning regarding targeting of critical infrastructure by Iranian-affiliated threat actors. Bank of Baroda, a major Indian bank, has disclosed an email account compromise that exposed internal communications and attachments. Reports claim more than 700GB of customer files, loan documents, and audit records were leaked, although the bank has not confirmed the reported volume. Core banking systems were unaffected. Amgen, a US biotechnology company that develops medicines for serious illnesses, has confirmed a breach involving cloud environments operated by third-party providers. Attackers exfiltrated proprietary corporate information and patient health data. The company reported no disruption to manufacturing, financial reporting, products, or its ability to supply medicines. Angola’s largest telecommunications provider, Unitel, has suffered a cyberattack that disrupted voice, mobile data, and internet services for millions of customers. The outage also affected electronic payments shortly before the company’s stock market debut. Network data indicated that internal systems were disabled while external routers remained online. AI THREATS Anthropic has disclosed that Claude-based cybersecurity models gained unauthorized access to systems belonging to three outside organizations during controlled evaluations. The models moved beyond intended test environments and reached sensitive production assets. Anthropic identified the incidents while reviewing testing practices following separate autonomous AI security failures. Researchers have published details of CVE-2026-59726, a critical vulnerability in the Ruflo AI agent platform. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse its exposed Model Context Protocol bridge to execute commands, steal API keys, access conversations, and alter stored AI memory. Ruflo addressed the issue in version 3.16.3. Researchers surfaced a privacy issue in Anthropic’s Claude sharing feature that allowed publicly shared conversations and artifacts to be indexed by search engines. Indexed content reportedly included personal information, resumes, financial records, access codes, API keys, and clinical trial material that users may not have expected to become searchable. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Cisco has addressed CVE-2026-20316, an actively exploited vulnerability in Secure Firewall Management Center. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to access a built-in low-privileged account and retrieve sensitive information from affected systems. Cisco released hotfixes after exploitation was identified, and the vulnerability was added to CISA’s catalog. Broadcom has released patches for five vulnerabilities affecting VMware vCenter, ESX, Workstation, and Fusion. Three critical flaws could allow authentication bypass, arbitrary code execution, or escape from a virtual machine to its host. The issues include CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-59310, both carrying CVSS scores of 9.8. JetBrains has released fixes for CVE-2026-63077, a critical authentication bypass affecting all TeamCity On-Premises versions. A remote unauthenticated attacker could execute code with TeamCity server privileges and compromise connected build environments. The flaw is fixed in versions 2025.11.7 and 2026.1.3. TeamCity Cloud was not affected. Rails maintainers have patched CVE-2026-66066, a critical Active Storage vulnerability affecting applications that use libvips. An unauthenticated attacker could read sensitive server files… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Multiple npm packages across @tanstack, @mistralai, @uipath, @squawk, and safe-action namespaces were compromised in a worm-like attack affecting over 50 packages. The malicious code executes during installation, downloading the Bun runtime and running a payload that harvests GitHub credentials and cloud secrets. The attack specifically targets AWS environments by querying the IMDS and attempting privilege escalation through STS and SSM endpoints across multiple regions. Stolen credentials are automatically used to publish additional malicious package versions across different maintainer accounts, creating a self-propagating infection chain. The attack patterns mirror previous Shai-Hulud compromises, using a drop-and-execute technique and command-and-control infrastructure at git-tanstack.com, a domain designed to mimic legitimate tanstack.com traffic. Organizations should rotate GitHub credentials, audit AWS credentials, and check for suspicious activity. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48035 Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 20th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Ernst & Young, a global accounting and professional services company, has disclosed a data breach involving a compromised third-party IT support platform. The exposed support tickets may have contained client documents, tax information, employee details, and other sensitive information submitted while requesting technical assistance. Jscrambler, a JavaScript code-protection package with more than 15,000 weekly downloads, has experienced a supply chain compromise after stolen npm publishing credentials distributed malicious releases. The packages deployed malware targeting developers’, cloud, browser, cryptocurrency, and messaging credentials. Jscrambler removed the affected versions. Coca-Cola’s US dairy subsidiary Fairlife has confirmed a ransomware attack that temporarily halted production across the United States. Attackers accessed systems supporting manufacturing operations, prompting the company to activate incident response and business continuity procedures. Coca-Cola has not confirmed whether data was exfiltrated in the attack. Nihon Kotsu, Japan’s largest taxi operator, has suffered a malware attack following unauthorized access to its internal network. The company shut down affected systems, disrupting taxi dispatches, telephone services, bookings, reservations, and car rentals from July 11. No theft of customer or corporate information has been confirmed. AI THREATS Researchers identified a China-linked campaign that used Claude Code and DeepSeek to automate attacks against government and financial organizations. The tools generated scripts, adapted failed exploits, created credential-harvesting pages, and executed commands. Confirmed compromises affected government systems in Thailand and Afghanistan and organizations in Taiwan. Researchers found that xAI’s Grok Build coding assistant could upload entire Git repositories while processing debugging requests. Transferred information included unopened files and complete commit histories, potentially exposing API keys, credentials, and proprietary source code. Initial privacy controls did not prevent uploads until a server-side restriction was introduced. Researchers verified a weakness in Anthropic’s Claude for Chrome extension that allowed malicious browser extensions to impersonate Claude and act through authenticated user sessions. Successful exploitation could expose Gmail, Google Drive, or GitHub information through Claude’s permissions. Anthropic released fixes, although researchers reported that a bypass remained possible. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Microsoft released patches for 622 vulnerabilities in July’s Patch Tuesday, the largest monthly release recorded by the company. Two vulnerabilities were under active exploitation, including CVE-2026-56164 in SharePoint Server and CVE-2026-56155 in Active Directory Federation Services. Both vulnerabilities could allow attackers to elevate privileges. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (Microsoft SharePoint Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-56164)) WordPress has issued emergency updates for CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137, collectively called wp2shell. The critical WordPress Core vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution and website takeover. Affected releases include versions 6.9.0 through 6.9.4 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.1. Fixed versions include 6.9.5 and 7.0.2. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (WordPress Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-63030)), WordPress SQL Injection (CVE-2026-60137)) SonicWall has released a hotfix for CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410, two critical vulnerabilities affecting SMA 1000 Series gateways. The flaws allow unauthenticated attackers to execute system commands on vulnerable appliances. Active exploitation has been associated with Inc ransomware. Check Point IPS provides protection… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Blacksite is a newly identified adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service offering sold alongside Cloaked.gg, a cloaking platform that conceals phishing infrastructure from automated security analysis. The kit operates as a reverse-proxy that intercepts authentication tokens, session cookies, and 2FA codes in real time, enabling full account takeover even against MFA-protected accounts. Cloaked.gg blocks traffic from AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure networks while serving AI-generated decoy pages to suspected scanners, making malicious URLs appear benign during automated analysis. Priced between $600-$1,000 monthly, the service commercializes sophisticated AiTM techniques, lowering technical barriers for attackers. The pairing of credential theft capabilities with anti-detection infrastructure creates a split-view environment where security tools see harmless content while intended victims are routed to live phishing pages targeting consumer, financial, and enterprise identity systems. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 1.1% | High7.8EPSS 1.1%Reddit ExploitDev CVE-2026-23111 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's nftables subsystem, introduced by a flawed security fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2023-4244). It affects Container-Optimized OS nodes and can lead to privilege escalation. Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) Standard clusters are impacted, while Autopilot clusters are not vulnerable by default unless specific insecure configurations are used. Patch versions have been released for Ubuntu node pools and Container-Optimized OS node pools on GKE. Other GKE environments (AWS, Azure) and VMware are pending patch and severity updates. Bare metal GDC software is not affected as it does not include an OS. The vulnerability is rated high severity. Detection techniques focus on monitoring behavior rather than payload signatures, applicable even on patched kernels. | Reddit ExploitDev | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical9.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-10560 Worksnaps before version 1.6.20260201 contains hardcoded cloud credentials and related secret material in the Worksnaps client application binaries. The exposed credentials included AWS access keys, S3 bucket names, and related cloud access information. The originally exposed AWS credentials authenticated as the AWS account root identity and provided access to Worksnaps production cloud resources, including S3 buckets containing sensitive data such as screenshots of user desktops. An attacker with access to the affected client binaries could extract or recover the credentials and use them to access affected Worksnaps cloud resources. | CVE Database V5 |
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