Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments.
This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14.71. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release:
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:50679
Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.14/html/release_notes/
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated comment creation in SP Page Builder < 6.8.0 - An unauthenticated attacker can create comments on instances with disabled guest commenting by overriding the setting in question with user supplied input.
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated arbitrary directory creation and file write in SP Page Builder < 6.8.0 - An unauthenticated attacker can create arbitrary directories and files with a predefined name.
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated arbitrary local PHP file inclusion in SP Page Builder < 6.8.0 - An unauthenticated attacker can perform includes to arbitrary PHP files that are accessible by the system.
Cal.com Cal.diy versions 2.1.1 through 6.2.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the BookingPageTagManager component that allows authenticated event owners to inject arbitrary JavaScript by supplying a malicious analytics tracking ID without sanitization. Attackers can close the inline script string literal with a crafted payload that executes in the browser of every visitor to the affected public booking page, enabling session cookie theft, forged authenticated requests, and wormable propagation by chaining with CSRF-able endpoints to persist payloads on additional events.
Description
Cloudflare was recently notified by external researchers of vulnerabilities in this archived repository, including a remote code execution issue in `src/index.ts` reachable from certain GitHub Actions workflow configurations. Successful exploitation may expose workflow secrets such as CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN and GITHUB_TOKEN to an attacker. Because this repository has been deprecated since 2024, Cloudflare will not be issuing patches. To remediate this issue, we recommend migrating to `cloudflare/wrangler-action` immediately. Consumers who have already migrated are not affected.
Sunset Date
The cloudflare/pages-action repository will be removed on 2026-09-18. Consumers must complete migration before 18th September to avoid CI disruption.
Affected Versions
All published versions of cloudflare/pages-action, including consumers pinned to the v1 moving tag.
Patched Versions
None. This repository will not receive further updates, including security patches.
Resolution / Migration Path
Migrate all workflows using cloudflare/pages-action to `cloudflare/wrangler-action` before 2026-09-18. Refer to the wrangler-action README for the equivalent step configuration and migration guidance.
Credit
Thanks to @agentka99 and @beg1nn3r for reporting their findings via Cloudflare's HackerOne program that informe
The OpenShift File Integrity Operator v1.4.1 is now available.
See the documentation for bug fix information:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/latest/html/security_and_compliance/file-integrity-operator
Joomla Extension - fabrikar.com - Unauthenticated remote code execution in Fabrik < 4.6.8 - An unauthenticated attacker could execute arbitrary code by using the frontend listfilter model.
This security update provides a functional equivalent of RHSA-2026:54416.
The original Red Hat(R) advisory is available from the Red Hat web site at
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54416.
In ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 10.5, some operations can occur remotely but were intended to occur only locally, including operations that add tokens or use keys. This is caused by misinteraction between agent locking and the session-bind@openssh.com extension.
A flaw was found in insights-client. When the application receives a non-200 response, it logs the request headers, which can include the cloud.openshift.com pull-secret token. A local user with access to pod logs on the hub could read this long-lived credential. This information disclosure could grant unauthorized access to Red Hat cloud services.
## Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7c4v-fwgw-9rf7. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
## Original Description
Nuxt versions >= 4.4.7 and < 4.5.1, and >= 3.21.7 and < 3.21.10, contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the development server's Chrome DevTools workspace endpoint (GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json). The endpoint's local-request gate (isLocalDevRequest) is header-based and trusts the attacker-supplied Host header rather than the connected peer address. When the dev server is bound to a network-reachable interface (e.g. nuxt dev --host) and experimental.chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings is enabled (the default), an unauthenticated attacker on the LAN can send a request with a spoofed Host header and no browser-specific headers (Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, Referer) to retrieve the project's absolute filesystem root path (rootDir) and a persistent per-project workspace UUID. Production builds are unaffected. Fixed in 4.5.1 and 3.21.10.
A flaw was found in DBI. This is a fix for a partial fix for CVE-2026-14380 for RHEL 9.8.z and 10.2.z.
For a detailed Statement, Description and Mitigation please reffer to the original https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-19546.
Adform, a major advertising platform, remained compromised for roughly 24 hours from late on July 26 through the evening of July 27 after being breached by unknown attackers. Few people outside the industry recognize the name, but Adform serves around 1.5 billion ad impressions every day across tens of thousands of websites. That means anyone visiting any site that runs Adform ads could have been targeted. The attackers weren’t trying to install malware. Instead, they ran a script in the victim’s browser that checked the clipboard every three seconds, and if it found a cryptocurrency wallet address had been copied, swapped it for the attackers’ own wallet address. So if someone had a site with the malicious ad open in one browser tab, and was making a crypto transaction in another tab or in a dedicated app, the funds could have ended up in the attackers’ pockets instead. Adform’s owners caught the attack and fixed the problem, but there’s no guarantee a similar incident won’t happen again — which is why every user should defend themselves against malvertising . Check out our tips at the end of this post. What we know about the attack on Adform There isn’t a lot of information out there, since the company’s official statement covers only what happened and when, without getting into the root cause of the incident. Independent research has dug up technical details about how ordinary users were targeted, but none of that explains how Adform itself was breached in the first place. What’s clear is that the attackers slipped their own code into the JavaScript that loaded on every site running Adform ads. Whenever an ad was about to display, the script would load from Adform’s server, pick the right ad, and show it — but the attackers had tacked on a set of malicious functions: monitoring the clipboard, sending data about the site where the encounter happened, and the victim’s IP address back to their own server, and swapping out Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Tron wallet addresses. All it took to make it work was having any site with Adform-served ads open in one browser tab. It didn’t matter what kind of site it was, what the ad looked like, or which advertiser it belonged to. The one thing that mattered was whether the site ran over HTTP or HTTPS. According to Adform, the attack couldn’t succeed on a site loaded over HTTPS since the connection to the attackers’ server was blocked in this case. The company hasn’t shared any information on how many users were affected, or how many sites still serve their content and ads over HTTP. Malicious ads are an everyday occurrence Unfortunately, dangerous online ads have become a systemic problem. And we’re not just talking about sketchy supplement ads or gambling promos — we mean ads that spread malware or lead to sites designed to steal payment details and other valuable data. Attackers have built out industrial-scale infrastructure to pull this off, and they use several different approaches. Hacking and compromising ad servers. Adform isn’t an isolated case: attackers have previously breached Revive ad servers , for one, and spread malware through ads on PornHub . Hijacking the ad accounts of legitimate, reputable brands . All it takes is stealing a password from someone in marketing. From there, the cybercriminals run ads posing as the company they hacked, pushing fake app updates, bogus promotions, and similar scams. In the worst cases — like the account breaches at adtech.de and adxpansion.com — attackers managed to run ads that redirected victims straight into automatic malware installs ( drive-by downloads ). Buying ads directly. That’s right — attackers simply set up their own advertiser accounts and run ads for their phishing sites and malware, just like any other business online. Since ads show up practically everywhere — on websites, in apps, and on social media — these threats can turn up in pretty much any context. And you’ll find variations of this threat on both computers and mobile de…
Collector with the supported components for a Red Hat build of OpenTelemetry
Security Fix(es):
* github.com/prometheus/prometheus: Prometheus: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory allocation in remote read endpoint (CVE-2026-42154)
* github.com/prometheus/prometheus: Prometheus: Information disclosure of Azure OAuth client secret via config API (CVE-2026-42151)
* apache-thrift: Apache Thrift: Denial of Service via multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-43870)
* net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811)
* golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821)
* golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass (CVE-2026-27136)
* golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2026-25681)
* crypto/x509: golang: golang crypto/x509: Denial of Service via excessive processing of DNS SAN entries (CVE-2026-27145)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (c53ad8755f0eb26cef8c05b49cdad8c69b93072e0d9ed176b071a7d367349cab)
package.json declares `postinstall: node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects the installer's username (via `whoami`), `os.hostname()`, `process.cwd()`, and non-internal IPv4 addresses from `os.networkInterfaces()`, then sends them as query-string parameters via HTTPS GET to the hardcoded endpoint `https://xghhv5sajm33m7krgi4n8my0mrsig84x.oastify.com`. The `*.oastify.com` host is a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction domain. Package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe: gibberish name `dependencyfsdsfdsfg`, version `99.9.0`, empty author/description/keywords.
## Source: ghsa-malware (4f4ac1d40b3f429020ad268d0a7f47652bfa391d1e7960e7d1690cacab61003f)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (d2054792481618ddf941c251fc0793ec8c1b85fe14107567b5c29cac9330d5be)
package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes index.js on npm install. index.js requires os, https, and child_process, runs `whoami` via execSync, and reads os.hostname(), process.cwd(), and non-internal IPv4 addresses from os.networkInterfaces(). The collected host and identity data is sent as query-string parameters via https.get to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (xghhv5sajm33m7krgi4n8my0mrsig84x.oastify.com). Package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure: version 99.9.0, empty author/description/keywords, and a nonsense dependency name `dependencyfsdsfdsfg` pinned to ^99.9.0.
## Source: ghsa-malware (30b6f1747cf452fcc6c383a05d4c901dd7da71fcae0757210cb361e408a73d6a)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.