A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 135cefead339d5e0813e38049da8666efefef7c7b64c6ed22f5fec62b676ced1 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on August 8, 2026. The file was detected twice during attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany. This hash can be used as an indicator of compromise to detect the presence of this malicious file in environments and security tools.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ca2af697388746b2381dc7c4e857ffcec86223ea4618de4583437380050d7770 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-08-08. The file was involved in attacker activity using the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany (DE). This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this malicious payload in environments by matching the hash against files in endpoint detection and response (EDR), antivirus (AV), and threat intelligence feeds.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 41973e5dc419ef5d31ba3c0b984ae22d80dddd15d3bf65696e7e0c919134430f was observed twice in attacker activity on August 8, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany. This file hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) for detection and response efforts.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (80727943437a7e22116b369c010fc965c4854a0c58a053504c4bc55555e90dd4)
On import, dist/index.mjs chmods 0755 and spawns the bundled Linux x86_64 binary dist/internal/calc-math.dat as a detached background process. The binary is a RedShell-style remote-access implant: it beacons to hardcoded C2 217.60.77.63, executes /bin/sh commands, drops and runs additional ELFs and shellcode fetched from the C2, offers SOCKS5 proxying and TCP port forwarding, installs systemd --user persistence (svc-update.service), and exfiltrates files via POST /api/extract-receive. Implant commands /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /env, and /dataextract harvest installer-side secrets (SSH private keys, stored credentials, clipboard, environment) and upload them to the same C2 through a chunked BIGEXTRACT upload routine. Package name, README, and inline comments describe the ELF as a 'native math accelerator' for calendar/streak math, but the pure-JS daymath.mjs never invokes the binary; the shipped SHA-256 'integrity check' (4537b118...3466) pins this specific implant, so it functions as anti-tamper for the payload rather than a security control.
## Source: ghsa-malware (14340c09001c59fa53d0926ed49265d43efcb6115df75c49ac24c1358efa007b)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash f2e2ffc024ab99eb49fa207756481aa80713398142f30888aebace5706909b36 was observed 182 times in attacker activity between August 7 and August 29, 2026. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure in multiple countries including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Indonesia, India, Italy, and Jordan. The hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. This indicator should be matched against files in environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. No known exploits in the wild or vendor patches are applicable.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 848f1546a84dd92cce3c1463e3e964698533d93d6ea7be00e000db5efbb1d2f4 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors eight times between August 6 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Chile (CL) and China (CN). There is no known exploit in the wild or vendor patch information available. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environment and threat intelligence feeds.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash f2291321df3b93aed41359a2f5f3fa22bf4a16da1a13343cc3daca9657fbac6c was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on August 6, 2026. This file was detected six times during attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Ethiopia, India, and Turkey. There is no known exploit in the wild or vendor patch information associated with this indicator. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environment and security feeds.
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 could allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a cryptographic weakness in the custom component validation mechanism. When the optional hardening mode that restricts execution to trusted component templates is enabled, the application validates component code using a truncated SHA‑256 hash. Because the hash comparison relies on only a portion of the digest, an attacker can craft malicious component code that collides with a trusted template hash and bypasses validation. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to introduce and execute unauthorized Python code within the Langflow process, defeating the intended security control and potentially leading to full compromise of the affected instance.
The npm package dolyame-ui-badge version 35.4.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts. The binary is saved under disguised names in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and run detached from the main process. The package falsely claims to verify the payload via SHA-256 and offers opt-out flags, but no such verification exists. This behavior is unexpected for a UI badge component and indicates malicious intent.
The npm package 'claims-policy-details-api-adapters' version 35.3.1 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated and suspicious hosts. This binary is saved to temporary directories under covert filenames, made executable, and executed detached from the main process. The package uses a DNS-TXT record-based covert channel to retrieve the binary in chunks, bypassing typical URL and domain egress controls. No integrity verification of the downloaded binary is performed despite comments referencing SHA-256, increasing the risk of executing untrusted code.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (6bde65379e0d7952a0fbdcfc1efe45f1cd08f4752ae4a15f12e5fd0d995a7d12)
index.js unconditionally requires./_polyfill.js on load. _polyfill.js constructs C2 hostnames at runtime via Array.join to evade static inspection (assembling `oob-worker.cf10[0-3]-*.workers.dev` mirrors plus a DNS-TXT fallback under `*.dl.well1.site`), fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under cover-story filenames (`dotnet_diag_*.exe`, `.cache_*`, `.analytics_state`), sets mode 0755, and spawns it detached via `cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true})` (or the cmd equivalent on Windows). Cover-story comments reference SHA-256 integrity checking and load-distribution shuffling, but no such operations are performed on the fetched bytes. lib/telemetry.js ships duplicate dropper primitives (`Buffer.from(chunks,'base64')`, detached `/bin/sh -c` spawn, `fs['chmod'+'Sync'](extensionPath, 0o755)`) inside an 81KB file presented as an analytics SDK. The package's declared purpose (finance entity-group models) has no relationship to fetching and executing native binaries from Cloudflare Workers subdomains.
## Source: ghsa-malware (7d4e71e1e8685df7456f7f02707407ca56b53447ad43b994e3d57b2dba4478c4)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (91b37a5aa06b2d75f250bd23ce01f2667646c1aa7609ec2323f226842e043e9d)
streak-calc-metrics@1.0.0 is presented as a native math accelerator for streak calculations but ships a bundled Linux ELF at dist/calc.bin that the main module unconditionally chmods and spawns detached at import time (cp.spawn(binaryPath, [], { stdio: 'pipe', shell: false, detached: true })). The ELF self-identifies as 'REDSHELL' and beacons to hardcoded C2 IP 217.60.77.63 with the protocol tag SECURE_BEACON|...|REDSHELL, providing a full remote shell over /bin/sh and /bin/bash. The implant downloads and executes arbitrary ELF binaries and shellcode over plain HTTP with TLS verification disabled from http://217.60.77.63/Others/<name> and http://217.60.77.63/SC/<name>, staging into /tmp/.elf_* or via memfd_create (syscall 319) and chmod +x before execution, with no hash or signature check. It exposes command handlers /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /env, and /dataextract <path> that harvest the installer's SSH keys, credential files, environment variables, and arbitrary filesystem paths, then exfiltrates them in chunks via POST /api/extract-receive using markers such as BIGEXTRACT_START and Destination: Loot_%s_%s_%s. Persistence is established by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it with systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now svc-update.service. The implant additionally exposes a remote-controlled SOCKS5 proxy (/socks start <port>) and arbitrary TCP port forwarding (/portfwd start <lport> <rhost> <rport>), turning the installer's host into a pivot into internal networks. The JS wrapper contains a cover story ('Native accelerator loaded and verified', 'Performance mode enabled') and an inverted SHA-256 integrity check against 4537b1189ce419f1a595cf47216c03f80e9170ce80dad8d9227a1e52f9cb3466 that never blocks execution.
## Source: ghsa-malware (96488efc57092e2b1f373623a88bf26607c9ece7ed95270327febc6b536d0d01)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash e4e6d77040f6a91d42292fe7b8fbf9e6ca5722c940097e21a345d03b522af43d was observed 95 times in attacker activity between August 4 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure in multiple countries. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security feeds to detect potential compromise.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ee86d4b3017ccb464b3d27332ceed33de1a9e3836e2cf55adced642d210bef7f was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-08-04. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Israel. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to check this hash against their environments and security tools. No known exploits or threat actors are currently linked to this indicator.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 4af5a5c98ad132095c6fbe7b02c242153a190a01cc321e50a916a0ca46fbaa62 was observed 618 times in attacker activity between August 4 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise.
CVE-2026-12259 is a medium severity vulnerability in nltk version 3.9.4 where the downloader component may write and extract package data before verifying integrity checks such as SHA-256 or MD5. This flaw allows an attacker who can manipulate the package source (e.g., via a compromised mirror or malicious proxy) to substitute malicious package content. As a result, downstream users or applications may trust and use attacker-controlled corpus or model data.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash cac00f4de01f0b46d9646e425ae88152df96d7393c98099f2a373e86dbd56176 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors 79 times between July 31, 2026, and August 5, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in multiple countries, but no specific targeted countries are confirmed. There is no known exploit in the wild or vendor patch information related to this file hash. This is an indicator of compromise (IOC) to be matched against files in environments and security tools.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 92a919c18841e8ff2a2e1165a3d446f06fba4e866f7e6d8fd6dd4933e43985f8 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-07-31. The file was detected three times during attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in the United States. This indicator can be used to match against files in environments and security tools to detect potential compromise.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ab8d6adf1976431e290cc6d5991f0e23dfc450ee89463b0bcf8191601c0cc0c4 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 30 and August 1, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security telemetry to detect potential compromise.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 8f312413d911af37f7636c63f33fb48b5f6d15c68a04a3db42a3189e24690d3f was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors four times between July 30 and August 1, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany and Great Britain. This indicator can be used to detect or block the malicious file in environments and security tools.