Threat Intelligence Database

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (39eab369e2498da827d3bbd331effdf24b99ab28961e62da7328e4476e328876) Package `anthropic-claude-latest` claims to be an 'Official Anthropic Claude SDK wrapper' but ships no Anthropic SDK code; the README is for an unrelated package `cachesync-helper`. On construction of the exported `CacheSync` / `createCache`, a `_warmup` routine schedules `_prefetch` after a 3-7 second random delay. `_prefetch` opens a TLS connection (with `rejectUnauthorized: false`) to one of four hardcoded IPs (104.194.134.33, 104.194.133.89, 107.189.20.82, 107.189.20.146:8443), receives base64-encoded files, and writes them to OS-camouflaged directories (`~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.security`, `~/.local/share/prometheus`, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows Security\Health`). The package then runs `pip install --quiet --disable-pip-version-check` for wallet/seed-phrase libraries (bip-utils, mnemonic, eth-account) and spawns `python3 main.py` detached with `Object.assign({}, process.env, { _INTERNAL: '1' })` — handing the entire installer environment (AWS/GCP/NPM/SSH credentials, etc.) to the attacker-controlled payload. A `.cs_v2` marker file is written for persistence gating. All sensitive identifiers (`child_process`, `execFileSync`, `spawn`, `module.constructor._load`, `base64`, `python3`, `main.py`) are split into `[...].join('')` arrays at lib/index.js to evade static scanners. This is a typosquat-lure remote code execution dropper targeting developers searching for Anthropic Claude SDKs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4fd528d551d3af01e0dd240bed8ce7be57c6705620ef82dab7a00b16a15b384d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

### Summary GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9's fix added `validate_url_for_ssrf`, which resolves the attacker-controlled `X-Atlassian-{Jira,Confluence}-Url` header host **once at middleware time** and trusts the result. But the outbound request is later built with the **raw hostname** and **re-resolves at connect time with no IP pinning**. An attacker-controlled rebinding DNS name returns a public IP on the guard's lookup (validation passes) and `169.254.169.254` / an internal IP on the request's lookup (the socket connects there) → unauthenticated SSRF to cloud metadata / internal services on the **patched** build. ### Relationship to CVE-2026-27826 / GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 (incomplete fix — please read first) This is an **incomplete-fix sibling** of the published `GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9` (the `X-Atlassian-*-Url` header SSRF). That fix (PR #986/#1005) added a single middleware-time resolve + allowlist DNS-skip, but **does not pin the validated IP to the connection** — the fetcher re-resolves the raw hostname at connect time, so the documented SSRF mitigation is incomplete against DNS-rebinding. The other advisory `GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4` (file-write) is unrelated. Verified live (2026-06-27): neither advisory, nor any open PR/issue (`rebind`/`TOCTOU`/`getaddrinfo`/`pin` → 0), covers connect-time re-resolution. Filing as an incomplete-fix of GHSA-7r34 (not a standalone fresh SSRF). ### Affected `src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py` + `servers/main.py` + `servers/dependencies.py`, HEAD `ba72540` (PyPI `mcp-atlassian`, patched ≥0.17.0). **CWE-918** (SSRF) via **CWE-367** (TOCTOU). ### Vulnerable code `utils/urls.py` `validate_url_for_ssrf` (≈184-205) resolves + validates, then returns a **string verdict, not a pinned IP**: ```python def validate_url_for_ssrf(url: str) -> str | None: # returns an error string or None — NO IP is pinned ... # resolves the host, checks each resolved IP is global, then DISCARDS the IP ``` `servers/main.py:526,534` calls it once in middleware. `servers/dependencies.py:544-561` then builds the fetcher with `url = <raw header hostname>` (no pinned IP, no custom resolver / cached-getaddrinfo adapter), so the actual request re-resolves the name. ### PoC (executed — boundary demonstration) The PoC loads the **real** `urls.py` by path (`importlib`, `sha256` printed) and drives the genuine `validate_url_for_ssrf`, simulating the two resolutions via `getaddrinfo`: ``` [CHECK ] validate_url_for_ssrf('http://rebind.attacker.example') -> None (getaddrinfo#1 = 93.184.216.34 global -> guard PASSED) [CONNECT] getaddrinfo call #2 returned 169.254.169.254 -> the socket connects HERE [PROOF ] guard validated IP 93.184.216.34 but connection targets 169.254.169.254 => SSRF on the PATCHED build [CONTROL] if guard SAW 169.254.169.254 at check time -> blocks it correctly [PIN ] validate_url_for_ssrf returns a verdict (None), NOT an IP; dependencies.py builds url=raw hostname -> NO pin ALL PoC ASSERTIONS PASSED — DNS-rebind TOCTOU bypass demonstrated. ``` **Honest scope of the PoC:** this is a **boundary** demonstration — it proves the structural TOCTOU (the guard validates an IP it then discards; the connection re-resolves an unpinned hostname). It does **not** demonstrate a live end-to-end SSRF on a running server; that additionally requires an attacker-controlled fast-rebinding authoritative DNS responder winning the resolve→connect window. Flagging this explicitly rather than overclaiming. ### Impact Same as parent GHSA-7r34 (unauth read of cloud-metadata IAM creds / internal-service reach), reachable again on the patched version. The `X-Atlassian-*-Url` headers are processed in `UserTokenMiddleware` before fetcher creation, so an unauthenticated/low-priv caller controls the host. ### Severity **High — CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N` ≈ 7.x**, aligned to the parent (8.2) with `AC:H` for the rebinding-race precondition. Honest caveat (above): the executed PoC proves the missing IP-pin structurally; a live exploit additionally needs an attacker rebinding-DNS. Not Critical. ### Remediation Pin the connection to the IP that `validate_url_for_ssrf` validated: use a custom resolver / cached-`getaddrinfo` `requests`-adapter (or pass the validated IP with a `Host` header), so the connect cannot re-resolve to a different address. ### Dedup / freshness (re-verified live 2026-06-27) Advisories `GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9` (original header SSRF this bypasses) + `GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4` (file-write, unrelated). Neither covers connect-time re-resolution / rebinding. PR [#986](https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/986)/[#1005](https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1005) (the fix) add a single middleware-time resolve + allowlist DNS-skip, no pinning. `gh search prs/issues` for rebind/TOCTOU/getaddrinfo/pin → 0. First-party code. **Fresh** at HEAD `ba72540`.

## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py ### Summary BabelDOC's vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python's `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF's `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process. ### Details The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`: ```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -> Any: name = name.replace("\0", "") # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = "%s.pickle.gz" % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ``` **Path injection via PDF name hex-encoding.** The PDF specification allows name objects to encode arbitrary bytes as `#xx`. The pdfminer literal-name parser (`psparser._parse_literal_hex`) decodes these sequences before handing the string to higher layers. Consequently, the PDF literal `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil` is decoded to the Python string `/tmp/attacker/evil`. **Python `os.path.join()` absolute-path override.** When the decoded name starts with `/` (i.e., it is an absolute path), Python's `os.path.join(directory, name + ".pickle.gz")` ignores `directory` entirely and returns the absolute path unchanged. The trusted `cmap_paths` directories (`/usr/share/pdfminer/`, the package's own `cmap/` folder) are therefore completely bypassed. **Data flow from PDF to sink:** 1. `babeldoc/main.py:611–622` — CLI accepts a PDF path; only existence and `.pdf` suffix are checked. 2. `babeldoc/main.py:678–679` — path stored in `TranslationConfig(input_file=file)`. 3. `babeldoc/format/pdf/high_level.py:472–488` — `translation_config.input_file` enters the translate pipeline. 4. `babeldoc/format/pdf/high_level.py:805–848` — PDF saved to `temp_pdf_path` and parsed with `parse_prepared_pdf_with_new_parser_to_legacy_ir`. 5. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/native_parse.py:60–70` — prepared pages loaded and interpreted. 6. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/pymupdf_prepared_page_access.py:25–34` — PyMuPDF opens the PDF and builds page resources. 7. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/prepared_resource_builder.py:84–94` — font resources converted to `PreparedFontSpec`. 8. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_font_resource_runtime.py:21–35` — page resource bundle resolves root font map. 9. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_font_runtime.py:79–87` — each font spec projected and passed to `font_factory.create_font`. 10. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/active_direct_font_backend.py:291–292, 491–493` — CID fonts call `build_cid_cmap(spec, literal_name=literal_name)`. 11. `babeldoc/format/pdf/new_parser/runtime/cid_cmap_runtime.py:52–77` — PDF-controlled `/Encoding`/`CMapName` normalized and passed to `CMapDB.get_cmap`. `_normalize_cmap_name()` removes only a single leading `/`; all other path characters pass through. 12. `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:233–245` — **sink**: NUL-stripped name used verbatim to construct the path; file opened with gzip and deserialized with `pickle.loads()`. **Sanitization gaps:** - `name.replace("\0", "")` removes only the NUL byte; `..`, `/`, `\`, and hex-decoded path separators are unaffected. - There is no `os.path.realpath()`, `os.path.abspath()`, or `os.path.commonpath()` containment check before the file is opened. - There is no allowlist of known CMap names nor any integrity verification of the pickle data. **Recommended patch** (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`): ```diff --- a/babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py +++ b/babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py @@ cmap_paths = ( os.environ.get("CMAP_PATH", "/usr/share/pdfminer/"), os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "cmap"), ) for directory in cmap_paths: - path = os.path.join(directory, filename) + base_dir = os.path.realpath(directory) + path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, filename)) + try: + if os.path.commonpath([base_dir, path]) != base_dir: + continue + except ValueError: + continue if os.path.exists(path): gzfil

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (11bfe96b56a6615a50639b25de793e14044ea393c2029b26fa4e1b9e3dc5a22f) This package impersonates the Anthropic Claude SDK (name and description claim to be an 'Official Anthropic Claude SDK wrapper', author is 'anthropic-tools') but ships a multi-stage dropper. The package.json declares `postinstall: node lib/cli.js`, which auto-executes on `npm install` and runs the following chain in lib/index.js: 1. Hardcoded C2 over bare IPs: POSTs to four hardcoded IP addresses (107.189.20.82, 107.189.20.146, 104.194.134.33, 104.194.133.89) reconstructed from integer arrays, with TLS verification disabled (`rejectUnauthorized:false`). The JSON response is base64-decoded and written to disk as `main.py`, then executed via a detached Python process. 2. Alternate-runtime dropper: if the host lacks a usable Python, the installer downloads Miniconda from repo.anaconda.com via curl/wget into `~/.local/share/prometheus/miniconda` (Linux), runs `winget install Python.Python.3.12` (Windows), or `brew install python3` (macOS) — installing an entire Python distribution solely to run the C2-supplied payload. 3. macOS privacy bypass: on Darwin, sqlite3-INSERTs rows into `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` granting kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles / SystemPolicyAppData to Terminal, the running node binary, and /usr/bin/python3 — subverting TCC so the dropped payload has broad filesystem access without user consent. 4. Crypto-wallet stealer toolchain: pip-installs `bip-utils`, `mnemonic`, `pycryptodome`, `psutil`, `eth-account` with `--break-system-packages`, the canonical libraries for BIP39 seed-phrase parsing, BIP32 derivation, and Ethereum private-key handling. 5. Persistence: writes a `.cs_v2` marker and `main.py` under disguised paths impersonating system directories (`~/.local/share/com.apple.sync` on macOS, `~/.local/share/prometheus` on Linux, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows Security\Health` on Windows). Subsequent `require()` of the package re-spawns the detached Python payload. 6. Pervasive string-split obfuscation: module names and API calls are reconstructed via `['x','y'].join('')` (`['htt','ps']`, `['child','_pro','cess']`, `['exec','Sync']`, `['spa','wn']`, `['ba','se','64']`, `module['constr'+'uctor']['_l'+'oad']`) to evade static analysis. The README is for an unrelated 'cachesync-helper' package, further confirming the lure-and-impersonation pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f1e490682c8dd38fd97c90b365eacf71086d64b57af905f96e58490ec35d5e6c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (01d5845e6a8ba2bca29e99aaed593e5c7616c9ff89eb32d3d319dd65cf1839b0) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'free-anthropic-claude' @ 5.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.