The Head Mare APT group exploited two vulnerabilities in TrueConf video conferencing servers released since 2022 to deliver PhantomCore malware to conference participants. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code, replace legitimate client installers with malicious versions, and deploy web shells. Infected installers deployed a backdoor granting attackers full control over infected systems. On Linux servers, additional backdoors used GitHub as a command and control channel. The vulnerabilities were patched in TrueConf server versions 5.3.9, 5.4.9, and 5.5.5 released in June 2026. Organizations with employees participating in TrueConf conferences may have been affected even without operating their own servers.
CVAT is an open source interactive video and image annotation tool for computer vision. From 2.68.0 until 2.70.0, the audio-task annotation guide renderer in cvat-ui/src/audio/components/annotation-page/audio-workspace/top-bar/audio-right-group.tsx passes attacker-controlled guide Markdown to MDEditor without the rehype-sanitize plugin. A user who can create or edit an annotation guide can store malicious JavaScript that executes when another user opens the guide. The script can issue arbitrary CVAT requests with the victim user's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 2.70.0.
CVE-2026-77118 is a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Photo CD (PCD) decoder of GraphicsMagick. The flaw occurs in the DecodeImage() function where the output pointer advances without proper boundary checks, potentially leading to heap memory corruption when processing crafted PCD files. This affects GraphicsMagick versions from 0 up to but not including 1.3.48. The vulnerability has a high severity score of 8.4 CVSS v4.0.
CVE-2026-61712 is a low-severity vulnerability in moby buildkit prior to version 0.31.1. The issue involves BuildKit reading attacker-controlled /etc/passwd and /etc/group files without limits while resolving user and group identifiers. Maliciously crafted oversized files can exhaust memory and cause the buildkitd process to terminate due to out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.31.1.
## Summary
Vikunja's `web.Auth` interface (`pkg/web/web.go`, single method `GetID() int64`) is satisfied by BOTH `*user.User` and `*models.LinkSharing`. A link-share's `GetID()` returns the **raw positive** `share.ID` (`pkg/models/link_sharing.go:83-85`), which lives in the same positive autoincrement ID space as `users.id`. The safe negated form `getUserID() = share.ID * -1` (`link_sharing.go:126-128`) exists but is NOT used at three permission sinks. As a result, a link-share principal with id `N` — which should have zero authority over teams or bot users — is treated as the *user* whose `users.id == N` at three permission checks that lack the `a.(*LinkSharing)` guard their sibling methods have. This is the same principal-type-confusion class as CVE-2026-68581 (GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844), but at three code paths that advisory/fix never touched.
## Root Cause
`web.Auth` is a one-method interface (`GetID() int64`). `*LinkSharing.GetID()` returns the raw positive share id. Three permission methods compare this raw id directly and omit the link-share type guard used elsewhere in the same files:
1. **`TeamMember.CanDelete`** (`pkg/models/team_members_permissions.go:31-40`): the self-removal fast path `if u.ID == a.GetID() { return true }` (:36) executes **before** `IsAdmin`. `IsAdmin` (:48-51) is the ONLY place that rejects link shares (`if _, is := a.(*LinkSharing); is { return false }`, :50) — and it is never reached when the fast path returns true.
2. **`BotUser.isOwner`** (`pkg/models/bot_users_permissions.go:47-56`): `return u.BotOwnerID == a.GetID()` (:55), used by `CanRead`/`CanUpdate`/`CanDelete` (:36-45). Unlike `CanCreate` (:27-30) which type-asserts `a.(*user.User)`, these three paths have no principal guard.
3. **`Team.CanRead`** (`pkg/models/teams_permissions.go:68-78`): matches membership on `And("user_id = ?", a.GetID())` (:76) with no link-share guard, unlike sibling `IsAdmin` (:45-49, guard at :47).
Link-share JWTs reach these routes: `SetupTokenMiddleware` validates the signature only, `GetAuthFromClaims` returns `*models.LinkSharing`, and the `/user`/`/teams` route groups add no link-share rejection. Link sharing is enabled by default (`config.go` `ServiceEnableLinkSharing.setDefault(true)`).
## Impact
A link-share principal (obtainable from any public share link, or self-registered via a share on the attacker's own project) whose id `N` collides with a victim's `users.id == N` can, without being that user or any user:
- **Integrity (I:H):** remove the victim from any team they belong to (`DELETE /api/v1/teams/{T}/members/{username}`) → revokes all project permissions the victim inherited through that team.
- **Availability/Integrity (A:H, I:H):** enumerate the victim's bot users (`GET /api/v1/user/bots` → `bot_owner_id = a.GetID()`), then disable/rename or **permanently delete** them (`DELETE /api/v1/user/bots/{id}` → `DeleteUser`), destroying data owned solely by those bots.
- **Confidentiality (C:H):** read the roster + metadata (name, description, full member list) of any team the colliding user belongs to (`GET /api/v1/teams/{T}`), plus read bot-user records via `isOwner`-gated reads.
## Attack Chain
### Sink 1 — TeamMember.CanDelete (integrity)
1. **Entry:** `POST /api/v1/shares/{hash}/auth` → link-share JWT with `id = N`. **Guard:** JWT middleware — signature only. **Bypass proof:** `GetAuthFromClaims` returns `*models.LinkSharing`; no route-group link-share rejection on the `/teams` group.
2. **Action:** `DELETE /api/v1/teams/{T}/members/{usernameOfUserN}` with the link-share bearer, targeting a team `T` (≥2 members) that user `N` belongs to. **Guard:** `CanDelete` → `GetUserByUsername(tm.Username)` returns user N, then `u.ID == a.GetID()` (`team_members_permissions.go:36`). **Bypass proof:** `a.GetID()` returns `N` (raw positive `share.ID`, `link_sharing.go:84`) == user N's id → `true`. No `a.(*LinkSharing)` check on this branch (only `IsAdmin` at :50 has it, never reached).
3. **Sink:** `Delete` (`team_members.go`) removes user N from team T (last-member check passes when team has ≥2 members). **Impact:** victim loses all project access inherited through team T.
### Sink 2 — BotUser.isOwner (bot takeover / destruction)
1. **Entry:** link-share JWT id N (as above). **Guard:** signature-only; `/user` group adds no link-share reject.
2. **Enumerate:** `GET /api/v1/user/bots` → `ReadAll` runs `Where("bot_owner_id = ?", a.GetID())` = bots owned by user N. **Bypass proof:** `a.GetID()` = N; returns victim's bot ids self-contained (removes the id-guessing barrier).
3. **Sink:** `DELETE /api/v1/user/bots/{botId}` → `CanDelete` → `isOwner` → `u.BotOwnerID == a.GetID()` (`bot_users_permissions.go:55`) → true; `Delete` calls `DeleteUser`. **Bypass proof:** no `a.(*LinkSharing)` guard here (Create-only, :28). **Impact:** disable/rename/permanently delete victim's bot automation identities.
### Sink 3 — Team.CanRead (info disclosure)
1. **Entry:** link-share JWT id N. **Guard:** signature-onl
An unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability exists in the Zoo extension for Joomla by yootheme.com, versions 1.0.0 through 4.1.63. The vulnerability arises because the image element accepts arbitrary files when the client-supplied Content-Type is within the image MIME group. This can allow attackers to upload dangerous files without authentication.
Multiple critical vulnerabilities have been identified in Keycloak, an identity and access management solution enabling single sign-on for modern applications. These include a predictable account-linking hash that allows account takeover via a malicious OIDC client, disclosure of hidden group metadata without proper permissions, leakage of rotated client secrets through the Admin REST API, unauthenticated account takeover via reset-credentials flow bypass, and a privilege escalation vulnerability due to a TOCTOU race condition. Red Hat has released fixed versions to address these issues.
Red Hat has released a critical security update for its build of Keycloak version 26.6.6 addressing multiple vulnerabilities. These include privilege escalation via a TOCTOU flaw, unauthenticated account takeover through reset-credentials flow bypass, information disclosure of rotated client secrets, predictable hashes enabling account takeover, and disclosure of hidden group metadata without proper permissions. The update fixes five CVEs affecting authentication and authorization components. Users are advised to back up their installations before applying the update.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (08547edeec8e522d84b40fd8236878da54c888ede86588be3913a1c37cd2b245)
infogram-bot@1.6.0 implements a Telegram bot that accepts text messages from remote parties and passes them directly to subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True,...) on the host running the package, giving any authorized Telegram user (and, for the.sh command, any member of a group chat) arbitrary shell command execution with the privileges of the process. Additional handlers expose 'get all' (walks the working directory, zips it, and uploads all files in 50MB chunks via reply_document), 'take <file>' / 'tk a' (streams any requested file or all files under the cwd back to the Telegram chat), '.printenv' (iterates os.environ and sends every environment variable value to the chat), and '.grep' (greps environment values and files for arbitrary substrings and returns matches). Together these provide a full remote-shell backdoor plus a data-exfiltration channel to a destination the host owner did not configure at runtime. pyproject.toml also ships placeholder maintainer metadata (author 'Aapka Naam' / you@example.com, Homepage containing the literal 'YOUR_GITHUB_USERNAME'), consistent with low-attribution publication.
## Source: kam193 (454fa32963f58275e35167d59dd581240725e099682e76e44b6fca7b22332cb0)
The package provides Telegram-based remote access to the machine it runs on. It was deliberately created and used to hack other machines, exfiltrate files and credentials.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-08-httpz-requests
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- files-exfiltration
- rat
- persistence
- uses-telegram-bot
- obfuscation
- native-extension
mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.7.1, release tar archives record mise/bin/mise with user and group ID 1001 and packaging/standalone/install.envsubst extracts and moves it without normalizing ownership, allowing a local user with those IDs to replace a root-installed executable, especially when MISE_INSTALL_PATH targets a shared location such as /usr/local/bin. This issue is fixed in version 2026.7.1.
Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities affecting MySQL 8.4 have been addressed in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 update. These vulnerabilities impact various components including Performance Schema, Optimizer, Replication, Clone Plugin, Group Replication Plugin, X Plugin, Pluggable Authentication, InnoDB, JSON, and DDL. The update rebases MySQL to version 8.4.11 and includes security fixes, bug fixes, and enhancements. The advisory references numerous CVEs with unspecified details and no CVSS scores provided. The update is rated as having an important security impact by Red Hat Product Security.
CVE-2026-19608 is a vulnerability in the group policy provider of the Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.6 authorization services. It arises when group-based policies are evaluated using tokens that contain only group names without full path information. This can cause users belonging to groups with the same name but different organizational paths to be incorrectly authorized, potentially granting unauthorized access to protected resources.
Onyx Enterprise Edition versions prior to 4.3.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in specific user group management endpoints. This flaw allows a curator to add accounts to arbitrary user groups without proper validation, potentially granting unauthorized document access. The issue is resolved in version 4.3.0.
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cybercrime group conducting sophisticated ransomware campaigns targeting Microsoft Azure cloud environments. Unlike traditional ransomware that encrypts local endpoints, Storm-0501 hijacks cloud tenants by compromising high-privilege administrative identities, dismantling defensive controls such as resource locks and backups, and weaponizing native cloud tools. This cloud ransomware campaign involves evading detection, exfiltrating data, destroying backups, and demanding ransom payments. Detection requires cloud detection and response (CDR) capabilities that provide full visibility into the attack chain and connect disparate cloud activity logs into a unified threat story. Tenable One Cloud Exposure offers AI-powered threat detection tailored to Storm-0501’s tactics, enabling rapid triage, containment, and recovery actions to mitigate the impact of these attacks.
A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's Btrfs filesystem allows a NULL pointer dereference during rescue mounts with corrupted block group or RAID stripe tree roots. This occurs because the global block reserve accounting is performed even when the filesystem is mounted read-only in rescue mode, leading to a crash.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP, REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer. The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer. Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: stop fast-leave after deleting a port group br_multicast_leave_group() iterates mp->ports with pp = &p->next in its fast-leave path. After br_multicast_del_pg() removes p, continuing the loop advances pp through the deleted entry. If multicast-to-unicast was enabled, the bridge can hold multiple port groups for the same port and group with different source MAC addresses. Once multicast-to-unicast is disabled, br_port_group_equal() matches those entries by port only. A fast leave can then delete one entry and continue from its stale next pointer, leaving mp->ports pointing at a deleted port group. Fast leave only needs to remove one matching port group. Break after br_multicast_del_pg() so the loop stops before dereferencing the removed entry.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF iopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF pending list before invoking the domain fault handler. iommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the IOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list. When detach or HWPT replacement drops the device's IOPF reference count to zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That function responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list without removing the same groups from IOMMUFD's deliver list or response xarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed group and cause a UAF. Fix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list before IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response. Make iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list membership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD.