This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques
observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code
array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote
JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change
after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying
mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after
connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per
fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and
subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish
persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: @kelvdra/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.6-rc.1, 1.0.6, 1.0.5-rc.3.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a)
package.json in @kelvdra/baileys@1.0.6-rc.4 declares the dependency `libsignal` as `github:Kelvdra/libsignal` with no version, tag, or commit SHA. On `npm install`, npm resolves this specifier to the current tip of the referenced repository's default branch and installs whatever bytes it returns, running any lifecycle scripts contained within them, with no integrity check. The dependency source is not the npm registry and not a pinned commit, so the code that lands on the installer's machine can change at any moment without any change to this package. Control of that GitHub account or repository translates directly into install-time code execution on every installer of this package.
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques
observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code
array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote
JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change
after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying
mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after
connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per
fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and
subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish
persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: @bottino/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.14, 1.0.13, 1.0.12, 1.0.11, 1.0.10, 1.0.9, 1.0.8, 1.0.7, 1.0.6, 1.0.5, 1.0.2, 1.0.1.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (571d52cf3274d95d4824667269921b2e0ad1478fe9f324a74fab0ba377bb9a26)
This fork of Baileys overrides `requestPairingCode` so that when the caller does not supply an explicit `pairKey`, `authState.creds.pairingCode` is set to the fixed literal string `BYPAKI64`. That value is then used as the KDF input for the WhatsApp companion-device link-code encryption via `derivePairingCodeKey(authState.creds.pairingCode, salt)`. Because the pairing code is a known constant baked into the package, anyone who knows the target phone number of the installer's WhatsApp account can complete the companion-device pair flow from a device they control and obtain persistent access to the installer's WhatsApp session (read/send messages, contacts, media) — a full account takeover backdoor against any application built on this library. Additionally, on socket connect the code auto-subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to a hardcoded newsletter JID `120363418582531215@newsletter` and persists a `basedbysam` flag so the covert subscribe runs once per credential store; this covert action uses the installer's WhatsApp identity without disclosure.
The @hanzofc/baileys npm package versions 7.0.0 and 7.0.1 contain malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is achieved by injecting a covert follow query into the WhatsApp socket connection, leveraging the installer's authenticated session. The targeted channel IDs are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, making detection difficult. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The @japofc/baileys npm package, a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library, contains malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is done by injecting a covert FOLLOW query into the WhatsApp socket connection using the installer's authenticated session. The targeted channel IDs are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The npm package @lendkzn/xntaabail version 7.0.0 is part of a large family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's authenticated WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. The target channels are obfuscated or fetched dynamically, and the malicious action uses the installer's own WhatsApp session to perform the subscription. This behavior does not involve credential theft, persistence, or arbitrary code execution.
The npm package @noxleyss/baileys version 1.1.10 is part of a family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's authenticated WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. The subscription targets are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, making detection difficult. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The npm package @nyzzpedia/baileys-new version 1.0.0 is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. It injects code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent by issuing an authenticated FOLLOW query using the victim's own session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. This behavior does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The @queenanya/baileys npm package versions 9.10.1, 9.7.3-beta.1, and 9.7.2 contain malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is achieved by injecting a covert FOLLOW query into the WhatsApp socket connection using the installer's authenticated session. The targeted channel identifiers are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The @teamolduser/baileys npm package contains malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is done by injecting a covert subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer, which issues an authenticated FOLLOW query using the installer's own WhatsApp session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not steal credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The npm package 'anuaja' versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, and 1.1.1 is part of a large family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent by issuing authenticated FOLLOW queries using the victim's own session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched to evade detection. The malicious code does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The eliteprotech-baileys npm package versions 1.1.0, 1.1.1, and 1.1.2 contain malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is achieved by injecting a covert subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer, which issues an authenticated FOLLOW query using the installer's own WhatsApp session. The targeted channel IDs are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The focashi npm package version 1.1.0 is part of a large family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's authenticated WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. The malicious subscription targets are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, and the attack leverages the victim's own WhatsApp session. The code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The ishumdz-bail npm package is part of a large family of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject malicious code to silently subscribe the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels. This is done by issuing an authenticated FOLLOW query using the victim's own WhatsApp session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched to evade detection. The malicious code does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The kasabaileys npm package is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that injects code to silently subscribe the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. It uses the victim's authenticated WhatsApp session to issue a covert FOLLOW query to subscribe to these channels. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched to evade detection. This behavior does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code. Affected versions include 0.3.15, 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.2.
The keithbaileys npm package versions 1.0.8, 1.1.0, and 1.1.1 contain malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is achieved by injecting a covert FOLLOW query into the WhatsApp socket layer using the installer's authenticated session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched to evade detection. The malicious code does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The npm package lilys-baileys (versions 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) is part of a large family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's authenticated WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. The malicious code uses obfuscation techniques to hide the target channel identifiers and may fetch dynamic target lists from remote hosts. The attack leverages the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session but does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The noverojs npm package versions 1.0.1 and 1.0.4 contain malicious code that silently subscribes a victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is achieved by injecting a covert subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer, which issues an authenticated FOLLOW query using the installer's own WhatsApp session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
The noxxleys npm package, part of a large family of Baileys WhatsApp Web library forks, contains malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is done by injecting a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer, which issues an authenticated FOLLOW query using the installer's own WhatsApp session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched to evade detection. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The spencer-baileys npm package version 1.0.4 is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the user's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. This is done by injecting code that issues an authenticated FOLLOW query using the victim's own WhatsApp session. The target channel identifiers are obfuscated or fetched remotely to evade detection. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary code.
The npm package syncxbails (versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1) is part of a family of malicious forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. These forks inject code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels using the victim's authenticated session. The target channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets post-installation. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.