Search: dian.server.tl
27 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-34106guardian language-system · OS Command Injection Critical9.3EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-34106 Guardian language-system passes the id GET parameter directly into a PHP exec() call in subtitles.php (line 19) without sanitization: exec(\"php jobs/subtitle_rendering.php \".$login_session.\" \".$_GET['id'].\" ...\"). No authentication is required. An unauthenticated remote attacker can append shell metacharacters to the id parameter to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-42889No-Instructions relay-server · Incorrect Authorization Critical9.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42889 Relay adds real-time collaboration to Obsidian. Relay Server versions 0.9.0 through 0.9.6 contain an authentication bypass in the multi-document WebSocket endpoints. When authentication is configured, WebSocket connections without a token query parameter were incorrectly treated as having full server permissions. An unauthenticated network attacker who knows or guesses a document ID could connect to the document sync WebSocket and read or modify document contents without a valid document token. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure. `common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing. Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8) The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present: 1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value. 2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams. 3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities. 4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment. 5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author. Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.5% | High8.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40036 Unfurl before 2026.04 contains an unbounded zlib decompression vulnerability in parse_compressed.py that allows remote attackers to cause denial of service. Attackers can submit highly compressed payloads via URL parameters to the /json/visjs endpoint that expand to gigabytes, exhausting server memory and crashing the service. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-34804Endian Firewall · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-34804 Endian Firewall version 3.3.25 and earlier contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the dscp parameter in the /manage/qos/rules/ page. An authenticated attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code that is stored on the server and executed when other users view the affected page. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.1. No patch or official fix information is currently provided. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec A recently reported security issue involves a path traversal vulnerability that can lead to a supply chain compromise affecting MCP server hosting environments. This vulnerability allows attackers to access unauthorized files and potentially manipulate server hosting infrastructure, escalating to a broader supply chain attack. Although no specific affected versions or patches are detailed, the threat is considered medium severity due to its potential impact and exploitation complexity. There are no known exploits in the wild yet, and technical details remain limited, primarily sourced from a Reddit NetSec discussion linking to a GitGuardian blog post. European organizations using MCP server hosting or related supply chain components should be vigilant. Mitigation requires thorough code audits for path traversal flaws, strict input validation, and enhanced supply chain security practices. Countries with significant cloud infrastructure and supply chain dependencies, such as Germany, France, and the UK, are more likely to be impacted. The threat's medium severity reflects moderate impact potential with some exploitation difficulty and limited current exposure. Defenders should prioritize monitoring for unusual file access patterns and supply chain anomalies while awaiting further technical disclosures and patches. | Reddit NetSec | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In July-August 2025, India faced a surge of cross-border cyberattacks combining data breaches, DDoS, defacement, phishing, and malware. Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Russian, Indonesian, and likely Chinese actors targeted Indian judicial, defense, and transport systems. High-impact incidents included judicial server breaches, government website disruptions, retaliatory defacements, phishing schemes, and malware campaigns. Indian groups retaliated under 'Operation Vasudev Strike'. The attacks demonstrated the growing scale, sophistication, and multinational nature of hacktivist operations targeting India's digital infrastructure, blending hacktivism and cybercrime to challenge national security and public trust. | AlienVault OTX General |
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