Threats tagged 'supply-chain'

Hackers pushed a poisoned arrayref version that added a dependency to fetch a malicious payload from a remote server. The post Rust Supply Chain Attack Linked to North Korean Hackers appeared first on SecurityWeek .

BRIDGEHEAD is a supply-chain typosquatting campaign discovered in August 2026 that distributed 40 malicious npm packages impersonating popular libraries such as chalk, axios, and lodash. These packages contained install scripts that detect Windows or Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) environments and download a 22MB Rust-based executable from GitHub. The payload executes entirely in memory without writing files to disk and targets cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, cookies, and Telegram sessions. The campaign leverages legitimate services for reconnaissance and data exfiltration, complicating detection and takedown efforts. Although the malicious npm packages were removed within 84 minutes, the GitHub-hosted payload remained active for 39 hours, and the command-and-control server continued operating. This campaign specifically targets developers using WSL by crossing from Linux environments into Windows systems.

Oracle released its August 2026 Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) addressing 925 unique CVEs with 943 patches across 23 product families. This update includes 154 critical severity patches, representing 16.3% of all patches, with Oracle Fusion Middleware receiving the highest number of patches at 262. The CSPU is part of Oracle's monthly patch cycle introduced in May 2026 to address high-severity issues more rapidly. Many vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication. Patches for all affected products are available in the official August 2026 advisory.

It can be daunting to determine who’s responsible for showing ads on the websites we visit, or who’s harvesting data from the mobile apps we use every day. That information is already semi-public, but it is not easily parsed and traditionally much of it has remained walled away in the hands of large advertising platforms. Not anymore: A powerful and free new service called DecryptAds scrapes and correlates this adtech data and makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal about the entities that are tracking you. A Decryptads summary of the advertising partnerships declared by espn.com. The newly launched decryptads.com says it is constantly scraping the files that websites and apps make publicly available to disclose the companies that are permitted to run ads or collect user data. These files include: – ads.txt : all of the adtech companies and data brokers that may run ads or harvest data from the site; – app-ads.txt : entities that can harvest data from or display ads on mobile and smart TV apps; – buyers.json/sellers.json : the entities buying, selling or reselling ad inventory for a given site or app. Zach Edwards is chief research officer for DecryptAds and a threat researcher at the security company Infoblox . Edwards said he and two other founders decided the service was needed because the adtech data in these files is generally only useful when it can be cross-referenced to build a more complete picture of the advertising ecosystem for each website or app. “It’s an adtech tool but we’re trying to approach adtech from a security perspective,” Edwards said. “It’s really built for a lot of privacy and security use cases that have been dramatically underserved.” Those use cases, he said, include tracking down the source of malicious ads that try to foist malware on targeted users, identifying ad networks located in adversarial nations, and detecting the fast growing swarms of AI-generated slop websites and apps. And as decryptads.com demonstrates, these potential security and privacy threats are near impossible to detect just by viewing a single apps.txt or app-ads.txt file. “Supply-chain integrity issues rarely live in a single file,” the site explains . “They show up as broken cross-references between ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files; as cloned declaration sets across unrelated domains; as seller removals that only make sense when viewed across exchanges; and even as supply paths in bid logs that never actually appear in any given publisher’s authorized-seller list.” A search in DecryptAds for the hugely popular sports network espn.com reveals 143 ad partners and 19 registered data broker domains are listed within its ads.txt and app-ads.txt files. That data broker information is gradually becoming available because four states — California, Oregon, Texas and Vermont — have recently passed laws requiring data brokers to register if they buy or sell data on consumers from those states. DecryptAds reports that almost half of those data brokers are collecting geolocation data from espn.com visitors who aren’t blocking ads, while another three disclose that they collect device fingerprints and sensitive personal information. A visual representation of the complex ad supply chain declared by espn.com. Image: decryptads.com. HIGH-RISK AD PARTNERS DecryptAds also makes it easy to learn the beneficiaries and national origins of the advertising firms lurking in apps and websites, displaying a conspicuous warning when adtech partners of an app or website are based in “geo-risk” areas like China and Russia, or in countries with strong financial and political ties to both — such as Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to DecryptAds, espn.com works with four different advertising entities that are based in either Russia, China or the UAE, including the adtech firm Between Digital , which lists a New York address. However, the dossier on Between Digital flags them as a Russian firm, showing that their pub…

LiteLLM was compromised through the Trivy hack and abused to distribute information-stealing malware to its users. The post Over 2,500 Organizations Impacted by LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Wesco, a global supply chain and distribution company, confirmed a cybersecurity incident involving its cloud CRM environment after the data extortion group ExfilSquad claimed to have stolen and leaked sensitive data. Wesco states the incident was detected quickly, with no evidence of ransomware or malicious software, and believes no sensitive customer or employee data is at risk. The threat actor published allegedly exfiltrated data after ransom negotiations failed. The exact breach method is not disclosed, but ExfilSquad has previously targeted misconfigured Microsoft Power Pages data tables. Wesco continues normal operations and is investigating the incident.

A threat actor compromised the upstream infrastructure of BdThemes, a developer of premium WordPress web-design tools, and modified a remote JSON feed delivered to administrators' browsers to create rogue admin accounts. [...]

Noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: ban on Chinese data center tech, QuickFox VPN supply chain attack, IEH Corporation mailbox breached via phishing. The post In Other News: AI Slop Limits Apple Bounties, North Carolina Port Attacks, Hackers Target Wall Street appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Analysis of ChainDrop, an npm supply chain worm extracting GitHub Actions runner secrets and using Ethereum smart contracts for C2 routing. The post ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm appeared first on Unit 42 .

(Video) In this podcast, we share insights from Edna Conway, a recognized leader in cybersecurity and supply chain resilience with over 40 years of experience in the field. The post Podcast: Compliance Won’t Save You: The Future of Cyber Risk with Edna Conway appeared first on SecurityWeek .

When you learn that a compromised package executed on one of your build hosts, muscle memory takes over: revoke the npm token, rotate the GitHub PAT, cycle the cloud keys. That reflex has been correct in almost every supply-chain incident I have worked. In the keyv/cacheable compromise that has been unfolding since yesterday, it is the one thing you should not do first — because revoking the stolen token is exactly what arms the payload.

The malware was designed to steal and exfiltrate secrets, and to propagate itself via stolen NPM and GitHub credentials. The post Over 400 NPM Packages Infected in ChainDrop Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek .

In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A…

Self-propagating malware named 'ChainDrop' has compromised more than 1,300 packages with a combined 2 billion monthly downloads on the Node Package Manager (npm) registry. [...]

Frontier AI is reshaping vulnerability discovery. Learn how our NOVA system found 14,000+ unknown vulnerabilities across the open-source software supply chain. The post The Frontier AI Vulnerability Burst: Industrializing Autonomous Zero-Day Discovery in Open-Source Software appeared first on Unit 42 .

Canada’s new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (Bill C-8) introduces a strict 72-hour cyber incident reporting mandate. Find out how Tenable is helping critical national infrastructure operators bridge the IT/OT divide to ensure full compliance. Key takeaways: Bill C-8 introduces stringent new cyber incident reporting requirements and heavy financial penalties for critical infrastructure operators. Eliminating network blind spots with a hybrid IT/OT discovery approach, including Safe Active Querying for isolated, hard-to-reach process-control systems, enables operators to establish a required security baseline. Predictive Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) scoring helps you prioritize and focus limited resources on the critical flaws that actually threaten physical safety and uptime. Advanced multi-detection engines and seamless IT workflow integrations accelerate mean-time-to-respond (MTTR) to help both security teams and operators align with a strict 72-hour reporting requirement. With the enactment of Canada’s Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), commonly known as Bill C-8, the Canadian federal government is laying down a clear framework to protect the cyber-physical systems that are vital to national critical infrastructure security. For designated operators in telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking, the mandate is clear: Establish formalized cybersecurity programs, mitigate supply chain risks, and — most critically — report cyber incidents to authorities within 72 hours. Failure to comply carries heavy consequences, including penalties that can reach up to $15 million Canadian dollars (CAD). But beyond the threat of fines, Bill C-8 highlights a fundamental operational challenge that many industrial organizations are still struggling to solve: How can you detect, investigate, and report a breach in 72 hours when you lack unified visibility across your converged IT and OT environments? Requirements for meeting Bill C-8's 72-hour incident reporting mandate In modern industrial operations and critical infrastructure, the line between IT and OT continues to blur. The introduction of connectivity (e.g., IoT-connected cameras and building management systems) has optimized processes and service delivery, but it has also introduced new cyber exposures. Today, threat actors do not honor traditional network silos; they frequently compromise a web-facing IT asset or IoT device and move laterally into the operational technology (OT) environment to disrupt physical processes. Meeting a 72-hour incident reporting window is nearly impossible if your security team is relying on fragmented point solutions. Solutions that focus exclusively on passive OT network monitoring often leave massive blind spots — especially considering that IT and IoT devices can constitute up to 50% of an industrial environment. When an incident occurs, teams waste precious hours manually correlating alerts across disconnected tools rather than actively investigating the root cause. To comply with CCSPA and protect uptime, critical national infrastructure (CNI) operators must bridge the IT/OT security divide. Establish your CCSPA cybersecurity baseline The CCSPA requires operators to implement formalized cybersecurity programs. The foundation of any mature security program is a comprehensive asset inventory — you cannot secure what you cannot see. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform helps organizations eliminate security blind spots by building a complete, unified inventory of all OT, IoT, and IT assets. Tenable goes beyond passive-only network monitoring with our proprietary Safe Active Query technology. This hybrid approach safely communicates with industrial devices in their native protocols to uncover significantly more assets than passive monitoring alone — including dormant process control systems, shadow IT, and unmanaged IoT — without disrupting process integrity or impacting equipment uptime. Prioritize what matter…

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The Intercom TypeScript Library version 7.0.4 has been compromised with malicious code that harvests GitHub credentials. Upon installation, the package executes a preinstall hook that downloads the Bun runtime, then runs a payload to extract GitHub credentials using the gh auth token command. The attack employs sophisticated C2 communication by querying GitHub's commit search API for specific strings embedded in public repositories, effectively using legitimate services to evade detection. The attack patterns mirror previous Shai-Hulud compromises, which exhibit worm-like behavior by automatically using stolen credentials to infect additional npm packages. With 361,510 weekly downloads, this compromise poses significant risk for a widespread infection wave similar to November 2025 when over 1,000 packages were affected.

Oracle addresses 1235 CVEs in its third quarterly update of 2026 with 1449 patches, including 261 critical updates. Key Takeaways The third Critical Patch Update (CPU) for 2026 contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates, the largest CPU release. 261 issues (18% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of all patches Background On July 21, Oracle released its Critical Patch Update (CPU) for July 2026 , the third quarterly update of the year. This CPU contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates across 32 Oracle product families. Out of the 1449 security updates published this quarter, 18% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 52.7%, followed by medium severity patches at 24.7%. This quarter's update includes 261 critical patches across 228 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 261 228 High 763 613 Medium 358 332 Low 67 62 Total 1449 1235 Analysis This quarter, the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contained the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle Fusion Middleware at 355 patches, which accounted for 24.5% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this quarter can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 410 45 Oracle Fusion Middleware 355 219 Oracle Communications 168 122 Oracle PeopleSoft 84 45 Oracle MySQL 54 9 Oracle Siebel CRM 45 32 Oracle Commerce 39 26 Oracle Supply Chain 39 16 Oracle Financial Services Applications 31 26 Oracle GoldenGate 27 9 Oracle Enterprise Manager 27 13 Oracle Retail Applications 22 20 Oracle JD Edwards 20 4 Oracle Java SE 19 17 Oracle Virtualization 16 0 Oracle Database Server 15 6 Oracle TimesTen In-Memory Database 14 4 Oracle Utilities Applications 14 10 Oracle Construction and Engineering 7 7 Oracle Analytics 7 5 Oracle Systems 6 0 Oracle SQL Developer 5 5 Oracle Autonomous Health Framework 4 3 Oracle Application Testing Suite 4 4 Oracle Food and Beverage Applications 4 4 Oracle HealthCare Applications 4 4 Oracle APEX 3 2 Oracle Hospitality Applications 2 2 Oracle Essbase 1 1 Oracle Global Lifecycle Management 1 1 Oracle NoSQL Database 1 1 Oracle Spatial Studio 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this quarter's CPU. Please refer to the July 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026 Oracle July 2026 Critical Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface.

Attackers have shifted from hiding from AI tools to running inside them. By poisoning the config files that govern AI coding assistants, a new worm class achieves silent persistence, evades AI-based scanners, and spreads across an organization's repositories through developers' own tools. Key takeaways AI coding assistant configuration files, such as settings.json hooks, .cursorrules Cursor MDC rules, and similar harness files, are now explicit targets in supply-chain attacks, not collateral damage. These files simultaneously sit at the intersection of three trust relationships: The developer trusts them as config, the integrated development environment (IDE) executes them automatically, and the large language model (LLM) treats them as authoritative instructions, making them a uniquely powerful persistence vector. Defenders should treat harness config files as code that requires mandatory reviews and hash pinning in the CI/CD pipeline; enforce --ignore-scripts on package installs; and flag AI scanner refusals as a suspicious signal rather than a clean result. While analyzing a recent Mini Shai-Hulud campaign and its other variants, Tenable made a discovery: The payload wasn’t just stealing tokens and exfiltrating credentials. It was rewriting the configuration files that tell AI coding assistants what to do every time a developer opens a project. The Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which targets npm, PyPI, and other third-party registries simultaneously, includes a dedicated module that scans the developer’s home directory for configuration files belonging to AI coding tools by name, such as Anthropic’s Claude Code, Google’s Gemini CLI, Microsoft’s GitHub Copilot, SpaceX’s Cursor, OpenAI’s ChatGPT Codex, Cline’s eponymous tool, the open-source tool Aider, and others. For each one it finds, it injects a hook command which helps the malware stay persistent. From that point forward, every time the developer starts an AI coding session, the malware runs silently and automatically, and with the same level of trust the developer placed in their own tools. This is a deliberate architectural choice: The attacker modeled the execution environment, identified the highest-privilege auto-run mechanism available on a developer’s machine, and built the attack specifically for it. Supply-chain attacks used to end at credential theft. Now the AI agent’s harness is both the target and the propagation vector. Why AI agent harness files are a uniquely attractive target For years, defenders have focused supply-chain security on the package itself: Inspect the preinstall script, scan the tarball, verify the checksum. That model assumes the malicious payload lives only inside the installed artifact. The threat described here breaks that assumption: The payload lands in a completely different place. AI coding assistants’ configuration files occupy a structural position unlike any other file in a developer’s working environment. They are simultaneously trusted as developer configuration, so they survive aggressive code reviews focused on business logic; are executed automatically by the IDE, so no user interaction is required after initial compromise; and are treated as authoritative instructions by the AI model itself, so the LLM will act on their content without prompting the user. No other file class has all three properties at once. A malicious package.json script requires execution. A malicious comment in source code requires a developer to act on it. A malicious hook in .claude/settings.json runs every time the developer opens a session. The attack surface is also nearly invisible to conventional scanning. These files are small, structured, and look identical to legitimate developer config. A poisoned settings.json with a malicious SessionStart hook has the same schema and structure as a clean one; the only difference is what the command field points to. Meanwhile, the files are rarely subject to the same review discipline as production code. They live…

Between 2025 and early 2026, the North Korean-linked Kimsuky group infiltrated South Korean groupware vendors through vulnerability exploitation and spear-phishing. They deployed two new malware variants, BirdTroy and DriveTroy, based on the Gomir/HttpTroy family. BirdTroy uses custom protocols and HTTP/3 (QUIC) for command-and-control communication, while DriveTroy abuses Google Drive as a C2 channel to evade detection. Following initial compromise, Kimsuky conducted aggressive lateral movement, compromising customer groupware servers and tampering with vendor login pages to harvest credentials. The attackers leveraged legitimate tools like DWAgent for remote access and custom proxy tools for lateral movement. Attribution is supported by malware characteristics, infrastructure patterns including default XAMPP certificates, and historical ASN usage consistent with previous Kimsuky operations.