The KRVTZ-NET IDS alerts from 2026-02-23 report reconnaissance activity targeting Fortigate VPN devices via repeated GET requests to the /remote/logincheck endpoint linked to CVE-2023-27997. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and potentially execute arbitrary commands. The alerts also note scanning for hidden environment files and PHP info pages to gather sensitive configuration data. No active exploitation or ransomware campaigns are currently associated with these activities. The threat is considered low severity and represents broad scanning efforts from diverse global sources.
KRVTZ-NET IDS alerts from February 19, 2026, report reconnaissance activity targeting web applications using React Server Components and vulnerable JavaScript code. The alerts focus on attempts to exploit CVE-2025-55182, known as React2Shell, which allows unsafe property access, and JavaScript prototype pollution attacks via the __proto__ property in HTTP request bodies. These activities are preliminary probes without confirmed active exploitation or available patches. The vulnerabilities could enable remote code execution, privilege escalation, data manipulation, or denial of service if exploited. Multiple suspicious IPs suggest coordinated scanning, with European organizations using these technologies at particular risk. The threat is currently assessed as low severity but carries significant risk if unmitigated. Early detection, input validation, and network monitoring are recommended to reduce potential impact.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cpsw: Execute ndo_set_rx_mode callback in a work queue Commit 1767bb2d47b7 ("ipv6: mcast: Don't hold RTNL for IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP.") removed the RTNL lock for IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP operations. However, this change triggered the following call trace on my BeagleBone Black board: WARNING: net/8021q/vlan_core.c:236 at vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124, CPU#0: rpcbind/481 RTNL: assertion failed at net/8021q/vlan_core.c (236) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 997 PID: 481 Comm: rpcbind Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260130-yocto-standard+ #35 PREEMPT Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x28/0x2c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x30/0x38 dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb8/0x11c __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x130/0x194 warn_slowpath_fmt from vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124 vlan_for_each from cpsw_add_mc_addr+0x54/0x98 cpsw_add_mc_addr from __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev+0xc4/0xec __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev from __dev_mc_add+0x78/0x88 __dev_mc_add from igmp6_group_added+0x84/0xec igmp6_group_added from __ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x1fc/0x2f0 __ipv6_dev_mc_inc from __ipv6_sock_mc_join+0x124/0x1b4 __ipv6_sock_mc_join from do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x84c/0x1168 do_ipv6_setsockopt from ipv6_setsockopt+0x88/0xc8 ipv6_setsockopt from do_sock_setsockopt+0xe8/0x19c do_sock_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt+0x84/0xac __sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 This trace occurs because vlan_for_each() is called within cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode(), which expects the RTNL lock to be held. Since modifying vlan_for_each() to operate without the RTNL lock is not straightforward, and because ndo_set_rx_mode() is invoked both with and without the RTNL lock across different code paths, simply adding rtnl_lock() in cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode() is not a viable solution. To resolve this issue, we opt to execute the actual processing within a work queue, following the approach used by the icssg-prueth driver. Please note: To reproduce this issue, I manually reverted the changes to am335x-bone-common.dtsi from commit c477358e66a3 ("ARM: dts: am335x-bone: switch to new cpsw switch drv") in order to revert to the legacy cpsw driver.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cpsw_new: Execute ndo_set_rx_mode callback in a work queue Commit 1767bb2d47b7 ("ipv6: mcast: Don't hold RTNL for IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP.") removed the RTNL lock for IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_GROUP operations. However, this change triggered the following call trace on my BeagleBone Black board: WARNING: net/8021q/vlan_core.c:236 at vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124, CPU#0: rpcbind/496 RTNL: assertion failed at net/8021q/vlan_core.c (236) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 997 PID: 496 Comm: rpcbind Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-next-20260122-yocto-standard+ #8 PREEMPT Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x28/0x2c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x30/0x38 dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb8/0x11c __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x130/0x194 warn_slowpath_fmt from vlan_for_each+0x120/0x124 vlan_for_each from cpsw_add_mc_addr+0x54/0xd8 cpsw_add_mc_addr from __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev+0xc4/0xec __hw_addr_ref_sync_dev from __dev_mc_add+0x78/0x88 __dev_mc_add from igmp6_group_added+0x84/0xec igmp6_group_added from __ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x1fc/0x2f0 __ipv6_dev_mc_inc from __ipv6_sock_mc_join+0x124/0x1b4 __ipv6_sock_mc_join from do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x84c/0x1168 do_ipv6_setsockopt from ipv6_setsockopt+0x88/0xc8 ipv6_setsockopt from do_sock_setsockopt+0xe8/0x19c do_sock_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt+0x84/0xac __sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x5 This trace occurs because vlan_for_each() is called within cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode(), which expects the RTNL lock to be held. Since modifying vlan_for_each() to operate without the RTNL lock is not straightforward, and because ndo_set_rx_mode() is invoked both with and without the RTNL lock across different code paths, simply adding rtnl_lock() in cpsw_ndo_set_rx_mode() is not a viable solution. To resolve this issue, we opt to execute the actual processing within a work queue, following the approach used by the icssg-prueth driver.
Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1 expose an unauthenticated .NET Remoting HTTP service on TCP port 8001. The service publishes default ObjectURIs (including EndeavorServer.rem and RemoteFileReceiver.rem) and permits the use of SOAP and binary formatters with TypeFilterLevel set to Full. An unauthenticated remote attacker can invoke the exposed remoting endpoints to perform arbitrary file read and write operations via the WebClient class. This allows retrieval of sensitive files such as WebRoot\\web.config, which may disclose IIS machineKey validation and decryption keys. An attacker can use these keys to generate a malicious ASP.NET ViewState payload and achieve remote code execution within the IIS application context. Additionally, supplying a UNC path can trigger outbound SMB authentication from the service account, potentially exposing NTLMv2 hashes for relay or offline cracking.
Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1 use static ASP.NET/IIS machineKey values configured for the VeraSMART web application and stored in C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Veramark\\VeraSMART\\WebRoot\\web.config. An attacker who obtains these keys can craft a valid ASP.NET ViewState payload that passes integrity validation and is accepted by the application, resulting in server-side deserialization and remote code execution in the context of the IIS application.
This security update for Trivy addresses multiple vulnerabilities across various dependencies including hashicorp/go-getter, golang.org/x/crypto/ssh, golang.org/x/net/html, github.com/golang-jwt/jwt, and others. The fixes cover issues such as argument injection, authorization bypass, denial of service, memory consumption, information leaks, and code execution. The update also includes other non-security related fixes and dependency upgrades. No specific affected versions of Trivy are stated in the provided data.
Hyland OnBase contains an unauthenticated .NET Remoting exposure in the OnBase Workflow Timer Service (Hyland.Core.Workflow.NTService.exe). An attacker who can reach the service can send crafted .NET Remoting requests to default HTTP channel endpoints on TCP/8900 (e.g., TimerServiceAPI.rem and TimerServiceEvents.rem for Workflow) to trigger unsafe object unmarshalling, enabling arbitrary file read/write. By writing attacker-controlled content into web-accessible locations or chaining with other OnBase features, this can lead to remote code execution. The same primitive can be abused by supplying a UNC path to coerce outbound NTLM authentication (SMB coercion) to an attacker-controlled host.
Threat actors have been observed exploiting Net Monitor for Employees Professional and SimpleHelp software in ransomware operations. These legitimate tools were used for remote access, command execution, and persistence. The attackers disguised Net Monitor as Microsoft OneDrive and configured SimpleHelp with cryptocurrency-related keyword triggers. In one case, the attack led to an attempted deployment of Crazy ransomware. The intrusions involved initial access through compromised VPN accounts, followed by the installation of these tools for remote control and monitoring. The shared infrastructure and tactics suggest a single threat actor or group behind these activities, with objectives including cryptocurrency theft and ransomware deployment.
PowerDocu contains a Windows GUI executable to perform technical documentations. Prior to 2.4.0, PowerDocu contains a critical security vulnerability in how it parses JSON files within Flow or App packages. The application blindly trusts the $type property in JSON files, allowing an attacker to instantiate arbitrary .NET objects and execute code. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.0.
A malicious email attachment containing a . bat script is delivering a multi-stage malware payload designed to steal data via a Chrome injector. The initial script is a fork of publicly available GitHub code but includes obfuscated Base64-encoded payloads executed through PowerShell. The payload fetches additional components from a compromised website, including a . NET program that establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and communicates with a Telegram-based command and control (C2) server. This malware, identified as XWorm V7.x, uses sophisticated obfuscation and evasion techniques to avoid detection. It targets Windows systems and aims to steal sensitive information silently. The attack does not require user interaction beyond opening the malicious attachment and does not currently have known widespread exploitation but poses a medium risk. European organizations using Windows and Chrome browsers are potential targets, especially those with less mature email security controls.
A sophisticated multi-stage malware campaign employs living-off-the-land techniques and in-memory payload delivery to evade security controls. The infection chain begins with a hidden batch file that executes an embedded PowerShell loader, which then injects Donut-generated shellcode into legitimate Windows processes. The final payload is a heavily obfuscated .NET framework implementing advanced anti-analysis techniques, credential harvesting, surveillance capabilities, and remote system control. Data exfiltration occurs via Discord webhooks and Telegram bots. The malware, identified as Pulsar RAT, features live chat functionality and background payload deployment, demonstrating a modern, high-evasion Windows malware operation designed for long-term access and large-scale data theft.
A critical flaw in Node.js version 25's permission model allows Unix Domain Socket (UDS) connections to bypass network restrictions when the --permission flag is enabled. This vulnerability permits attacker-controlled inputs to connect to arbitrary local sockets even without the --allow-net permission, breaking the intended security boundary. This can lead to privilege escalation, data exposure, or local code execution. The issue affects Node.js versions from 25.0.0 up to but not including 25.3.0. A patch is available for this vulnerability.
This security update for Go 1.25 addresses multiple vulnerabilities including memory exhaustion in net/http Request.ParseForm, denial of service in archive/zip, and several issues in crypto/tls and cmd/go that could lead to incorrect encryption processing or arbitrary code execution. The update is provided in Go 1.25.6 released on 2026-01-15 by the SUSE Product Security Team.