Cockpit enables users to administer GNU/Linux servers using a web browser. It offers network configuration, log inspection, diagnostic reports, SELinux troubleshooting, interactive command-line sessions, and more.
Security Fix(es):
* cockpit: Cockpit: Arbitrary command execution via crafted links in system logs UI (CVE-2026-4802)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
This entry describes the addition of an interactive security map feature to the NoEyes project, which visually represents what a server can observe or not observe. The information is sourced from a Reddit NetSec post linking to the project's GitHub repository. There is no indication of a vulnerability or exploit associated with this feature. No affected versions or patch information is provided, and no known exploits are reported. The content is primarily informational about a tool enhancement rather than a security threat.
A coordinated supply-chain attack involving nine npm packages published by the maintainer polymarketdev delivers malicious code that exfiltrates Ethereum private keys. The packages masquerade as legitimate Polymarket trading tools but steal private keys via interactive prompts or by silently reading environment variables. The malware persists locally and sends stolen keys to a Cloudflare Worker command-and-control server. The attack targets developer workflows using AI-assisted coding tools by naming packages to appear relevant. Installing or running these packages fully compromises the host system.
A coordinated supply-chain attack involving nine npm packages published by the maintainer polymarketdev under the polymarket-bot family. These packages masquerade as legitimate Polymarket trading tools but steal Ethereum private keys by prompting users or silently reading environment variables, then exfiltrate them to a Cloudflare Worker command-and-control server. The malicious code uses a postinstall hook that evades automated detection by checking for interactive shells and persists locally with device fingerprinting. The payload is identical across all packages and includes legitimate SDKs to provide functional cover commands. No patch or remediation guidance is currently available.
Russh is a Rust SSH client & server library. Prior to version 0.60.1, a pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server's keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials. This issue has been patched in version 0.60.1.
Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, the SbieIniServer RunSbieCtrl handler contains a stack buffer overflow. The MSGID_SBIE_INI_RUN_SBIE_CTRL message is handled before normal sandbox and impersonation checks, and for non-sandboxed callers, the handler copies the trailing message payload into a fixed-size WCHAR ctrlCmd[128] stack buffer using memcpy without verifying the length fits within the buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local interactive process to connect and send an oversized payload to overflow the stack. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.
xrdp is an open source RDP server. Versions through 0.10.5 allow an authenticated remote user to execute arbitrary commands on the server due to unsafe handling of the AlternateShell parameter in xrdp-sesman. When the AllowAlternateShell setting is enabled (which is the default when not explicitly configured), xrdp accepts a client-supplied AlternateShell value and executes it via /bin/sh -c during session initialization. This results in shell-interpreted execution of unsanitized, user-controlled input. This behavior effectively provides a scriptable remote command execution primitive over RDP within the security context of the authenticated user, occurring prior to normal window manager startup. This can bypass expected session initialization flows and operational assumptions that restrict execution to interactive desktop environments. This issue has been fixed in version 0.10.6.
CVAT is an open source interactive video and image annotation tool for computer vision. In versions 2.8.1 through 2.52.0, an attacker with an account on a CVAT instance is able to retrieve the contents of any file system directory accessible to the CVAT server. The exposed information is names of contained files and subdirectories. The contents of files are not accessible. Version 2.53.0 contains a patch. No known workarounds are available.
PILOS (Platform for Interactive Live-Online Seminars) is a frontend for BigBlueButton. PILOS before 4.8.0 exposes the PHP version via the X-Powered-By header, enabling attackers to fingerprint the server and assess potential exploits. This information disclosure vulnerability originates from PHP’s base image. Additionally, the PHP version can also be inferred through the PILOS version displayed in the footer and by examining the source code available on GitHub. This information disclosure vulnerability has been patched in PILOS in v4.8.0.
PILOS (Platform for Interactive Live-Online Seminars) is a frontend for BigBlueButton. PILOS before 4.8.0 includes a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfiguration in its middleware: it reflects the Origin request header back in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header without proper validation or a whitelist, while Access-Control-Allow-Credentials is set to true. This behavior could allow a malicious website on a different origin to send requests (including credentials) to the PILOS API. This may enable exfiltration or actions using the victim’s credentials if the server accepts those cross-origin requests as authenticated. Laravel’s session handling applies additional origin checks such that cross-origin requests are not authenticated by default. Because of these session-origin protections, and in the absence of any other unknown vulnerabilities that would bypass Laravel’s origin/session checks, this reflected-Origin CORS misconfiguration is not believed to be exploitable in typical PILOS deployments. This vulnerability has been patched in PILOS in v4.8.0
Hi all,
I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity.
In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring.
First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue.
"Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC.
Gather all the information:
time generated (time of the sign in)
app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph)
username/email
IP address
device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage)
locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server)
user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well)
Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel)
Signinlogs
| Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent
| where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only)
\^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before.
Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in).
NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign.
Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious.
From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs.
From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common.
After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did.
Will have to look for:
\- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs.
\- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well.
\- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events)
Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in RomanCode MapSVG mapsvg-lite-interactive-vector-maps allows Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server.This issue affects MapSVG: from n/a through <= 8.6.4.
This security update for OpenSSH addresses multiple issues including two security vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-26465, which fixes a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack against clients with VerifyHostKeyDNS enabled, and CVE-2025-26466, which fixes a denial-of-service (DoS) attack affecting both client and server. Additional fixes include resolving a client segmentation fault related to GSSAPI key exchange, improving X11 forwarding performance, correcting keyboard-interactive authentication behavior to support MFA push notifications, and fixing memory leaks and other minor bugs.