The Janssen Project is an open-source identity and access management (IAM) platform. In versions 1.9.0 and below, Janssen stores passwords in plaintext in the local cli_cmd.log file. This is fixed in the nightly prerelease.
Hi all,
I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity.
In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring.
First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue.
"Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC.
Gather all the information:
time generated (time of the sign in)
app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph)
username/email
IP address
device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage)
locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server)
user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well)
Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel)
Signinlogs
| Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent
| where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only)
\^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before.
Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in).
NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign.
Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious.
From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs.
From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common.
After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did.
Will have to look for:
\- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs.
\- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well.
\- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events)
Conjur provides secrets management and application identity for infrastructure. Conjur OSS versions 1.19.5 through 1.22.0 and Secrets Manager, Self-Hosted (formerly known as Conjur Enterprise) 13.1 through 13.5 and 13.6 are vulnerable to bypass of the IAM authenticator. An attacker who can manipulate the headers signed by AWS can take advantage of a malformed regular expression to redirect the authentication validation request that Secrets Manager, Self-Hosted sends to AWS to a malicious server controlled by the attacker. This redirection could result in a bypass of the Secrets Manager, Self-Hosted IAM Authenticator, granting the attacker the permissions granted to the client whose request was manipulated. This issue affects both Secrets Manager, Self-Hosted (formerly Conjur Enterprise) and Conjur OSS. Conjur OSS version 1.22.1 and Secrets Manager, Self-Hosted versions 13.5.1 and 13.6.1 fix the issue.
Timing difference in password reset in Ergon Informatik AG's Airlock IAM 7.7.9, 8.0.8, 8.1.7, 8.2.4 and 8.3.1 allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate usernames.
An information disclosure vulnerability exists in OneLogin AD Connector versions prior to 6.1.5 via the /api/adc/v4/configuration endpoint. An attacker with access to a valid directory_token—which may be retrievable from host registry keys or improperly secured logs—can retrieve a plaintext response disclosing sensitive credentials. These may include an API key, AWS IAM access and secret keys, and a base64-encoded JWT signing key used in the tenant’s SSO IdP configuration.
The Janssen Project is an open-source identity and access management (IAM) platform. Prior to version 1.8.0, the Config API returns results without scope verification. This has a large internal surface attack area that exposes all sorts of information from the IDP including clients, users, scripts ..etc. This issue has been patched in version 1.8.0. A workaround for this vulnerability involves users forking and building the config api, patching it in their system following commit 92eea4d.
A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products due to a business logic flaw in SOAP admin services. A malicious actor can create a new user with elevated permissions only when all of the following conditions are met:
* SOAP admin services are accessible to the attacker.
* The deployment includes an internally used attribute that is not part of the default WSO2 product configuration.
* At least one custom role exists with non-default permissions.
* The attacker has knowledge of the custom role and the internal attribute used in the deployment.
Exploiting this vulnerability allows malicious actors to assign higher privileges to self-registered users, bypassing intended access control mechanisms.
Improper request input validation in Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) for AWS IAM Identity Center allows a user to modify a valid request and spoof an approval in TEAM.
Upgrade TEAM to the latest release v.1.2.2. Follow instructions in updating TEAM documentation for updating process
The AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) is an open-source software development framework to define cloud infrastructure in code and provision it through AWS CloudFormation. Users who use IAM OIDC custom resource provider package will download CA Thumbprints as part of the custom resource workflow. However, the current `tls.connect` method will always set `rejectUnauthorized: false` which is a potential security concern. CDK should follow the best practice and set `rejectUnauthorized: true`. However, this could be a breaking change for existing CDK applications and we should fix this with a feature flag. Note that this is marked as low severity Security advisory because the issuer url is provided by CDK users who define the CDK application. If they insist on connecting to a unauthorized OIDC provider, CDK should not disallow this. Additionally, the code block is run in a Lambda environment which mitigate the MITM attack. The patch is in progress. To mitigate, upgrade to CDK v2.177.0 (Expected release date 2025-02-22). Once upgraded, users should make sure the feature flag '@aws-cdk/aws-iam:oidcRejectUnauthorizedConnections' is set to true in `cdk.context.json` or `cdk.json`. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
The NetAdmin IAM system (version 4.0.30319) has a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the /BalloonSave.ashx endpoint, where it is possible to inject a malicious payload into the Content= field.
In the Console in Soffid IAM before 3.5.39, necessary checks were not applied to some Java objects. A malicious agent could possibly execute arbitrary code in the Sync Server and compromise security.