RICOH Streamline NX versions 3.5.1 to 24R3 are vulnerable to tampering with operation history. If an attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they may alter the values of HTTP requests, which could result in tampering with the operation history of the product’s management tool.
A sophisticated phishing campaign called ZipLine is targeting U.S.manufacturing companies, especially those in supply chain-critical sectors. The attackers initiate contact through company contact forms, leading to weeks-long email conversations before delivering malicious payloads. They use legitimate-looking business interactions and AI-related pretexts to build trust. The campaign employs a custom malware called MixShell, which uses DNS TXT tunneling for command and control. The attackers utilize domains matching registered U.S.companies and maintain similar template websites across multiple domains. The campaign primarily targets U.S.-based organizations in industrial manufacturing, hardware, semiconductors, and other sectors, affecting both large enterprises and smaller businesses.
DSLRoot, a residential proxy provider, operates a network of hardware devices deployed in U.S.homes across at least 20 states. The network is managed by a Belarusian national with ties to both Minsk and Moscow. Unlike typical proxy services, DSLRoot uses dedicated hardware in American residences, creating persistent access to U.S.home networks. The company's custom software enables remote management of consumer modems and Android devices, allowing for IP address rotation and connectivity control. The network operates without authentication, permitting anonymous traffic routing through U.S.residential IPs. The operator also runs related services, including virtual credit card issuance and company formation, targeting both English and Russian-speaking markets. The discovery raises concerns about foreign-controlled infrastructure in sensitive locations, including military homes.
A vulnerability was found in code-projects Medical Store Management System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file UpdateCompany.java of the component Update Company Page. The manipulation of the argument companyNameTxt leads to sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
Bitdefender Labs has uncovered a new threat actor group named Curly COMrades, operating since mid-2024 to support Russian interests. The group targets critical organizations in countries experiencing geopolitical shifts, focusing on judicial and government bodies in Georgia and an energy distribution company in Moldova. Their primary objective is to maintain long-term network access and steal credentials. The attackers use proxy tools like Resocks, SSH, and Stunnel to establish multiple entry points, and deploy a new backdoor called MucorAgent. They also utilize compromised legitimate websites as traffic relays to complicate detection. The group's tactics include credential theft, lateral movement, and data exfiltration, employing both custom and open-source tools.
I came across a broken link hijacking case involving a Google Play Store package. The app link returns a 404, and the package name is currently unclaimed.which means it can potentially be taken over. It’s a valid security issue and could be eligible for a bug bounty, though I'm not 100% sure.
The company asked for a working proof of concept, meaning the package has to actually be claimed and uploaded to the Play Store. I haven’t created a developer account myself yet, since I haven’t needed one except for this case and it requires a $25 fee.
If you already have a developer account, would you be willing to contribute by uploading a simple placeholder app using that package name, just to prove the takeover? If the report gets rewarded, I’ll share 10% of the bounty with you. Usually, these types of reports are rewarded with $50 or $100, so I hope you understand I can’t offer more than 10%.
Let me know if you’re open to it.
Thanks!
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in code-projects Vehicle Management 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /updatebal.php. The manipulation of the argument company leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability was found in code-projects Vehicle Management 1.0. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /addcompany.php. The manipulation of the argument company leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in code-projects Vehicle Management 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /filter3.php. The manipulation of the argument company leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Other parameters might be affected as well.
\#️⃣ How we Rooted Copilot #️⃣
After a long week of SharePointing, the [Eye Security](https://www.linkedin.com/company/eyesecurity/) Research Team thought it was time for a small light-hearted distraction for you to enjoy this Friday afternoon.
So we rooted Copilot.
It might have tried to persuade us from doing so, but we gave it enough ice cream to keep it satisfied and then fed it our exploit.
Read the full story on our research blog - [https://research.eye.security/how-we-rooted-copilot/](https://research.eye.security/how-we-rooted-copilot/)
Hi all,
I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity.
In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring.
First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue.
"Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC.
Gather all the information:
time generated (time of the sign in)
app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph)
username/email
IP address
device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage)
locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server)
user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well)
Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel)
Signinlogs
| Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent
| where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only)
\^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before.
Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in).
NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign.
Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious.
From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs.
From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common.
After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did.
Will have to look for:
\- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs.
\- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well.
\- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events)
Lookout Threat Lab has uncovered a mobile forensics application called Massistant, used by Chinese law enforcement to extract extensive data from mobile devices. Believed to be the successor of MFSocket, Massistant requires physical access to install and is not distributed through official app stores. It collects sensitive information including GPS data, SMS messages, images, audio, contacts, and phone services. The tool is associated with Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co., Ltd., a Chinese technology company controlling a significant portion of China's digital forensics market. Massistant introduces new features like Accessibility Services to bypass device security prompts and support for additional messaging apps. The discovery raises concerns about data privacy for travelers to China, as law enforcement can potentially access and analyze confiscated devices without a warrant.
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Heroes of Might and Magic III Complete 4.0.0.0, HD Mod 3.808 build 9, and Demo 1.0.0.0 via malicious .h3m map files that exploit object sprite name parsing logic. The vulnerability occurs during in-game map loading when a crafted object name causes a buffer overflow, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution. Exploitation requires the victim to open a malicious map file within the game.
An ongoing social engineering campaign is targeting cryptocurrency users through fake startup companies impersonating AI, gaming, and Web3 firms. The scammers create elaborate facades using spoofed social media accounts and project documentation on platforms like Notion and GitHub. They contact victims offering to pay them to test software, which is actually malware designed to steal crypto wallet contents. The campaign uses both Windows and macOS malware, including information stealers like Atomic Stealer. The threat actors go to great lengths to appear legitimate, even creating fake conference photos and merchandise stores. Multiple fake company identities have been identified as part of this campaign.
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in PHPGurukul Dairy Farm Shop Management System 1.3. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file edit-company.php. The manipulation of the argument companyname leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability via a specific parameter exists in SLNX Help Documentation of RICOH Streamline NX. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary script may be executed in the web browser of the user who accessed the product.
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in SourceCodester Simple Company Website 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /classes/Users.php?f=save. The manipulation of the argument img leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in SourceCodester Simple Company Website 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /classes/SystemSettings.php?f=update_settings. The manipulation of the argument img leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in SourceCodester Simple Company Website 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /classes/Login.php. The manipulation of the argument Username leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.