A new variant of SHub Stealer dubbed 'Reaper' targets macOS users through fake WeChat and Miro installers, employing sophisticated multi-stage delivery chains that spoof Apple, Google, and Microsoft services. The malware leverages the applescript:// URL scheme to bypass Terminal-based defenses, conducting extensive fingerprinting and anti-analysis checks before execution. Reaper harvests browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, developer configurations, iCloud data, and Telegram sessions. It includes an AMOS-style document theft module targeting files under 150MB with chunked uploads. The variant establishes persistence through a fake Google Software Update LaunchAgent and installs a backdoor for remote code execution. The infection specifically avoids CIS regions and employs extensive anti-analysis techniques including WebGL fingerprinting, VM detection, and DevTools interference.
A supply chain compromise involving Daemon Tools installers distributed via the official vendor website has been identified. The attackers used valid code-signing certificates to make the trojanized installers appear legitimate and bypass security controls. These malicious packages deploy a backdoor that performs system reconnaissance, environment verification, and communicates with attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure. The compromise leverages trusted software delivery mechanisms to evade detection, establish persistent access, and enable remote command execution. Organizations should block related malicious infrastructure, hunt for suspicious Daemon Tools installations and network activity, verify software integrity, and implement application allowlisting. Monitoring for unusual certificate usage in software deployment is also advised. No patch or official fix information is available, and no known exploits in the wild have been reported.
A new variant of the LOTUSLITE backdoor, version 1.1, has been identified targeting India's banking sector and South Korean diplomatic circles. The backdoor is delivered via DLL sideloading using legitimate Microsoft-signed executables and initially through CHM files containing malicious JavaScript. It communicates with dynamic DNS-based command-and-control servers over HTTPS, supporting remote shell access, file operations and session management. Code-level analysis reveals direct lineage to LOTUSLITE v1.0, including identical command structures, shared persistence mechanisms, and residual exports from the original codebase. The campaign demonstrates incremental improvements including updated magic values, API resolution techniques, and delivery mechanisms evolving from CHM-based to JavaScript loaders to DLL sideloading. Infrastructure hosted under Dynu Systems shows continuity with previous operations.
GhostSocks is an emerging threat that turns compromised devices into residential proxy nodes, enabling attackers to evade detection. Originally marketed on Russian underground forums as Malware-as-a-Service, it has gained popularity due to its partnership with Lumma Stealer. Written in GoLang, GhostSocks uses SOCKS5 proxy protocol and TLS encryption to blend malicious traffic into normal network activity. It also incorporates backdoor functionality for running arbitrary commands and deploying additional payloads. Darktrace observed an increase in GhostSocks activity, detecting it alongside Lumma Stealer in customer networks. The malware's versatility in converting devices into proxy nodes while enabling covert network access illustrates how threat actors maximize the value of compromised infrastructure.
EtherRAT, a Node.js-based backdoor linked to a North Korean APT group, was detected in a retail customer's environment. It allows arbitrary command execution, extensive system information gathering, and asset theft. The malware uses 'EtherHiding' to store C2 addresses in Ethereum smart contracts, making infrastructure resilient to takedowns. It communicates using CDN-like beaconing to blend with normal traffic. Initial access varied, including ClickFix and IT Support scams via Microsoft Teams. A SYS_INFO module performs comprehensive host fingerprinting for target selection. The malware checks for CIS languages and self-destructs if found. It collects detailed system information, including hardware, software, and network details.
A series of attacks targeting Libyan organizations, including an oil refinery, a telecoms organization, and a state institution, occurred between November 2025 and February 2026. The campaign utilized the AsyncRAT backdoor, delivered through spear-phishing emails with Libya-themed lure documents. The attackers exploited current events, such as the assassination of Saif al-Gaddafi, to gain access to networks. The modular nature of AsyncRAT and the targeted organizations suggest possible state sponsorship. The campaign's focus on Libya and its oil industry is notable, given the country's increased oil production and global energy supply concerns amidst Middle East conflicts.
A new campaign targeting Ukrainian entities has been identified, attributed to actors linked to Russia. The campaign uses judicial and charity-themed lures to deploy a JavaScript-based backdoor called DRILLAPP, which runs through the Edge browser. This backdoor enables various actions including file manipulation, microphone access, and webcam capture. Two variants of the campaign have been observed, with the second variant introducing additional capabilities. The attackers utilize the browser's capabilities to evade detection and gain access to sensitive resources. The campaign shares tactics with a previously reported Laundry Bear operation, leading to a low-confidence attribution to this group.
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has triggered a surge in cybercriminal activity. Over 8,000 newly registered domains with conflict-related keywords have been identified, many of which may be weaponized in future campaigns. Multiple cases of malicious activity have been observed, including targeted attacks using conflict-themed lures, deployment of the LOTUSLITE backdoor, fake news blogs leading to StealC malware, phishing sites impersonating government portals, donation scams, fraudulent storefronts, and meme-coin pump-and-dump schemes. Threat actors are leveraging various techniques such as DLL sideloading, shellcode execution, and social engineering to compromise victims. The campaigns demonstrate the opportunistic nature of cybercriminals in exploiting geopolitical events for malicious purposes.
A malicious campaign by threat actor UAT-10027 has been targeting education and healthcare sectors in the United States since December 2025. The campaign utilizes a new backdoor called Dohdoor, which employs DNS-over-HTTPS for stealthy command-and-control communications and can download and execute payloads reflectively. The multi-stage attack chain likely begins with phishing emails, followed by PowerShell scripts, batch files, and DLL sideloading techniques. Dohdoor uses various evasion methods, including API obfuscation, encrypted communications, and EDR bypasses. The campaign's infrastructure leverages Cloudflare services for stealth. While some techniques overlap with North Korean APT groups, the targeting differs from their typical focus.
A malicious Go module impersonating the legitimate golang.org/x/crypto has been discovered, containing a backdoor in ssh/terminal/terminal.go. This module captures passwords, exfiltrates them, and executes remote commands. The attack chain includes a Linux stager that installs an SSH key for persistence, weakens firewall settings, and deploys a Rekoobe backdoor. The campaign targets high-trust cryptography libraries and likely aims at cloud environments. The threat actor uses GitHub for staging and disguises payloads as media files. This sophisticated supply chain attack highlights the need for careful scrutiny of Go module changes and implementation of robust security measures in development workflows.
APT37, a DPRK-backed threat group, has launched a new campaign called Ruby Jumper, utilizing Windows shortcut files to initiate attacks with newly discovered tools. These tools include RESTLEAF, SNAKEDROPPER, THUMBSBD, and VIRUSTASK, which work together to deliver surveillance payloads like FOOTWINE and BLUELIGHT. The campaign leverages removable media to infect and communicate with air-gapped systems. Key features include the use of Ruby for shellcode-based payloads, abuse of cloud storage services for command and control, and sophisticated techniques for bypassing network isolation. The malware demonstrates advanced capabilities in system reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and persistent surveillance.
A global espionage campaign targeting telecommunications and government organizations across four continents has been disrupted. The threat actor, UNC2814, is suspected to be linked to China and has been active since 2017. The campaign utilized a sophisticated backdoor called GRIDTIDE, which leveraged Google Sheets API for command and control. The attackers compromised 53 victims in 42 countries, with suspected infections in 20 more. GRIDTIDE's capabilities include executing shell commands, file transfers, and evading detection by disguising traffic as legitimate cloud API requests. The disruption involved terminating attacker-controlled cloud projects, disabling infrastructure, and revoking API access.
A NuGet supply chain attack involving four malicious packages targeting ASP.NET web application developers has been discovered. The campaign deploys a multi-stage payload where NCryptYo acts as a dropper, establishing a local proxy, while companion packages exfiltrate ASP.NET Identity data and accept threat actor-controlled authorization rules, creating backdoors in victim applications. The packages, published between August 12-21, 2024, have accumulated over 4,500 downloads. The attack uses obfuscation, JIT compiler manipulation, and a two-stage architecture to evade detection. The campaign's objective is to compromise applications during development, gaining access to deployed production instances by controlling the authorization layer.
A new Android backdoor called Keenadu has been discovered embedded in the firmware of several tablet brands. It infects the libandroid_runtime.so library during firmware building, injecting itself into every app launched on the device. Keenadu provides attackers unrestricted control over victims' devices, primarily for ad fraud purposes. The investigation revealed connections between Keenadu and other major Android botnets like Triada, BADBOX, and Vo1d. The malware was found in system apps, Google Play apps, and modified versions of popular apps. Over 13,000 users worldwide have been affected, with Russia, Japan, Germany, Brazil and the Netherlands seeing the highest number of infections.
A recent investigation reveals that the APT-C-28 (ScarCruft) group has expanded its targets to include the cryptocurrency industry. The group employs sophisticated phishing tactics, using LNK files disguised as PDFs to lure victims with investment proposals ranging from $1-3 million. Upon execution, a multi-stage payload deployment occurs, ultimately installing MiradorShell v2.0 to gain system control. The attack chain involves file downloads, decryption, and the creation of scheduled tasks for persistence. MiradorShell, an AutoIt-based backdoor, connects to a command and control server, offering reverse shell capabilities, file management, remote program execution, and victim fingerprinting. The malware employs various evasion techniques, including inline library files and direct API calls.
Rapid7 Labs has uncovered a sophisticated campaign attributed to the Chinese APT group Lotus Blossom, involving a new custom backdoor named Chrysalis. The attack compromised Notepad++ infrastructure to deliver the backdoor. Analysis revealed multiple custom loaders, including one using Microsoft Warbird for obfuscation. The Chrysalis backdoor has extensive capabilities for information gathering, file operations, and remote command execution. Additional artifacts found include Cobalt Strike beacons and Metasploit payloads. The campaign shows Lotus Blossom evolving its tactics, mixing custom and off-the-shelf tools with advanced obfuscation techniques to evade detection.
MicroWorld Technologies has confirmed that one of its update servers was breached and used to distribute a malicious update to some customers in the early hours of January 2026, reports BleepingComputer.
A new campaign targeting Indian government entities was uncovered, utilizing three backdoors: SHEETCREEP, FIREPOWER, and MAILCREEP. These tools leverage legitimate cloud services like Google Sheets, Firebase, and Microsoft Graph API for command and control, enabling the attackers to blend in with normal traffic. The campaign, named Sheet Attack, employed PDFs and malicious LNK files as initial infection vectors. Evidence suggests the use of generative AI in malware development. While sharing similarities with APT36, the campaign's unique characteristics point to either a new Pakistan-linked group or an APT36 subgroup. The attackers demonstrated hands-on-keyboard activity and deployed additional payloads, including a document stealer, to selected targets.
The HoneyMyte APT group has enhanced its toolset with an updated CoolClient backdoor and new data stealing capabilities. The group targeted government entities in Asia and Europe, particularly Southeast Asia. CoolClient now features clipboard monitoring, HTTP proxy credential sniffing, and plugin support for extended functionality. HoneyMyte also deployed browser login data stealers and document theft scripts. The campaign's focus has shifted towards active surveillance, including keylogging, clipboard data collection, and proxy credential harvesting. Organizations are advised to remain vigilant against HoneyMyte's evolving toolkit, which includes CoolClient, PlugX, ToneShell, Qreverse, and LuminousMoth malware families.
A North Korea-linked threat actor known as KONNI has been observed conducting a phishing campaign targeting software developers and engineering teams, particularly those with blockchain expertise. The campaign uses AI-generated PowerShell backdoors and targets a broader range of countries in the APAC region. The infection chain begins with a Discord-hosted link downloading a ZIP archive containing a PDF lure and a malicious LNK file. The LNK file deploys additional components, including the AI-generated PowerShell backdoor. The backdoor employs various anti-analysis techniques and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. This campaign demonstrates KONNI's evolution in tactics and tooling, including the adoption of AI-assisted malware development.
