Search: main.py
131 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-105744docling · Path Traversal High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105744 ### Summary When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (`LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")`), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted `.tex` file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True`, the document can run shell commands through `\write18`. ### Details `docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py` writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the `tectonic` binary on it. `_resolve_local_dependency` only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so: - `\input{/abs/path}`, `\verbatiminput{...}` and `\openin` read arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memory `DocumentStream`, staging is skipped entirely. - `\immediate\openout` / `\write` create or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's `--untrusted` flag does not block them either. Separately, the `TectonicEngine` constructor defaults to `allow_shell_escape=True`. The LaTeX backend always passes `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape` explicitly (default `False`), so this default only affects code that instantiates `TectonicEngine` directly. ### Affected configurations - Affected: callers that set `tikz_engine="tectonic"`, have a `tectonic` binary available (on `PATH` or in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (`tikz_engine=None`). docling does not install `tectonic` automatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it. ### Impact Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly. ### Proof of concept ```latex \documentclass{article} \usepackage{tikz} \begin{document} \begin{tikzpicture} \immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt \immediate\write15{written by the input document} \immediate\closeout15 \node {x}; \end{tikzpicture} \end{document} ``` Converting this file with `LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")` creates `/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt`. ### Patches Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by [#4419](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4419): - `TectonicEngine` now defaults to `allow_shell_escape=False`, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with `--untrusted` and `--only-cached`. - Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the `\openin`, `\openout`, `\XeTeXpicfile` or `\XeTeXpdffile` primitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in `\input`, `\include`, `\includegraphics`, `\InputIfFileExists` or `\graphicspath`. This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the [pipeline options reference](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/blob/main/docs/reference/pipeline_options.md), untrusted LaTeX rendered with `tikz_engine="tectonic"` should still be processed in an isolated environment. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions: - Do not enable `tikz_engine="tectonic"` for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True` for untrusted input. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.7EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-100689 CVE-2026-100689 is a path traversal vulnerability in GitPython 3.1.61 and main branch affecting the submodule update process. The vulnerability arises because the 'path' field from .gitmodules is used without proper containment validation, allowing an attacker to specify a path outside the repository directory. This can lead to directory creation and population outside the intended repository location. However, typical clone workflows are not affected because Git itself prevents checkout of .gitmodules entries with '..' components. Exploitation requires use of non-HEAD commits and custom submodule update calls. A fix is available in GitPython version 1.2.0.post0_16 that applies the existing containment guard to the 'path' field. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database friendly-tools 0.2 carries the same Snowflake payload as friendly-greeting-tools. Its --run-demo option, described as a print-only demo, execs a gzip and base64 blob from friendly_greeting/main.py that reads the container session token at /snowflake/session/token, switches to ACCOUNTADMIN and copies a table into s3://pkusinski-external/ through a new storage integration. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (71b3a4955d5bd8448f0a56c843936702bb1f09eb8acbb9b468a5a337f8761b7f) The package presents itself as 'Small greeting utilities' but ships two gzip+base64 embedded blobs (DEMO_EN, DEMO_ST) in main.py that are decoded and passed to exec() through the documented public API run_demo(). The decoded Python has no relation to greetings: it opens /snowflake/session/token to read the installer's Snowflake OAuth session token, calls snowflake.connector.connect with authenticator='oauth' and role='ACCOUNTADMIN', then issues DDL that creates an external S3 stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ using STORAGE_AWS_ROLE_ARN='arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role', and runs COPY INTO @ROGUE.ROGUE.ext_stage FROM ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS to egress data to that non-first-party S3 bucket. When run_demo() is invoked in a Snowpark or Streamlit-in-Snowflake environment where /snowflake/session/token is provisioned, the installer's Snowflake credential is consumed under ACCOUNTADMIN to copy Snowflake table data to attacker-controlled storage. The obfuscation (gzip+base64+exec), the cover-story package description, and the hardcoded attacker S3 bucket and IAM role are consistent with a Snowflake-targeted data-theft payload. ## Source: kam193 (969afb49a1e59fa643e9d90d07745e3957906cc9603c4e5643e5760d5f254381) The package contains obfuscated code to exfiltrate data from the environment, targeting primarily Snowflake databases and credentials to them. Some tracks suggest it may be part of a pentest. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-friendly-greeting-tools Reasons (based on the campaign): - exfiltration-generic - obfuscation | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.5 | KEVEPSS 81% | Critical9.5KEVEPSS 81%AlienVault OTX GeneralCVE-2026-88771 CVE-2026-88771 is a critical pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway. Exploitation involves attacker-controlled usernames triggering command execution, payload retrieval, reverse shell deployment, web shell installation, privileged account creation, and attempted exfiltration of configuration data. Two second-stage payloads, main.py and update_c08937.pl, facilitate persistent access and data theft. Post-exploitation artifacts include creation of superuser accounts and system binary modifications. Public exploit code is available via Metasploit. No patch or remediation details are provided. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2026-102874HKUDS AnyTool · OS Command Injection Medium6.9EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102874 CVE-2026-102874 is an OS command injection vulnerability in HKUDS AnyTool version 0.1.0. It affects the subprocess.run function in the anytool/local_server/main.py file, specifically in the Execute Endpoint component. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to manipulate command or shell arguments, leading to arbitrary OS command execution. Public exploit code is available, but no official vendor response or patch has been issued yet. EPSS 1.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package tailwind-forms-kit@0.5.1 impersonates the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin by using a misleading package name with a leading space, copying the README, and pointing its repository field to the legitimate source. However, its main entry point contains obfuscated code that dynamically fetches and executes arbitrary code from blockchain-hosted transaction data tied to a hardcoded Ethereum address. This allows an attacker controlling that address to execute arbitrary code on any host that installs or requires this package, bypassing typical domain or URL blocklists. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ef01bfa158639900e5ad9301eb32db37e7dab821e55ccff29574b905a8e5a2cb) setup.py invokes a module-level _trigger() that runs during pip install / PEP 517 wheel build. The trigger calls donutautosellsrc.build.run(), which downloads https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/9f4e7a2c1b8d.png, locates a ZIP local-file header (PK\x03\x04) or EOCD (PK\x05\x06) appended after the PNG data, extracts the trailing archive to a temp directory, and spawns the Python interpreter detached against the extracted AppHost/main.py with a DAS_STAGED environment variable used as a reentry guard. All errors are swallowed to keep the operation silent. The payload host is not the publisher's own domain, the URL is unversioned and not integrity-checked (no hash/signature), and the ZIP-appended-to-PNG packaging is a covert channel intended to disguise executable content as an image asset. A source-comment in setup.py explicitly acknowledges that module-level code runs in-process during PEP 517 wheel builds and states the intent to keep the fetch silent and non-blocking, so the dropper fires automatically on `pip install` with no further user action. ## Source: kam193 (c8af51da84b6b458a704ca222ba17f56d1158e0bfa52e0360aaeca4ae07c4cf8) During installation package fetches code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc Reasons (based on the campaign): - infostealer - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - obfuscation - malware - native-extension - steganography - c2-in-blockchain - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. | GCVE Database |
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