ADPathFinder is an Active Directory attack path mapping and password auditing tool that integrates data from BloodHound collectors including SharpHound, MSSQLHound, and ConfigManBearPig. It automates the identification of privilege escalation paths across AD, ADCS, MSSQL, and SCCM by querying combined graph data, grouping related paths, and producing detailed reports. The tool also enhances password audits by contextualizing cracked passwords with BloodHound graph data, highlighting risks based on account privileges and group memberships. ADPathFinder is intended for use in internal penetration testing engagements to efficiently identify complex attack paths and password weaknesses.
A Russian-speaking threat actor known as 'bandcampro' leveraged Google Gemini CLI to migrate and operate a command-and-control botnet in six minutes, with the AI handling 89% of all work including architecture, coding, deployment, and debugging. Analysis of 200 Gemini CLI session logs from March-April 2026 revealed the actor controlled eight computers in a dental clinic, accessing OpenDental databases. The actor communicated intentions in plain Russian while AI executed technical operations. The entire C&C infrastructure fits in three plain-text files totaling 5KB, making it highly portable and disposable. Beyond botnet operations, the actor used AI for password cracking, WordPress compromise, and planning cryptocurrency fraud targeting elderly victims in the US and Canada. The AI proactively suggested improvements 59 times unprompted, demonstrating how AI lowers barriers for threat actors by replacing technical skill requirements with simple natural-language instructions.
Kratos is a mature Phishing-as-a-Service operation targeting Microsoft 365 users across the United States, Europe, and other regions. The platform enables attackers to steal credentials through trusted platforms, anti-bot verification, and convincing login pages. Researchers traced three generations of the kit and uncovered 1,484 previously unattributed detonations. The operation targets organizations across more than 20 countries with particularly strong concentration in the US, Spain, and Southern Europe. Kratos includes an operator panel allowing deployment of phishing domains, configurable Telegram or email delivery, geographic restrictions, and multiple anti-bot systems. The kit has evolved through three page generations (V0, V1, V2) with different exfiltration code. Activity has been visible since January 2026, with the operator panel active since September 2025.
A sophisticated multi-layered scam operation targets fans seeking tickets for Celine Dion's French tour through two primary vectors. Fraudsters embed themselves in Facebook Groups and Marketplace, using social engineering to create artificial urgency and selling tickets before official presale dates. They exploit Ticketmaster's legitimate transfer feature to resell identical digital tickets to multiple victims, accepting direct bank transfers from compromised accounts. Simultaneously, threat actors deploy fraudulent websites impersonating official distributors like AXS and Ticketmaster, exploiting Shopify's payment infrastructure to appear legitimate. These sites share common technical indicators suggesting use of a recycled phishing kit previously deployed for other major concert events, including Oasis and Taylor Swift tours. The scheme combines emotional manipulation with technical deception to defraud victims desperate for concert access.
A sophisticated campaign deployed 148 malicious npm packages disguised as student web proxy applications under brands like Riverbend Tutoring and Northstar Tutoring. Published by accounts terminal3airport and eerikakirk, these packages weaponized visitor browsers into distributed denial-of-service botnets while generating advertising revenue. The applications functioned as working proxies but secretly executed mutable remote code and high-performance WebSocket traffic generators compatible with the Wisp protocol. During a critical two-week period in May 2026, active deployments launched HTTP floods generating 2GB/s aggregate traffic and control-plane attacks establishing 10,240 socket connections per second against target servers. The campaign abused npm as a content delivery network, affecting users who visited proxy instances rather than through traditional dependency infection.
Tomorrowland Belgium 2026, spanning two weekends in July at De Schorre in Boom, sold out rapidly, creating opportunities for cybercriminals. Investigation uncovered approximately a dozen fraudulent websites impersonating the festival brand to target ticket seekers and travellers. These scams include fake ticket shops mimicking official sales with countdown timers and fraudulent biometric checks, travel sites offering bogus accommodation and transport packages, and affiliate schemes. The operations harvest complete identity data, payment credentials, and personal information through sophisticated social engineering. Victims lose money with no recourse, face identity theft risks, and ultimately receive invalid or non-existent tickets. The scammers exploit high demand, tight supply, and rushed purchasing decisions, with sites registered weeks in advance and pushed hardest when official tickets are sold out.
For years, the cyber security industry tracked AI as a force multiplier: something that made existing attack techniques faster, cheaper, and more accessible. That framing was accurate. But the Annual AI Security Report 2026 from Check Point Research documents a transition that goes further. AI has crossed from assistant to operator. Where it once helped attackers prepare, it now runs the operation. Key observed findings AI has crossed from development aid to live attack operator. It now does the hands-on work inside live intrusions, from China-nexus espionage campaigns to a criminal breach of multiple Mexican government agencies and has spread from nation states to ordinary cyber criminals. AI now builds deployment-ready malware and attack suites. Its involvement is often invisible in the finished artifact: one developer used an AI environment to produce VoidLink, an 88,000-line command-and-control offensive framework, in under a week. Attackers prefer commercial models, and now abuse them by exploiting the agentic architecture, not just single prompts. Most actors favor jailbroken mainstream models over self-hosted ones, and the durable bypass is now a planted configuration file an agent loads and trusts across sessions. An AI-enabled criminal tooling market has matured. Phishing-as-a-service kits now embed a language model with the jailbreak built in, and conversational AI voice-agent services run vishing and one-time-passcode theft at scale. Virtual Identity is no longer a reliable trust anchor. Voice, face, documents, and live video are now cheap to forge convincingly and are widely used in attacks taking multi-channel social engineering to a new level of integration. AI itself is an expanding attack surface. Models cannot always separate data from instructions and content they process might influence the model’s behavior; the surrounding stack adds ordinary software vulnerabilities and supply-chain risk, all in a rapidly evolving ecosystem where security practices not always mature. Indirect prompt injection is on the rise. Detections of longer malicious payloads increased sharply, rising roughly fivefold between March and May 2026 and approaching 1% of observed prompts in May. Longer payloads are more typical of content-borne and agentic attack paths, this pattern suggests that indirect prompt injection is becoming more operationally relevant. Enterprise data leakage through GenAI is persistent and growing risk . High-risk prompts doubled from 2% to 4% during the last year, while organizations used an average of 10 AI applications each month, many without official approval. Data exposure risks are not evenly distributed across the verticals . Sector-level analysis reveals that AI-related data exposure risks are not evenly distributed across the verticals, and correlate both with AI usage patterns and security maturity. Business Services recorded the highest rate of high-risk GenAI prompts at 5.91%, meaning nearly one in every 17 AI interactions carried a significant risk of sensitive data exposure. To read the full findings, access the AI Security Report 2026 from Check Point Research here. The post AI Security Report 2026 appeared first on Check Point Research .
The move targeted people and entities accused of links to an online spying network that the EU claims targeted governments and carried out sabotage operations against critical infrastructure. The post EU Targets Russian Intelligence Officers Accused of Running a Yearslong Cyber Spying Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Multiple threat campaigns are abusing dormant 'ghost' GitHub accounts to perform mass reconnaissance on GitHub organizations by enumerating public repositories, members, and related metadata via the GitHub API. These campaigns have been active since at least October 2025, using automated scanners and leaked credentials to collect information. While most activity targets publicly available data, some cases involved exfiltration of private repository data using exposed tokens. The activity blends with normal API traffic, complicating detection. Defenders are advised to monitor for anomalous user agent behavior and enable GitHub audit log streaming to detect unauthorized access.
Artlist.io has reportedly been compromised by a ClickFix attack, where users visiting the site encounter a fake CAPTCHA that instructs them to perform keypresses which may execute malicious commands on Windows systems. This issue appears on all blog posts of the site. The report originates from a Reddit cybersecurity post with minimal discussion and no confirmed exploits in the wild. No official vendor advisory or patch information is available.
A malicious release of the jscrambler npm package (version 8.14.0) was published on July 11, 2026, introducing hidden native binaries that execute automatically during installation. The compromised package added an undocumented preinstall hook executing dist/setup.js, which deploys platform-specific binaries for Linux, macOS, and Windows embedded in an obfuscated CSI container. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets, AI coding assistants, cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure), browser data, and messaging applications. String obfuscation uses per-string ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption. The threat actor published five malicious versions (8.14.0, 8.16.0, 8.17.0, 8.18.0, 8.20.0) over three hours, evolving delivery methods to evade detection. Version 8.22.0 is confirmed clean. The package receives approximately 15,800 weekly downloads, affecting developer workstations, CI systems, and build pipelines with access to credentials and secrets.
Multiple campaigns are using ghost accounts to map GitHub organizations, including their repositories and members. The post Ghost Accounts Abuse GitHub API in Mass Recon Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) has issued an alert about a global exploitation campaign targeting multiple vulnerable content management systems (CMS) and their plugins. The campaign involves deploying webshells on compromised websites, enabling persistent unauthorized access. Several WordPress plugins and CMS platforms including Craft CMS, MaxSite CMS, MetInfo CMS, and Joomla JCE are affected. The campaign has impacted many small- to medium-sized Australian businesses. The ACSC warns that AI may be used to accelerate and scale these attacks. Recommended mitigations include applying the latest security updates, removing unused components, enabling automatic updates, and restricting access to sensitive directories.
A sophisticated phishing campaign impersonates DocuSign's branding to compromise victims through malicious JavaScript embedded in fraudulent webpages. The attack leverages social engineering to trick users into downloading MSI installers disguised as legitimate DocuSign updates or documents. These payloads establish remote access through legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management tools from Atera Network Ltd and ConnectWise/ScreenConnect. Investigation revealed extensive attacker infrastructure spanning hundreds of domains, with tracking mechanisms via Telegram bots collecting detailed victim telemetry including IP addresses, geolocation, ISP information, and user-agent strings. The campaign targets both Windows and macOS systems, utilizing deployment kits across multiple infrastructures with similar URL patterns and JavaScript mechanisms.
Since April 2026, threat actors operating under O-UNC-066 have deployed a sophisticated vishing campaign targeting Microsoft 365 passkey enrollment. Attackers register domains containing 'passkey' and call victims to convince them to register new passkeys. Victims are directed to operator-controlled phishing kits that mimic Microsoft's enrollment process while attackers simultaneously register their own passkeys in victim accounts. The kit uses real-time polling and adapts to various MFA requirements including TOTP, push notifications, and SMS OTP. Targeted organizations span food and beverage, technology, healthcare, automotive, construction, and aviation industries. The campaign leverages Microsoft's legitimate passkey registration campaigns as a pretext, with primary motivation being data extortion through the Pink data leak site. Infrastructure is hosted on DDoS-Guard and IQWeb FZ-LLC.
A compromised version of the Injective Labs TypeScript SDK npm package was published containing malicious code that exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet private keys and mnemonic phrases. The malicious version 1.20.21 was published on June 8, 2026, through a compromised developer account with established repository access. The malware hooks key generation functions to capture sensitive wallet data and exfiltrates it via base64-encoded POST requests to legitimate Injective infrastructure endpoints, disguising the traffic. The threat actor amplified impact by publishing 17 additional scoped packages pinned to the malicious version. Though quickly detected and contained within hours, the compromised package received approximately 310 downloads. The package has roughly 50,000 weekly downloads and 87 dependent packages, presenting significant supply chain risk to cryptocurrency wallet implementations.
A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeting Russian aerospace and aviation organizations has been identified, likely attributed to the Rare Werewolf threat group. The attack begins with fraudulent emails impersonating a legitimate Russian aerospace research institute, delivering password-protected archives containing malicious installers. The campaign employs living-off-the-land techniques, abusing legitimate tools including AnyDesk, Blat, WinRAR, and Tray Minimizer to establish persistent remote access. The attack chain deploys portable AnyDesk with unattended access configured using a predefined password, exfiltrates configuration data via SMTP to attacker-controlled infrastructure, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. The operators conceal their activities by minimizing the AnyDesk interface and removing forensic artifacts. This methodology aligns with previously documented Rare Werewolf campaigns targeting strategically important sectors across Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, par...
Socket's AI scanner identified 17 malicious packages across npm and PyPI ecosystems published simultaneously on July 7, 2026. The packages typosquatted legitimate PaySafe, Skrill, and Neteller payment SDK names to steal developer credentials and tokens. The malware implements sophisticated anti-analysis techniques including sandbox detection based on CPU cores and hostname patterns, multi-layer C2 domain obfuscation using XOR encoding, and selective activation gating. Upon execution, the packages exfiltrate environment variables containing API keys, secrets, tokens, and authentication credentials to AWS-hosted infrastructure via an ngrok endpoint. The campaign demonstrates coordinated cross-ecosystem capabilities, proper operational security through varied obfuscation keys, and knowledge of defender technologies, suggesting an organized threat actor with financial motivation.
An unknown threat actor exploited Meta's Business Account Manager service to send phishing emails from legitimate Meta addresses between November 2025 and June 2026. The attackers manipulated the business partner mechanism by embedding URLs in the business name field, causing emails to appear as legitimate Meta communications. The campaign evolved to incorporate Facebook Messenger chatbots and exfiltrated stolen credentials, MFA codes, phone numbers, and identity documents to a private Telegram channel. The phishing pages impersonated Meta's Agency Partner Program and Verified badge services, targeting businesses to capture account credentials. Meta responded by implementing detections and blocking accounts attempting to use URLs in business names. Vietnamese language elements in the exfiltration process suggest the attackers' possible origin.
