CVE-2026-107334 is an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the role-based access control (RBAC) implementation of CISA Malcolm's nginx Lua layer. The vulnerability arises because the RBAC check uses the raw, percent-encoded request URI, while nginx routes requests based on the percent-decoded URI. This discrepancy allows an authenticated low-privilege user to access admin-only paths by using percent-encoded variants of restricted URLs, bypassing the RBAC restrictions.
CVE-2026-107335 is a vulnerability in CISA Malcolm affecting versions from 0 up to and including 26.07.1. The issue involves improper handling of highly compressed single-stream files (e.g., .gz, .bz2) that are not tar-style archives. Authenticated users with upload permissions can upload small, highly compressible files that decompress to very large sizes, causing resource exhaustion on the shared Docker volume and disrupting the platform. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.5 and is classified as medium severity.
CVE-2026-107337 is a high-severity Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the Malcolm kiosk Flask application by CISA. The application exposes a POST endpoint /script_call/<script> without any authentication and uses wildcard CORS, allowing attackers to trick an operator's browser into executing arbitrary management commands. Exploitation can lead to destructive actions such as permanently deleting all captured network traffic and forensic logs or stopping security monitoring. This vulnerability affects Malcolm versions from 0 up to and including 26.07.1.
CVE-2026-107361 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Arkime live capture service (arkime-live) component of CISA Malcolm. The service runs in host network mode exposing port 8005 on all interfaces and trusts the X-Forwarded-User header from any IP address, automatically creating users with full access. The passwordSecret is hardcoded to a public value "Malcolm", allowing a network-adjacent attacker to bypass nginx and authenticate by connecting directly to port 8005 with a forged identity header. This vulnerability affects Malcolm versions up to and including 26.07.1.
CVE-2026-107362 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Malcolm network traffic analysis tool. It arises from the inclusion of an upstream FilePond PHP server component that exposes a fetch API route allowing arbitrary URL downloads. This can lead to unauthorized reading of fetched content. The vulnerability affects Malcolm versions from 0 up to and including 26.07.1. The CVSS 3.1 score is 7.1, indicating high severity.
CVE-2026-107333 is a high-severity vulnerability in CISA Malcolm's nginx-based reverse proxy. It arises from a URL path normalization inconsistency between the Lua-based RBAC authorization layer and nginx's request routing logic. This flaw allows an authenticated user to bypass role-based access controls and access administrative or restricted endpoints, including file upload, PHP server, htadmin, and authentication management interfaces. The vulnerability affects all restricted paths protected by the RBAC layer in Malcolm versions from 0 up to and including 26.07.1.
CVE-2026-107336 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in CISA Malcolm's nginx reverse proxy configuration. The issue arises because a case-insensitive regex matcher allows requests with non-lowercase path segments to bypass a case-sensitive rewrite, leading to unauthenticated access to the Arkime backend. Additionally, the proxy forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header without overwriting it, and Arkime trusts this header for authentication. This combination allows an unauthenticated attacker to access Arkime with a forged identity.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.
A deployment mode intended to expose only read access to a bundled packet-analysis component's interface denies a list of write-capable routes by pattern, but the pattern omits routes that modify tags attached to stored session records, and the proxy configuration otherwise permits the request method those routes use. This allows an authenticated user on a deployment intended to be read-only to add or remove tags on stored session records.
A file-upload handler redirects the authenticated client's browser to a URL taken directly from that same request's Referer header, without validating it against the application's own origin. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft a request that causes another user's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary external destination after completing an upload.
Requests from the reverse proxy to the identity-provider service for token discovery, introspection, and credential exchange do not verify the identity provider's server certificate. An attacker positioned on the network path between the proxy and the identity provider could impersonate the identity provider and issue forged authentication tokens accepted by the deployment.
An example environment-configuration file ships with a fixed, publicly-known secret value used to sign authentication cookies for a bundled packet-analysis component. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates the value will use the known default, allowing an attacker aware of the default to forge valid authentication cookies for that component.
The application's role-authorization lookup defaults to granting access when a request handler's name is not present in its table of role requirements, rather than defaulting to deny. Any request handler that is not explicitly registered in this table is reachable by any authenticated user regardless of their assigned role, and any newly added handler is fail-open by default until explicitly added to the table.
When a particular authentication mode is configured, the reverse proxy forwards requests for a bundled third-party administrative interface directly to that interface without applying the gateway's own authentication requirement first. All access control for this administrative interface, which manages the credential store used to gate every other service in the deployment, is delegated entirely to that third-party interface's own login mechanism. Any authentication weakness in that bundled interface would compromise the credential store protecting the rest of the deployment.
A deployment mode intended to expose only read access to stored data proxies a set of application programming interface routes without restricting which request methods are allowed. One such route accepts a request that creates or overwrites a stored record, including an attacker-chosen identifier, using the application's own elevated backend credentials. This allows an authenticated user on a deployment intended to be read-only to forge or overwrite stored records that should not be modifiable in that deployment mode.
A routing rule selects between two different authentication mechanisms for the same downstream service based on the value of a client-supplied request header, rather than on any property the client cannot control. An authenticated user in possession of a shared service credential can set this header to route around the primary role-based authorization check and reach the alternate path's fixed, elevated role instead. This allows a low-privileged authenticated attacker who knows the shared credential to perform actions reserved for a higher-privileged role.
An application programming interface endpoint accepts a user-supplied value and interpolates it directly into the path of a backend request to the underlying search and analytics data store, without restricting its contents. This allows an authenticated attacker to substitute an arbitrary backend path, causing the application's own elevated service credentials to be used against unintended internal endpoints. This could allow an attacker to enumerate or read internal configuration and administrative data from the backend data store that would otherwise be restricted.
An interface that accepts file uploads from authenticated users extracts the contents of uploaded archives without validating that extracted file paths remain within the intended destination directory. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft an archive whose entries traverse outside the destination directory, causing the extraction process to write files to arbitrary locations with the privileges of that process. This could allow an attacker to inject fabricated records into the system's stored data or tamper with application configuration.