Sha1-Hulud represents an evolution in supply chain attacks targeting the Node Package Manager (NPM) ecosystem. Unlike previous variants that executed post-installation, Sha1-Hulud activates during the preinstall phase, increasing the likelihood of early compromise. It specifically targets widely used packages such as Postman, Zapier, and AsyncAPI, which are integral to many development workflows. Once executed, the malware harvests credentials from major cloud providers including AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP), enabling attackers to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources. Persistence is achieved through GitHub Actions by creating a self-hosted runner named 'SHA1HULUD' and injecting a malicious workflow with an injection vulnerability, allowing continuous execution of attacker-controlled code within CI/CD pipelines. This persistence mechanism facilitates lateral movement within cloud infrastructures, potentially compromising multiple systems and services. The attack leverages a broad range of MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as command execution (T1059.007), software supply chain compromise (T1195.001), scheduled task execution (T1053), credential dumping (T1555), credential access via token manipulation (T1552.001), and persistence via GitHub Actions (T1078.004). Although no active exploits have been observed in the wild, the attack’s complexity and targeting of critical development and cloud environments make it a significant threat. The recommended immediate response includes removing any compromised NPM packages, revoking and regenerating all cloud and GitHub tokens and credentials, and enforcing hardware-based multi-factor authentication (MFA) for developer accounts to prevent unauthorized access. Monitoring for the creation of suspicious self-hosted runners and anomalous GitHub Actions workflows is also critical for early detection.

For European organizations, the Sha1-Hulud attack poses a substantial risk due to the widespread adoption of NPM packages and cloud services in software development and production environments. Compromise of cloud credentials can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of cloud-hosted services, and potential data exfiltration. The persistence mechanism via GitHub Actions can allow attackers to maintain long-term access and execute arbitrary code within CI/CD pipelines, undermining software integrity and trust. This can result in supply chain contamination affecting downstream consumers and partners. Lateral movement capabilities increase the risk of widespread cloud infrastructure compromise, potentially impacting critical business operations and regulatory compliance, especially under GDPR and other data protection laws. The attack’s targeting of popular development tools used across industries means that sectors such as finance, telecommunications, and technology in Europe could be particularly vulnerable. The medium severity rating reflects the attack’s potential to cause significant operational and reputational damage if not promptly mitigated.

1. Immediately identify and remove any compromised NPM packages, especially those related to Postman, Zapier, and AsyncAPI, from development and production environments. 2. Revoke and regenerate all cloud provider credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP) and GitHub tokens associated with affected accounts to prevent unauthorized access. 3. Enforce hardware-based multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all developer and CI/CD pipeline accounts to mitigate credential theft risks. 4. Audit GitHub repositories for unauthorized self-hosted runners named 'SHA1HULUD' and remove any suspicious runners. 5. Review and harden GitHub Actions workflows to eliminate injection vulnerabilities and restrict workflow permissions to the minimum necessary. 6. Implement continuous monitoring and alerting for anomalous activities in cloud environments and CI/CD pipelines, including unusual token usage and workflow modifications. 7. Educate development teams about supply chain risks and encourage the use of trusted package sources and dependency scanning tools. 8. Employ runtime protection and endpoint detection on developer workstations to detect preinstall phase malicious activity. 9. Regularly update and patch development tools and dependencies to reduce exposure to known vulnerabilities. 10. Establish incident response plans specifically addressing supply chain and cloud credential compromise scenarios.