Search: payload.bin
656 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7933cd1ec11531feba788870555eeac615535d8e230b4d252880def9c68ff5e) tennacity is a one-character typosquat of the popular 'tenacity' library; its README/PKG-INFO are copied verbatim from real tenacity while setup.py lists placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', your.email@example.com) and a 'prints Hello World on import' description. On import, tennacity/__init__.py branches on OS and CPU architecture to download platform-specific binaries from https://easyswapnow.pro/downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin, and a Windows payload from a Google Drive file (id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), stages them to ~/.local/share/config, /Users/Shared/.local/config, and %TEMP%/t.jse, sets the executable bit, and invokes them via subprocess.run. It then installs login-time persistence: a systemd --user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service (enabled via 'systemctl --user enable --now') on Linux and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist (loaded via 'launchctl load -w') on macOS, both re-invoking the module's Python file at every user login. The fetched binaries are unpinned, unverified, and hosted on a non-publisher domain unrelated to the package's stated Hello-World purpose. ## Source: kam193 (d1f457b8b07c4cda5c20b76c195faa127906578c1977fb00469c44a7a114f810) The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity Reasons (based on the campaign): - malware - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - typosquatting - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fa26048a977a00adcd1ffc42ccf06110e3807bb2a3145a01fd01318dcfe79771) Package `@wrenfield/viem` impersonates the popular `viem` library (homepage viem.sh, repo wevm/viem); README and authors fields credit the real viem maintainers but the package itself is published under an unrelated `@wrenfield` scope. The shipped source under `_cjs/` mirrors viem's real code, but `package.json` rewrites the `abitype` dependency via npm alias: `"abitype": "npm:@wrenfield/abitype@1.2.4"`. The CommonJS entry `_cjs/index.js` calls `require("abitype")` at module load, so any installer who `require()`s or `import`s `@wrenfield/viem` transitively pulls and executes code from `@wrenfield/abitype@1.2.4` — a separate package under the same attacker-controlled scope, outside this tarball. The combination of brand impersonation of a top npm package plus a silent dependency redirect to an attacker-controlled namespace is the namespace-abuse / dependency-hijack pattern: the lure package looks legitimate on inspection, while the actual payload is delivered through the redirected dependency at first import. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (517d465272a3a1d252e83e178bb263a1ccf600b42fed6d5aa1d110b9141fc77a) On require of index.js, a delayed IIFE reads test/fixtures/keypairs.dat, base64-decodes it into ~/.cache-db/.node-sync/syncd.js (mode 0o700), and spawns it detached under Node. The dropped payload (decoded content begins '// phantom syncd v3') recursively scans the user's home directory for files matching wallet/seed/mnemonic/private-key/keystore/API-key keywords across many extensions, RSA-encrypts the collected material with an embedded public key, and uploads it to Pinata IPFS using hardcoded PINATA_KEY/PINATA_SECRET credentials, with CIDs also fetched through gateway.pinata.cloud, ipfs.io, and cloudflare-ipfs.com. Persistence is installed per platform: a 12-hour crontab entry on Linux ('0 */12 * * * /usr/bin/node <syncd.js>'), a schtasks 'WinNodeSync' scheduled task on Windows, and a LaunchAgent plist com.apple.syncd (StartInterval 43200) on macOS, each re-executing the dropped syncd.js. The fixture-file cover name (test/fixtures/keypairs.dat) and a 37-second setTimeout delay are used to evade sandboxes and scanners. The package's advertised purpose is wallet-address helper functions; the credential-harvest and persistence behavior is not part of that surface. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9828d7f04091054759c65d427b8f9d7b2853a8a062f9ca261a37e0a0bbc231d0) Package @vite-mcp/vite-type@6.44.1 impersonates the legitimate vite package: package.json declares name '@vite-mcp/vite-type', author 'Evan You', repository 'github.com/vitejs/vite', and a bin entry 'vite' → 'bin/vite.js', while shipping a copy of the vite source tree to look authentic. Appended to bin/vite.js, after a long whitespace-padded line intended to push it past editor viewports, is an obfuscated IIFE that uses a Fisher-Yates-style string-permutation decoder keyed to the integer 4606094 to reconstruct identifiers ('require','https','get','child_process','spawn','eval','JSON.parse'). At runtime it performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to a remote host, XOR-decodes the response, passes the result to eval(), and additionally invokes child_process.spawn(..., {detached:true, stdio:..., windowsHide:true}) to run the decoded payload as a hidden detached process. The loader fires whenever the shipped 'vite' bin is invoked (e.g. via 'npx vite' or a project's npm scripts), giving the publisher arbitrary remote code execution on any developer or build host that runs this CLI. Combined with the brand/author/repository impersonation of vitejs/vite, this is a deliberate supply-chain attack against developers who mistakenly install this scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (da355f47379edd22d66678f8031fb25c0655eee3ea057eefd577666021ab8c33) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8fe093d0d0fa83ab20aa57e9d9c8500e03a25ead578ff351fdc3609118cf5ecf) Package is published as `@vitets/vite-ts` and copies the legitimate Vite project's author (`Evan You`), README, homepage (`vitejs.dev`), and repository (`github.com/vitejs/vite`) to impersonate the real `vite` / `@vitejs/*` packages, and declares a `bin` entry named `vite` so consumers who install it and run the `vite` CLI execute the package's `bin/vite.js`. After ~5KB of whitespace padding, `bin/vite.js` contains an obfuscated payload that uses a custom string-scramble routine to hide identifiers (`require`, `child_process`, `spawn`, `eval`, hostnames, HTTP/JSON-RPC method names) as numeric indices into a reconstructed string table, defeating static IOC scanning. The decoded routine performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to remote hosts, XORs the response with a key fetched from a second endpoint, runs `eval(r)` on the result, and additionally `child_process.spawn`s a detached background process to execute it (with `detached:true`, `windowsHide:true`). This gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine every time the `vite` CLI is invoked, with no integrity check on the fetched code. The package's `dist/` bundle also contains base64+Buffer decode primitives consistent with additional obfuscated payload handling. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e6fa8ee8ed2a92db620d30015fe7d672d1dd66e500b3749a71cfd1486d62ca4d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c6076869d73ce328ffd736c9df9d269cd99e505ffc3bfceae5d3f5a633a8c420) Package @vite-ts/vite-ui@6.44.1 impersonates the legitimate vite package: it clones vite's README, declares author 'Evan You', homepage https://vitejs.dev, repository vitejs/vite, and a bin entry mapping `vite` to bin/vite.js. The shipped bin/vite.js contains an obfuscated IIFE that reconstructs a string table from a shuffled blob using the integer seed 4606094 to hide the strings 'https', 'child_process', 'eval', 'POST', '2.0', and the destination URLs. At runtime the payload issues an HTTPS GET to an Ethereum block-explorer URL and a JSON-RPC POST to an Ethereum node, XOR-decodes the hex result to retrieve JavaScript code from an attacker-controlled smart contract (EtherHiding pattern), and executes the retrieved code via eval(r) and via a detached child_process.spawn('node', ['-e',...+r], { detached: true, windowsHide: true }). The fetched bytes are not pinned, not signature-verified, and are mutable by the contract owner, so any consumer invoking the `vite` CLI from this package runs whatever code the attacker currently has staged on-chain. Additional install-time curl invocations and Buffer.from(...,'base64').toString() decode chains are present in the bundled dist files. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a98ce75ef5baa1877c3fbda8f5ecffce0e8f995402bbb243416cdc56ed112261) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9aaf307faea8efb93af6f3c8ee4811304a7d9afa25f1c9525aed108efea439e7) Package `@vite-pro/vite-ui` impersonates the official `vite` package: `package.json` declares author `Evan You`, points `repository` at `github.com/vitejs/vite`, sets `homepage` to `vitejs.dev`, ships the upstream Vite README, and exposes a `bin` named `vite`. Appended to the end of `bin/vite.js`, after the legitimate CLI bootstrap and a large block of trailing whitespace, is an obfuscated IIFE that constructs a string table via a seeded Fisher-Yates shuffle (seed 4606094) to hide endpoints, method names, and constants. The loader then fetches a remote payload over HTTP, XOR-decrypts it with an embedded key, and `eval`s the result. It subsequently fetches a second payload and passes it to `child_process.spawn` with `detached:true`, `stdio:'ignore'`, and `windowsHide:true`, establishing a hidden, long-running process independent of the parent `vite` invocation. The loader runs every time a developer executes `vite`, `npx vite`, or `npm run dev|build`, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution and a persistent background process on the developer machine on each CLI use. The obfuscation technique (seeded string-array shuffle + XOR + eval + detached spawn) matches reported blockchain-C2 loader families. ## Source: ghsa-malware (86e8afdc046433be596684c9c50254fafe49af5b72ce9782db5f5e22d6b8293e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @tqm-mfe/main version 5.4.7 contains malicious code in its postinstall.js lifecycle script. This script is heavily obfuscated and executes automatically on npm install. It performs environment checks to evade sandbox detection, downloads a remote binary payload, decrypts it, writes it to a persistent app-data directory, marks it executable, and runs it detached from the installer process. Additionally, it sends system information to a remote server. The package metadata is deceptive, mimicking an internal corporate mirror but is actually a dependency-confusion lure. This behavior is unrelated to the package's advertised functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'supertokens-web' version 1.16.0 is a malicious package impersonating the legitimate 'supertokens-web-js' authentication SDK. Upon being required, it downloads and executes an unverified binary from a non-publisher Vercel-hosted URL, placing it in hidden user directories and running it silently. The package uses obfuscation techniques to hide the malicious payload's URL and filenames, deceiving users who mistype the dependency name. This behavior results in unauthorized code execution on the affected system. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The @torbeck/heap npm package is a malicious typosquatting package impersonating the legitimate @datastructures-js/heap library. It contains heavily obfuscated code that executes at require-time to download and execute a hidden binary payload on the host system. This payload is platform-specific and runs detached, providing remote code execution (RCE). The package does not verify the downloaded binary's integrity or authenticity, making it a severe security risk. Any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fd1d5daf09cc7bfff164e60bf5abd0a1b374b5bb616f0a78cac8f6c6ea613608) The package's `prepare` lifecycle script, which runs automatically on `npm install`, collects host, user, and platform identifiers along with the full `process.env` and POSTs them to a hardcoded ngrok tunnel at crabbing-thong-overhung.ngrok-free.dev (path `/?cross_os_cloud=1`). When executed in GitHub Actions, it additionally reads ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, requests a GitHub Actions OIDC ID token, and includes that token in the exfiltrated payload. The version number (99.9.9) and hardcoded attacker-controlled tunnel destination are consistent with a dependency-confusion / typosquat lure targeting CI environments; the OIDC token can be exchanged for cloud credentials via configured trust relationships. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ba06f85b2f6ed01391c70e5ba328a9bacd99e5c40f62c3fb477e53bdeeb03b0e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @gleamkit/ws version 8.21.3 is a malicious package that impersonates the legitimate ws package by copying its metadata and source code. It contains a heavily obfuscated payload that, upon loading, fetches an external encrypted binary, decrypts it, writes it to the temporary directory, makes it executable, and runs it as a detached child process before exiting. This behavior executes attacker-controlled code on any project that installs and loads this package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @equansservices/tool version 1.0.2 contains malicious code executed during installation. Its postinstall script downloads and runs an attacker-controlled payload from an unauthenticated HTTP CloudFront URL, executing binaries or scripts depending on the platform. The package impersonates legitimate tooling associated with the Equans brand and Anthropic Claude ecosystem, but the payload source is unrelated and unverified. This results in automatic execution of potentially harmful code on any environment running npm install for this package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dotnet-runtime-base versions 1.0.4 and 1.0.5 contains malicious code in its postinstall script. On Windows systems, the script downloads and executes an attacker-controlled binary from a personal GitHub repository, running it hidden with bypassed execution policies. This behavior results in arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine and likely full system compromise. The malicious payload is designed to evade detection in development and CI environments. Removal of the package does not guarantee elimination of all malicious artifacts. Immediate secret and key rotation is recommended if the package was installed. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The slds-lsp-client package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System language-server (LSP) tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d1a204f1615398c380936de4d1e2603cab90300e0e7bc20770ffd0bbe693ce80) Package name presents as a Salesforce Lightning Design System / Language Server Protocol client, but the shipped code is a thin Sentry wrapper with no SLDS or LSP functionality. package.json declares a preinstall script that runs `npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js`, which resolves the installer's public IP via a Cloudflare trace endpoint, attaches it as the Sentry user identity (sendDefaultPii:true), and triggers a forced exception so the event — carrying the installer's IP and host/error metadata — is uploaded on `npm install` with no consent. The Sentry DSN is hardcoded to an author-controlled project at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672 (DEFAULT_DSN in src/index.js). The exported init() also falls back to the same hardcoded DSN when a caller does not supply one, so consumers of the library additionally route their application error telemetry and default PII to the same author endpoint. The name/description mismatch combined with an install-time beacon fits an opportunistic install-time data-collection package targeting typos or misfires. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2265e2b46fde3cf1883c191549a7bd9e5d2afe8072876c632b60edc4bc9e0cd6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'auto-debug-tool' versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2, and 1.0.3 contains malicious code that executes automatically during installation on Windows systems. The package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs a hidden PowerShell command to download and execute an unsigned binary from a mutable branch of a personal GitHub repository. This execution is concealed by skipping non-Windows platforms and development environments, and by swallowing errors, allowing the payload to remain dormant on developer machines while activating on Windows installations and CI environments. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The PyPI package 'solidity-dev' version 1.3.0 contains malicious code that drops and executes a base64-encoded Linux ELF binary upon import. This binary steals cryptocurrency wallet data from various local keystores and browser wallet extensions, encrypts the data, and exfiltrates it to attacker-controlled file-sharing and IPFS services. It also establishes persistence by installing a cron job to periodically re-execute the malicious payload. The package falsely advertises Solidity development helpers but contains no legitimate Solidity-related code. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A malicious release of the jscrambler npm package (version 8.14.0) was published on July 11, 2026, introducing hidden native binaries that execute automatically during installation. The compromised package added an undocumented preinstall hook executing dist/setup.js, which deploys platform-specific binaries for Linux, macOS, and Windows embedded in an obfuscated CSI container. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets, AI coding assistants, cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure), browser data, and messaging applications. String obfuscation uses per-string ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption. The threat actor published five malicious versions (8.14.0, 8.16.0, 8.17.0, 8.18.0, 8.20.0) over three hours, evolving delivery methods to evade detection. Version 8.22.0 is confirmed clean. The package receives approximately 15,800 weekly downloads, affecting developer workstations, CI systems, and build pipelines with access to credentials and secrets. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e34339f1be6afb8a41b6dbe2f7d7c480d5a438a67ff119b235d1d98ffa2b2e4a) google-caja-bower@1000.801.20 declares scripts.preinstall = 'node index.js', so index.js runs automatically on npm install. index.js walks the installer's current working directory, builds a directory tree, enumerates up to 500 files (skipping only common binary/media extensions) up to 8MB each, and POSTs the tree plus each file's bytes as multipart uploads to two hardcoded Discord webhook URLs under discord.com/api/webhooks/. The payload also collects os.hostname(), process.env.USER / process.env.USERNAME, os.platform(), and process.cwd() and includes them in the webhook messages. Because the file filter excludes only binary/media types, credential-bearing text files present in the working tree (.env,.npmrc, ssh configs, cloud credentials, source code) are uploaded verbatim. The package name impersonates the Google Caja / Bower namespace and its own package description self-labels the behavior as 'collect and send system information to a remote endpoint'; the webhook message body identifies the campaign as 'Dependency Confusion Crawler'. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4d307e63a5313eaae94ececb230bbd43410bc6fbd020b9f55d968bcb7f6c29f6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61429 ## Summary The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is **not limited to the httpx/urllib backend**. When `crawl4ai` (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, `web_crawl` auto-selects `provider=crawl4ai`, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (`provider: "crawl4ai"`). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05. ## Details ### Affected component - Package `praisonaiagents` 4.6.63. Backend selected when `crawl4ai`+Playwright are installed. - Files: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py` (`_crawl_with_crawl4ai`) and `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py` (standalone crawl wrappers). ### Vulnerable code / root cause Path: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py` Function: `_crawl_with_crawl4ai` Snippet: ```python async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler: for url in urls: result = await crawler.arun(url=url) # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects ``` Path: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py` Function: `Crawl4AITools.crawl` / `crawl4ai` Snippet: ```python result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config) # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation ``` Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch `_is_safe_crawl_url()` on the initial URL string in `web_crawl()` (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (`urls`) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is `crawler.arun(url=...)`; the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser). ### Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl `content`. See PRAI-05. ## Proof of Concept ### Environment `crawl4ai` + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (`127.0.0.1:18081`), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\` (`docker-compose.crawl.yml`). ### Steps to reproduce 1. `SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger` → `127.0.0.1:18081`: ```http POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:18081 Content-Type: application/json {"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"} ``` 2. Redirect variant `SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback`: `{"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}`. ### Expected result The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects. ### Actual result HTTP 200, `"provider":"crawl4ai"`, response `content` contains `PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91` + `FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91` for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload. ### Screenshots **Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back** The attacker-controlled `rebind.lab` URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed `web_crawl` endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing `PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91`. <img width="1542" height="763" alt="01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69" /> **Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence** The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving `rebind.lab` to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives `GET /secret` from a headless Chrome user agent. <img width="1659" height="946" alt="02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8" /> **Crawl4AI redirect read-back** The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body. <img width="1544" height="771" alt="03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d05c8aa-5bda-45bc-b94c-bef0bdcf055c" /> **Crawl4AI redirect runtime evidence** The controlled redirector returns `302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret`, and the internal canary receives `GET /secret` from the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend. <img width="1590" height="920" alt="04-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Internal-Hit-Log" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/dd9c0fec-3583-43ab-b83c-4470fa6aa409" /> ## Impact Same class as PRAI-05: read-back SSRF to internal/metadata services, now on the crawl4ai backend. Broadens the affected surface (the flaw is in the shared validate-without-pinning design, not one backend). ## Suggested remediation Resolve-once + IP-pin + per-connect validation must also cover the crawl4ai backend (constrain the headless browser to the validated IP, or allowlist crawl destinations). | CVE Database V5 |
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