Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of manufacturers, including Samsung, Vivo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. “We noticed something was wildly wrong,” Falé said. “Multiple devices reporting to this factory Android TV Box backdoor were ‘phones.'” Image: Bitsight. The researcher found all of the devices reported having the same two apps installed, and that those apps were made by a company called Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Ltd , an entity founded in 2019 in mainland China which operates an ad-publishing portfolio under the name Fengwo Group . Further investigation into the Fengwo Group revealed it has registered multiple patents that match the inner workings of these apps. “Bitsight TRACE identified several Hong Kong, Singapore, and single person ‘legal’ shell identities used to collect the monetization and traced the operation back to a mainland China company known as Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Co., Ltd, which operates under the Fengwo Group,” Falé wrote in a report released today about their findings. Falé said an analysis of the apps shows they help to coordinate an ad fraud network that uses these H96 devices as a captive traffic source to click on ads at AI-generated websites operated by the Fengwo Group. Bitsight discovered the websites contain machine-generated news articles and graphics across a range of categories, including finance, health, education, gaming, music and food blogs. But they also found none of those sites displayed ads unless the device visiting the page matched the spoofed mobile profile of these H96 devices. AI DIGITAL HUMANS The domain for the Fengwo Group — fwgcloud[.]com — claims the company is “redefining the boundaries of human-AI interaction,” and that it has created more than 120,000 “AI digital humans” available to rent for everything from emotional companionship to 24/7 customer service and creative design. The homepage for fwgcloud dot com. Falé said the Fengwo Group’s domain shared its SSL certificate data with other domains associated with the apps found on H96 devices, specifically the phone spoofing mechanism. He noted the domain also has an internal wiki platform that directly ties the Fengwo Group to a proprietary implementation of a Google-built visual programming language called Blockly , which was originally designed to help kids learn how to write software. According to Bitsight, the Fengwo Group’s employees use Blockly to build the sham websites, allowing low-skilled operators to drag blocks of code together in their Blockly editor — without any need to understand what the underlying code blocks do or how they work. The Blockly homepage. “An operator can drag blocks together in their Blockly editor, to define each fraud routine, given a task type,” reads Bitsi…
Researchers uncovered a fractured criminal ecosystem built around Flying Eagle, an Android remote access tool whose source code was stolen in early 2026 along with nearly 200 customer databases. The investigation began with a malicious APK impersonating a Chinese Provincial Public Security Bureau app, leading to identification of 170 active servers running the framework. Two Telegram channels, SQLRCE0 and Yx Technology, distribute modified versions with operational support and cash-out services at 20-50% transaction fees. The platform combines APK generation and C2 device management with phishing overlays targeting financial, adult, and government services. A successor platform called Night Dragon was introduced in June 2026, featuring enhanced credential capture capabilities for Chinese banking apps, cryptocurrency wallets, and social media platforms. The activity primarily targets Chinese citizens through social engineering lures, though international templates suggest broader targeting capability.
The RedHook Android malware has evolved to abuse the Android Wireless Debugging (Wireless ADB) feature to gain shell-level privileges without requiring a computer connection or device rooting. It tricks users into granting Accessibility permissions to enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging, then uses the pairing code to connect to the local ADB service. This grants it UID 2000 shell privileges, allowing it to execute privileged commands, install or uninstall apps silently, capture screen content, simulate user input, and more. The malware employs multiple persistence mechanisms to maintain its presence and is distributed via social engineering campaigns impersonating government or financial institutions. Android users are advised to install apps only from Google Play and scrutinize permissions carefully.
Rokarolla is a new Android banking Trojan targeting 217 banking and cryptocurrency apps. It spreads via malicious websites masquerading as popular apps like TikTok and Chrome, initially installing a dropper disguised as Google Play Protect. Once installed and granted Accessibility Services, it can simulate user actions, inject overlays, intercept credentials, block calls, read and send SMS, disable Google Play Protect, and silently capture screen content. The malware dynamically downloads fake login pages to steal credentials and can operate even when the device is locked. It also replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones and suppresses audio and notifications to avoid user detection. Rokarolla uses resilient command-and-control infrastructure and employs stealth techniques to maintain persistence and evade detection. No software flaw is exploited, so no patch is available; mitigation relies on user caution and security products detecting the malware.
A simple development setting bypassed protections designed to prevent unauthorized Android apps from accessing Microsoft account tokens, exposing billions of installations. The post Exclusive: How One Line of Code Put Billions of Microsoft Android App Downloads at Risk appeared first on SecurityWeek .
In multiple functions of PackageInstallerService.java, there is a possible way to install unverified apps due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.4.1 for iOS and 2026.4.4 for Android, he Home Assistant Companion apps for Android and iOS expose a JavaScript bridge to the in-app WebView window.externalApp on Android and webkit.messageHandlers.getExternalAuth (alongside revokeExternalAuth and externalBus) on iOS. Two flaws expose the bridge to all frames (including cross-origin iframes) and unsanitized interpolation of the JavaScript callback identifier allows a cross-origin iframe rendered inside the Companion app to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the Home Assistant frontend's main-frame origin and exfiltrate the signed-in user's access token. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.4.1 for iOS and 2026.4.4 for Android.
Tauri is a framework for building binaries for all major desktop platforms. From 2.0 to 2.11.0, a flaw in Tauri's is_local_url() function causes it to incorrectly classify remote URLs as trusted local origins on Windows and Android. On these systems, Tauri maps custom URI scheme protocols to http://<scheme>.localhost/ because those platforms' WebView implementations cannot serve custom URI schemes directly. The issue is that Tauri's check to see if the origin is local, only checks the first subdomain of the URL. An attacker can abuse this by hosting a page on a domain whose subdomain matches the custom scheme of the application. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.10.3.
AppLockZ App Lock and Fingerprint Lock (applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz) 4.2.11 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents, an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome). This results in information disclosure and privilege escalation.
SailingLab AppLock (aka com.alpha.applock) 4.3.8 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents - an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome). This results in information disclosure and privilege escalation.
Easyelife App lock (aka Fingerprint,Applock or locker.app.safe.applocker) 1.9.2 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents - an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome), resulting in information disclosure and privilege escalation.
In Meari IoT SDK builds embedded in CloudEdge 5.5.0 (build 220), Arenti 1.8.1 (build 220), and white-label Android apps <= 1.8.x (latest observed), multiple security-critical secrets are hardcoded and shared, including API signing material, password-transport keying, and service access keys.
A new variant of the TrickMo Android banking trojan was identified between January and February 2026, representing a substantial platform redesign rather than new capabilities. The malware has migrated its command-and-control infrastructure entirely onto The Open Network (TON) using .adnl endpoints, moving away from conventional internet infrastructure. Active campaigns have targeted banking and wallet users in France, Italy, and Austria. Once accessibility permissions are granted, operators gain real-time device control including credential phishing, keylogging, screen recording, SMS interception, and bidirectional remote control. New features include network reconnaissance capabilities and SSH tunnelling that transform infected devices into programmable network pivots and SOCKS5 proxy exit nodes, enabling operators to bypass IP-based fraud detection systems while accessing victim networks.
ESET researchers discovered 28 fraudulent Android applications on Google Play, collectively named CallPhantom, that falsely claimed to provide call histories, SMS records, and WhatsApp logs for any phone number. These apps were downloaded over 7.3 million times before removal, primarily targeting users in India and the Asia-Pacific region. The apps generate fabricated data using hardcoded names and random phone numbers, displaying this fake information only after payment. CallPhantom employs three payment methods, with some bypassing Google Play's official billing system through third-party UPI payments or direct card entry, making refunds difficult. The scam exploits user curiosity about private information, charging between €5 and $80 for worthless subscriptions that deliver entirely fabricated communication data.
The App Builder – Create Native Android & iOS Apps On The Flight plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to and including 5.6.0. This is due to missing authorization validation in the `upload_avatar()` function, which accepts an attacker-controlled `user_id` parameter from the POST request body and uses it to update user meta without verifying that the authenticated requester owns or has permission to modify the target account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the profile avatar of any arbitrary user on the site, including administrators, by supplying a target `user_id` in the request body to the `/wp-json/app-builder/v1/upload-avatar` endpoint.
CVE-2026-3568 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in the MStore API WordPress plugin up to version 4.18.3. It arises from the update_user_profile() function processing user-supplied meta_data JSON without validation, allowing authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or higher to modify arbitrary user meta fields on their own accounts. This includes sensitive fields such as wp_user_level, which can be used to escalate privileges, and plugin-specific authorization flags. The vulnerability does not allow direct exploitation of wp_capabilities but does permit modification of simpler meta keys. The CVSS score is 4.3, indicating medium severity. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available from the vendor.