CVE-2025-47812 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Wing FTP Server disclosed in June 2025. It allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code, which could lead to full system compromise. No official patch or detailed affected versions have been released yet, and no exploits have been observed in the wild. The vulnerability is considered high risk due to the ease of exploitation without authentication. Current mitigations focus on heightened monitoring, network segmentation, and restricting access to the FTP server until a patch is available. Organizations using Wing FTP Server, especially in Europe, face elevated risk. Defenders should prioritize anomaly detection on FTP traffic and prepare for rapid patch deployment once released.
**Disclosure**: I work at CyberArk
The research shows that Chrome’s AppBound cookie encryption relies on a key derivation process with limited entropy and predictable inputs. By systematically generating possible keys based on known parameters, an attacker can brute-force the correct encryption key without any elevated privileges or code execution. Once recovered, this key can decrypt any AppBound-protected cookies, completely undermining the isolation AppBound was intended to provide in enterprise environments.
Cisco warns of max severity RCE flaws in Identity Services Engine
Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisco-warns-of-max-severity-rce-flaws-in-identity-services-engine/
After discovering that the haveibeenpwned.com data is accessible via the API and noticing the lack of a visualization tool, I dedicated a few evenings to building haveibeenpwned.watch. This single-page website processes and presents data on leaks from Have I Been Pwned, with daily updates.
The site provides details on the total number of recorded breaches, the number of unique services affected, and the total accounts compromised. Charts break down the data by year, showing the number of breach
Model Context Protocol is quickly becoming the default way for LLMs to call out to tools and APIs—but from a security standpoint, it’s been a little hand-wavy. This post fixes that.
It shows how five OAuth specs—including dynamic client registration and protected resource metadata—combine to form a secure, auditable, standards-based auth flow for MCP.
Hard-Coded 'b' Password in Sitecore XP Sparks Major RCE Risk in Enterprise Deployments
Source: https://thehackernews.com/2025/06/hard-coded-b-password-in-sitecore-xp.html
Is b For Backdoor? Pre-Auth RCE Chain In Sitecore Experience Platform - watchTowr Labs
Source: https://labs.watchtowr.com/is-b-for-backdoor-pre-auth-rce-chain-in-sitecore-experience-platform/
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**\[Disclosure: I work at CyberArk and was involved in this research\]**
We've completed a security evaluation of the Model Context Protocol and discovered several concerning attack patterns relevant to ML practitioners integrating external tools with LLMs.
**Background:** MCP standardizes how AI applications access external resources - essentially creating a plugin ecosystem for LLMs. While this enables powerful agentic behaviors, it introduces novel security considerations.
**Technical
