In July 2026, China-aligned threat actor TA419 conducted credential phishing campaigns impersonating prominent economists and AI policymakers, targeting AI experts at US think tanks, universities, and legal organizations. The group sent benign conversation starter emails themed around AI policy topics, such as invitations to join an AI Policy Advisory Committee. Upon receiving responses, TA419 deployed multi-stage URL redirection chains leading to Adversary-in-the-Middle credential phishing pages using a customized Frameless Browser-in-the-Browser tool. Active since April 2025, TA419 consistently targets individuals at US and Japan-based think tanks, defense contractors, universities, and law firms. This activity likely supports Chinese intelligence objectives to monitor US AI policy and regulatory developments amid strategic competition involving AI technologies, model distillation concerns, and export controls between the US and China.
Huntress researchers discovered Knight Office, a phishing kit utilizing Adversary-in-the-Middle techniques to steal Microsoft 365 session tokens. The attack chain begins with DocuSign-themed phishing emails containing redirects through Monday.com and compromised Joomla websites. Victims are directed to credential capture pages where session tokens are harvested and fed into the Knight Office console. These stolen tokens enable attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication entirely by using already-authenticated sessions. In one incident, attackers registered rogue devices in Microsoft Entra ID and bound Windows Hello for Business credentials for persistence. Analysis revealed nine phishing attacks linked to this kit over two weeks, with hundreds of related emails reported since April. The console, hosted at IP 104.37.188.94, manages at least 25 phishing domains using .vu top-level domains.
A sophisticated multi-stage phishing operation has been active since April 2025, systematically exploiting legitimate SaaS platforms and cloud services to steal corporate credentials. The campaign utilizes 232 phishing domains and 80 command-and-control servers, primarily impersonating human resources consulting firms, with Robert Half Inc. and Aquent LLC representing 50% of targeted brands. Attackers leverage legitimate platforms like Salesforce, SendGrid, and Zoho for email delivery, directing victims to fake Calendly interview pages that mimic real recruiter identities. The operation deploys an adversary-in-the-middle toolkit using browser-in-the-box techniques to create replica Google sign-in pages, capable of harvesting credentials and bypassing MFA through email, SMS, Google Authenticator, and prompt notifications. The campaign specifically targets corporate email accounts, filtering out personal providers, with stolen data exfiltrated to Render-hosted servers and Telegram bots.
A misconfigured Python HTTP server on a Budapest VPS exposed the complete operational infrastructure of three distinct phishing operators. The investigation uncovered codemado, an Egyptian threat actor operating since 2018, running a full AiTM platform with custom tools including MaDoO Blaster; saroula01, deploying OAuth Device Code Flow attacks that accumulated 218 victims across 12 countries over a year; and mail-argenta, a Nigerian operator identified through infostealer logs containing his own credentials. All three actors leveraged customized Evilginx forks and AI-assisted development to build MFA-bypass infrastructure from public GitHub repositories. The campaigns targeted Microsoft 365 accounts primarily, with codemado maintaining ties to RockyBelling's "The Quarry" cybercrime ecosystem. The exposed server contained phishing configurations, credential logs, RMM installers, combolists, and Telegram session files, revealing sustained operations from at least January 2025 through May 2026.
Blacksite is a newly identified adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service offering sold alongside Cloaked.gg, a cloaking platform that conceals phishing infrastructure from automated security analysis. The kit operates as a reverse-proxy that intercepts authentication tokens, session cookies, and 2FA codes in real time, enabling full account takeover even against MFA-protected accounts. Cloaked.gg blocks traffic from AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure networks while serving AI-generated decoy pages to suspected scanners, making malicious URLs appear benign during automated analysis. Priced between $600-$1,000 monthly, the service commercializes sophisticated AiTM techniques, lowering technical barriers for attackers. The pairing of credential theft capabilities with anti-detection infrastructure creates a split-view environment where security tools see harmless content while intended victims are routed to live phishing pages targeting consumer, financial, and enterprise identity systems.
Multiple phishing campaigns are exploiting the FIFA World Cup 2026 event to target mobile users globally. These campaigns use typosquatting, institutional spoofing, and impersonation of major sports retailers to harvest credentials. A sophisticated recruitment fraud campaign also targets corporate Google Workspace accounts with an Adversary-in-the-Middle platform capable of bypassing MFA. Attack vectors include SMS, WhatsApp, and search engines, leveraging emotional urgency and ticket scarcity. This creates risks for enterprises as employees may access work resources via compromised personal devices.
Security researchers gained direct access to Doko's Panel, a real-time phishing platform used in criminal campaigns by ShinyHunters and BlackFile groups. The investigation revealed four distinct infrastructure clusters operating independently customized variants of the tooling. Attacks combine voice phishing with adversary-in-the-middle techniques targeting enterprise identity providers like Okta, Microsoft, and Google, as well as cryptocurrency exchanges. Operators call victims impersonating IT helpdesk staff, directing them to combosquatted domains where credentials and MFA tokens are manually relayed in real-time. Confirmed breaches include SoundCloud (30M records), Match Group (10M records), Betterment (20M records), and Crunchbase. Over 400 domains have been identified linked to these operations. Evidence shows extensive use of AI language models in developing phishing infrastructure, with operators leveraging legitimate services to rapidly deploy and rotate attack infrastructure.
A sophisticated credential theft campaign targeting over 35,000 users across 13,000 organizations was observed between April 14-16, 2026. The operation primarily impacted the United States, particularly healthcare and financial services sectors. Attackers used code of conduct themed phishing emails masquerading as internal compliance communications, sent through legitimate email delivery services from attacker-controlled domains. Victims received polished HTML emails with PDF attachments containing fake disciplinary logs and CAPTCHA gates to evade automated analysis. The multi-stage attack chain ultimately directed users to counterfeit Microsoft authentication pages operating as adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure, enabling real-time interception of credentials and session tokens while bypassing multi-factor authentication defenses.
KATARU is an IoT malware variant identified in 2026 that uses Telnet credential brute-forcing to infect devices. It combines traditional Mirai-style botnet features with multiple Linux local privilege escalation exploits and advanced persistence mechanisms across Linux and embedded platforms. The malware uses encrypted command and control communications and employs anti-analysis and decoy traffic techniques. Artifacts suggest AI-assisted development, including mismatched shellcode and untested cross-platform logic. It supports various DDoS attack methods and SSH brute-forcing.
Storm-2755 is a financially motivated threat actor conducting payroll pirate attacks targeting Canadian employees. The campaign uses malvertising and SEO poisoning to redirect victims searching for terms like "Office 365" to fraudulent sign-in pages. By employing adversary-in-the-middle techniques, the attacker captures authentication tokens and session cookies, bypassing MFA protections. The actor maintains persistence by replaying stolen tokens and performs discovery to identify payroll and HR contacts. They impersonate compromised users to socially engineer HR staff or directly manipulate payroll systems such as Workday. Malicious inbox rules are used to hide attacker communications. These attacks have resulted in direct financial losses through redirected salary payments to attacker-controlled bank accounts.
A new phishing campaign is targeting TikTok for Business accounts using adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) techniques. The attackers employ Cloudflare Turnstile to evade detection and create convincing lookalike pages impersonating TikTok for Business or Google Careers. Victims are tricked into clicking malicious links, leading to credential theft. The campaign aims to seize control of business accounts, which can be used for malvertising and malware distribution. Multiple domains are involved in hosting the phishing pages. Additionally, a separate campaign using SVG file attachments to deliver malware has been observed in Venezuela, with potential links to BianLian ransomware activity.
Cisco Talos uncovered 'DKnife', a sophisticated gateway-monitoring and adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) framework comprising seven Linux-based implants. Used since 2019, DKnife performs deep-packet inspection, traffic manipulation, and malware delivery via routers and edge devices. It targets various devices, including PCs, mobile devices, and IoT, delivering ShadowPad and DarkNimbus backdoors. The framework primarily targets Chinese-speaking users, with evidence suggesting China-nexus threat actors as operators. DKnife's capabilities include DNS hijacking, Android application update hijacking, Windows binary hijacking, anti-virus traffic disruption, and user activity monitoring. A link to the WizardNet campaign was also discovered, indicating a shared development or operational lineage.
The threat actor leveraged Evilginx (likely version 3.0), an open source, advanced phishing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM, aka MITM) framework designed to steal login credentials and session cookies. Evilginx is widely used by cybercriminals to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) security, and this actor has used it to target at least 18 universities and educational institutions across the United States since April 2025. The campaigns were delivered through email and the phishing domains used subdomains that mimicked the legitimate SSO sites.
Proofpoint has uncovered a sophisticated phishing campaign utilizing fake Microsoft OAuth applications to bypass multifactor authentication and steal credentials. The threat actors impersonate various enterprise apps like RingCentral, SharePoint, Adobe, and DocuSign to lure victims. The attack chain involves OAuth app creation, redirects to malicious URLs, and the use of attacker-in-the-middle phishing kits, predominantly Tycoon. This technique has been observed in email campaigns with over 50 impersonated applications, targeting multiple industries. The campaign's goal is to gain access to Microsoft 365 accounts, potentially for information gathering, lateral movement, malware installation, or further phishing attacks.
This analysis explores the connections between two Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms: Tycoon2FA and Dadsec. The investigation reveals shared infrastructure and operational similarities, suggesting a common origin or adaptation. The report details the evolving tactics of Tycoon2FA, including its use of Cloudflare Turnstile, anti-analysis techniques, and sophisticated phishing pages. Key findings include the rapid expansion of Tycoon2FA's infrastructure, with thousands of new phishing pages detected since July 2024. The analysis also uncovers the platform's advanced features, such as MFA bypass capabilities and real-time credential interception. The report emphasizes the growing threat posed by PhaaS platforms and the need for continued vigilance and adaptation in cybersecurity defenses.
